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Abstract
Lean strategy has become widely recognised since it was first popularised by the
Japanese automobile manufacturer Toyota. However, despite its promised benefits and
widespread proliferation, Lean strategy has not been extensively adopted in process
industries (e.g., steel-making). This study examines an unsuccessful attempt to
implement Lean strategy in a large Australian steel-manufacturing organisation, and
pays particular attention to factors influencing scheduling decisions. This attention to
scheduling decisions is both unique to the literature and crucial to a deeper
understanding of Lean strategy enactment.
Multiple facets are involved in the complex implementation of Lean strategy, and
thus this study draws on multiple academic sources. Operations-management and
behavioural decision-making literatures are reviewed, to identify aspects relevant to this
complex initiative. Common to both literatures is the importance of schedulers, who
daily make operational decisions that directly affect strategy execution. This study
develops a framework for factors influencing schedulers’ decisions that affect the
enactment of Lean strategy, based on a categorisation of factors: individual, task, and
context-related.
Scheduling decisions often strongly depend on their context, and are sensitive to
many interrelated factors. To identify these factors and provide an in-depth
understanding of their influence on the enactment of Lean strategy, this study examines
scheduling decisions within their natural setting, using an exploratory and descriptive
approach. It employs a longitudinal and retrospective case study of a single company to
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examine these issues with greater depth than possible when examining multiple
companies.
Specifically, this study draws on two sets of data collection, which cover two
different perspectives on scheduling. The first set retrospectively examines the
implementation of Lean strategy in a steel-manufacturing business unit. This includes
interviews with eight of the individuals involved in the implementation, as well as
archival documents. To overcome the limitations of a retrospective study, this study
examines current scheduling practices and factors that influence their alignment with
Lean strategy. This examination is conducted through a second set of interviews, which
examines current influences on scheduling practices, by interviewing eight key
scheduling-team members from two different business units. In addition, documents
relevant to current scheduling practices were also examined. A thematic analysis of the
two sets reveals factors from three different categories (individual, task, and contextual)
that support or impede Lean scheduling practices.
Findings show schedulers are critical to the sustainable enactment of Lean
strategy. Schedulers were found to influence the enactment of Lean strategy in two
ways: (1) They facilitate cross-functional collaboration, which is necessary for Lean
strategy, and (2) They have the discretion to balance and trade-off production and sales
requirements. The level of alignment between this trade-off and Lean principles can
sustain, or inhibit, the enactment of Lean strategy.
When examining individual factors that influence schedulers’ decisions, the
findings highlight the role of schedulers’ interpersonal skills and intuitive decisionmaking. Interpersonal skills enable schedulers to enact a strategy that they find
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beneficial for the business. Intuitive decision-making is influenced by two main factors
that impede the enactment of Lean strategy: (1) schedulers’ attitude towards Lean
practices, and (2) emotions the schedulers expect as a result of following traditional
practices versus Lean practices.
While schedulers are directly responsible for making decisions that align with
Lean strategy, this study identifies several contextual and task-related factors that can
also impede or support this alignment. These factors include assumptions shared
amongst organisational members concerning the source of business success, the way to
successfully address customer demand, the role of kanbans, the way to achieve high
utilisation, and the length of lead times. The study extends existing literature on Lean
strategy, by identifying factors that have the power to impede its adoption in the steel
industry, and emphasises the important role schedulers play in sustaining alignment.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The effectiveness of a company’s strategy is critical to its ultimate success or
failure (Thompson, Strickland & Gamble 2008). Aligning daily operations with the
strategy can determine whether it is successfully and effectively enacted (Voss, C. A.,
Åhlström & Blackmon 1997). Therefore, business success relies not just on the selection
of a strategy but also on its execution to ensure customer satisfaction and optimal
performance. Strategy execution and sustainability often depends critically on the staff
involved in daily decisions and operations (Bird & Beechler 1995; Harris & Ogbonna
2001).
Among businesses which employ production and manufacturing supply chains,
Lean strategy is widely recognised as important to business success and competitive
advantage (Pfeffer 1994; MacDuffie 1995; Lewis 2000; Shah, R. & Ward 2003). Even
critics admit that Lean strategy sets the standards for production and manufacturing
strategies in the 21st century (Shah, R. & Ward 2007). Lean strategy has been the
symbol of efficiency and optimal performance since the 1980’s, mainly due to its
association with the automotive industry (particularly Toyota). It has been shown to
outperform the traditional production model of large batches and high inventories (Boyer
et al. 1997; Nakamura et al. 1998). Lean strategy has successfully enabled businesses
around the world to address customer demand, while maintaining high production
volume (Ohno 1988; Sohal & Egglestone 1994; Sriparavastu & Gupta 1997; White,
Pearson & Wilson 1999). This strategy provides tangible benefits and performance
improvements such as lower inventory levels, improved throughput times, and shortened
customer-response times (White, Pearson & Wilson 1999; Fullerton & McWatters 2001).

Paradoxically, Lean strategy enables these improvements while permitting (or in fact,
requiring) lower inventory, contrary to traditional practices. However, not all industries
have taken up this strategy to the same degree (Dennis & Meredith 2000). Discrete
industries, the original setting in which Lean strategy was developed (Holweg 2007),
have been more successful than process industries at reducing waste and inventory levels
(Schonberger 1982; Dennis & Meredith 2000; Abdullah & Rajgopal 2003). These
industries routinely handle discrete parts both as input and as finished product. In
contrast, process industries add value by modifying the physical or chemical properties
of materials. These industries lag behind discrete industries in the uptake of Lean
strategy (Dennis & Meredith 2000; Abdullah & Rajgopal 2003; Belvedere & Grando
2005).
The difference in uptake between the two industry sectors suggests that process
industries are innately unsuitable for the successful adoption of Lean strategy, but this is
not the case. The steel industry is an example of a process industry that is a potential
candidate for the adoption of Lean strategy. This industry is characterised by high
volume and relatively predictable demand, two traits that can make it a good candidate
for the benefits of Lean strategy (Christopher 2000; Christopher & Towill 2002).
Indeed, several reports of successful adoptions and executions of Lean strategy in the
steel industry exist, (Dhandapani, Potter & Naim 2004; Harrison 2005; Abdulmalek &
Rajgopal 2007; Storck & Lindberg 2007), suggesting that the steel industry can adopt at
least some of its aspects. These reports, however, do not explain why Lean strategy is
not accepted more widely in process industries, such as the steel-making, chemical,
paper, and oil industries.
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Examining a case where Lean strategy was rejected in a process industry can
shed light on the factors that may impede its wider adoption amongst similar industries.
Failed projects are a potential source of valuable lessons that can provide insight for
future change attempts (Sauer 1999; Cannon & Edmondson 2005; Bartis & Mitev 2008).
An examination of failed change projects reveals obstacles and hindrances that could not
have been predicted (Williams et al. 2005). The obstacles often stem from
organisational complexities and contextual interrelationships, and are thus contingent on
variables specific to the organisational and industrial context.
This study reports a case of an implementation of Lean strategy in a steelmanufacturing organisation, which, despite initial benefits, was not sustained. Studying
the eventual rejection of Lean strategy in this organisation provides a unique opportunity
to identify factors that can be responsible for the low uptake of Lean strategy in process
industries. This research, therefore, takes an inductive approach in order to answer the
question (summarised in Table 1.2): What impedes the enactment of Lean strategy in
process industries, such as steel manufacturing?

1.1 Key principles of Lean strategy
Lean strategy is driven by three main principles that affect daily production
operations: (1) value, (2) paced production, and (3) continuous improvement. A brief
definition of each principle and its impact on daily operational decisions is presented
next, and summarised in Table 1.1 below.
(1) Value –Lean strategy takes a customer-centric view of value creation, and
determines the value of the final product based on what the customer is willing to pay for
it (Ohno 1988). This is in contrast to traditional production and operational strategy,
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which takes a cost-centric view and determines product value and price based on
production costs (Aitken et al. 2005). These different perspectives also mean different
priorities. Traditional strategy prioritises economies of scale to reduce costs-per-unit,
and thus prefers large batches. Lean strategy, in contrast, does not seek scale economies.
Rather, it emphasises quick delivery, which is seen as an important source of value;
Lean strategy prioritises small batches that reduce overall production lead time (Womack
& Jones 2003).
(2) Paced production – Lean strategy aims to optimise production over the
entire business (Ohno 1988; Rother & Shook 2003; Womack & Jones 2003). This is in
contrast to traditional production strategy, where each production unit seeks to optimise
its own operations (Schonberger 2007; Taylor & Taylor 2008). The difference in the
scope for optimisation leads to a different view of product flow. Lean strategy aims for a
continuous flow of product (Huang & Kusiak 1996; Sewell & Wilkinson 2001). To
achieve this continuous flow, Lean strategy requires that production is controlled and
paced along the entire supply chain, by scheduling small and standardised batches
(Rother & Shook 2003; Hopp & Spearman 2004). This preference for small batches and
paced production is contrary to the traditional focus on local optimisation of the
performance of each unit, which inevitably leads to production in large batches (SimchiLevi, Kaminsky & Simchi-Levi 2003).
To control and pace production, Lean strategy typically uses a mechanism called
“kanban” (Ohno 1988). Kanbans indicate the level of intermediate product between two
production units (Huang & Kusiak 1996). When these levels reach a permitted
maximum, the kanban is considered “full” and indicates that the supplying unit should
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stop production. Adherence to kanbans is central to the enactment of Lean strategy
(Hopp & Spearman 2004), whereas in the traditional strategy, kanbans can be an
impediment to the localised performance of individual units.
(3) Continuous improvement – Lean strategy places a strong emphasis on
striving for perfection, and views production operations as an inseparable part of this
pursuit (Ohno 1988). Lean strategy requires that processes are constantly re-examined in
search of imperfections, and relies on low inventory levels to expose these imperfections
(Womack & Jones 2003). This is as opposed to the traditional strategy, which
episodically addresses problems and improvements, but does not necessarily seek a
fundamental solution. The traditional strategy is happy to rely on inventory levels to
buffer potential problems.
Lean strategy identifies imperfections through evidence of excess raw material,
overproduction (i.e., producing more than ordered), unnecessary transportation, lengthy
setups, overselling (i.e., selling more than can be produced), defects, unwarranted labour,
complex solutions, unproductive use of energy, ineffective space and layout, or
unnecessary motion (Ohno 1988; Monden 1994; Womack & Jones 2003; Taylor &
Taylor 2008). To expose such sources of imperfection, Lean strategy relies on low
levels of intermediate product inventory, also termed “work-in-process” (WIP). This is
in contrast to the traditional strategy, which often results in high levels of WIP.
Table 1.1 summarises the differences between principles of Lean and traditional
strategy, along with their practical implications.
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Table 1.1: Principles of Lean and traditional strategies

Principle

Lean Strategy

Traditional Strategy

Value

Customer-centric

Cost-centric

Practical emphasis

Quick delivery

Scale economies

Optimisation

Overall

Localised

Practical emphasis

§

Small batches

§

Large batches

§

Paced production
(kanbans)

§

Localised
optimisations

Overcoming problems

Continuous improvement

Episodic improvement

Practical emphasis

Low WIP exposes problems

High WIP buffers problems

The requirement to strictly maintain low WIP levels throughout the supply chain
of a business is central to sustaining Lean strategy (Hopp & Spearman 2004). Reduced
supports the achievement of Lean principles: low WIP levels enforce paced production,
expose imperfections for improvement, and force value generation in ways that do not
rely on scale economies.
WIP levels, like other inventory levels, are not controlled directly (Sterman
1989), but result from indirect daily operational decisions regarding batch sizes, number
of changeovers, and aspired inventory levels. These decisions are routinely addressed
by schedulers (MacCarthy & Wilson 2001), often operating in teams that include
planners and controllers (McKay & Wiers 2003). Consequently, the role and impact of
schedulers on the enactment of Lean strategy warrants discussion.

1.2 The impact of schedulers’ decisions on Lean strategy
Schedulers are responsible for bridging and synchronising production
capabilities and customer demand (McKay & Wiers 1999; Jackson, Wilson &
MacCarthy 2004). They regularly balance and trade-off conflicting requirements of
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timely delivery and capacity utilisation (Cegarra 2008). When schedulers prioritise
these requirements in alignment with Lean strategy, the strategy is successfully
executed (van der Krogt et al.). Therefore, the enactment of Lean strategy depends on
the way schedulers prioritise and trade-off conflicting requirements (Baker & Scudder
1990).
Previous studies of schedulers identify their importance to operational activities
and business financial performance (Fransoo & Rutten 1994; Jackson, Wilson &
MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun 2007; Berglund & Guinery 2008). Schedulers
have been described as influencers and negotiators, problem anticipators and solvers,
and information nodes (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun
2007). However, the critical role that schedulers play in the adoption of Lean strategy
has not previously been highlighted. Schedulers were predominantly studied in stable
operational environments, that is, where new strategy implementations are not
underway (Fransoo & Rutten 1994; MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Jackson, Wilson &
MacCarthy 2004), and the link to strategy adoption has not been made explicitly. This
study, therefore, extends existing literature by examining the supporting or impeding
impact of schedulers on the enactment and sustainability of Lean strategy in the steel
industry. This raises the first research sub-question (summarised in Table 1.2):
RSQ1: What role do schedulers in the steel industry play in the enactment of
Lean strategy, and how does it compare with schedulers’ previously described roles?
Since schedulers’ daily decisions on priorities affect the sustainability of Lean
strategy, it is important to understand what factors might influence their decisionmaking. Previous studies of schedulers have identified that they often rely on
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behavioural decision-making strategies (MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Cegarra 2008),
which are typically sensitive to a myriad of factors (Hogarth 1987; Payne, Bettman &
Johnson 1993; Mellers, Schwartz & Cooke 1998; Kahneman 2003). A major
contribution of this study is to draw on behavioural decision-making literature to
develop a framework for scheduling decisions. Therefore, an introduction to
behavioural decision-making and its relevance to prioritisation in scheduling decisions
is warranted.

1.3 Behavioural decision-making and scheduling
When seeking to optimise business activities, schedulers draw on many
considerations, such as processing times, setup sequences, and product characteristics
(Baker & Trietsch 2009). In addition, schedulers’ decisions take into account factors
that are often dynamic and interrelated, and depend on situational constraints. For
example, schedulers need to consider the day of the month and week, the time of the day,
the individuals working on the shift, the transportation means available, and many other
factors (Higgins 1996; Stoop & Wiers 1996; McKay & Wiers 1999). Humans find it
difficult to address such complex daily decisions which involve multiple and interrelated
factors by using purely rational or analytical decision-making strategies (Simon 1979;
Klein, G. A. 1998; Gigerenzer & Selten 2001; Kahneman 2003).
The limitations of analytical decision-making in describing human decisions are
well documented (Simon 1976; Hogarth 1987; Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007).
Analytical decision-making requires extensive and clear knowledge of the problem and
its environment. The decision-maker’s preferences need to be stable, organised, and
ranked. Expected Utility Theory (EUT), which is the underlying theory of most
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economic models, makes these assumptions, and predicts that after comparing and
ranking the alternatives, the decision-maker will select that which provides the greatest
value (Simon 1955; Kahneman 2003). However, ample evidence of decision-making in
organisations indicates that these conditions are rarely met (see Shafir & LeBoeuf 2002
for a full review): the decision-maker’s knowledge of the problem and its environment
is often incomplete or uncertain. In addition, decision preferences are often constructed
during the search for information. Finally, bounded rationality helps decision-makers
address the limitations of processing capacity in terms of attention and time. These
limitations apply to scheduling decisions: schedulers are often not aware of future
events, such as orders, breakdowns, or logistics opportunities, and therefore have to
make decisions based on incomplete or uncertain information. Schedulers, like other
proficient decision-makers, construct their preferred courses of actions as they
investigate existing conditions (MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Jackson, Wilson &
MacCarthy 2004). Finally, facing increased complexity, workload, and time pressure,
schedulers resort to routine actions in attempt to reduce their cognitive load, rather than
seek optimal solutions through varying their actions (Fransoo & Wiers 2006).
When the examination of each alternative comes at the expense of the
examination of another, decision-makers do not necessarily seek optimal solutions. In
contrast, Naturalistic Decision-making (NDM) asserts that they are often content with
“satisficing” decisions (Klein, G. A. 1993; Lipshitz et al. 2001). That is, decisions
resulting from low cognitive effort, providing satisfactory and sufficient solutions.
Another violation of the optimality assumption of analytical decision-making is shown
by Prospect Theory, which affirms that decision-makers often prefer the aversion of loss
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and risk over maximal utility (Kahneman 2003). These deviations from optimal
decision-making have inspired a body of research dealing with what is known as
behavioural decision-making: decisions that are reflected in behaviours that deviate
from rational choice (Simon 1955; Levy 1997).
Extant literature on human decision-making asserts that humans make decisions
using two systems: (1) intuitive, and (2) rational (Epstein 1994; Kahneman 2003;
Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec 2005). This model of human decision-making is often
referred to as “the Dual Processing Model”. This model is supported by recent
neurological findings, demonstrating that intuitive decisions and rational decisions occur
in different areas in the human brain (Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec 2005). Extant
understanding of these systems is summarised by Kahneman:
There is substantial agreement on the characteristics that distinguish the two
types of cognitive processes. …The operations of [the intuitive system] are fast,
automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged; they are also
governed by habit, and are therefore difficult to control or modify. The
operations of [the rational system] are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately
controlled; they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule-governed. …
Because the overall capacity for mental effort is limited, effortful processes tend
to disrupt each other, whereas effortless processes neither cause nor suffer much
interference when combined with other tasks. (2003, p. 1451)
The intuitive system is thus very powerful – quick, effortless, and not easily
distracted. This system, however, has its limitations: it cannot be easily modified to
comply with new strategies, and it is highly sensitive to a wide variety of factors (Payne,
Bettman & Johnson 1993). These factors influence the decision and often leads to biases
and errors (Hogarth 1987; Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993; Kahneman 2003). The two
systems do not operate separately; rather, analytical decision-making harmoniously coexists with intuitive decision-making (Epstein 1994; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005), and
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decisions in most cases result from the influence of both systems. This work suggests
that the intuitive system is an integral part of decision-making, even if the decisions
seem to pertain to a more rational domain.
Similarly, research on schedulers’ decision-making indicates that schedulers do
not rely solely on analytical strategies in order to perform their role (MacCarthy &
Wilson 2001; Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004). Rather, schedulers learn through
experience, and draw on that experience when making their decisions. This type of
decision-making, which relies on experience-based intuition and heuristics, is in line
with behavioural decision-making (Cegarra 2008). Factors that influence behavioural
decision-making are therefore relevant to scheduling decision-making.
Applying recent developments in behavioural decision-making studies to
scheduling decisions enables a better understanding of the factors that can support, or
impede, the adoption of Lean strategy by schedulers. In turn, this understanding of
factors that influence schedulers’ enactment (or rejection) of Lean strategy can shed
light on the reasons behind the low uptake of this strategy in process industries.
Therefore, this thesis examines factors that influence schedulers to make decisions that
support or impede the enactment of Lean strategy.
The behavioural decision-making literature describes three categories of factors
that influence human decisions: individual, task, and context (Payne, Bettman & Johnson
1993; Mantel, Tatikonda & Liao 2006). The “individual” category includes
characteristics relating to the person making the decision, including his or her motivation
in making the decision, previous experience, and capabilities. The “task” category
includes characteristics of the problem addressed, such as task content domain (Weber &
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Johnson 2009), information mode (Hogarth 1987; Bar-Hillel 1990; Carter, Kaufmann &
Michel 2007), and time availability (Gilbert 1991). Finally, the “context” category
includes characteristics relating to the conditions within which the decision is made:
events surrounding the decision (Kahneman & Lovallo 1993; Kahneman 2003), and the
need to justify the decision to others (Simonson 1989). The current research adopts this
categorisation of factors as a framework for studying scheduling decisions. In order to
identify and understand the factors that influence the enactment of Lean scheduling
decisions, this research develops a framework which integrates aspects from both
analytical and intuitive decisions making, and examines how these factors support or
impede the adoption of Lean strategy. The development of this framework and the
examination of these factors’ influence is reflected in the second research sub-question
(summarised in Table 1.2):
RSQ2 – What factors – individual, task, and contextual - support or impede the
adoption of Lean scheduling practices in the steel industry, and how do they influence
scheduling decisions?
Among contextual factors influencing schedulers, attention is paid to the
influence of organisational culture. Organisational culture can be an impediment to
change, if it reinforces and stabilises existing norms and practices (Kotter 1996;
Cameron & Quinn 1999; Yauch & Steudel 2002). The broad and abstract nature of
literature on organisational culture renders it difficult to identify of the factors that are
specific to the adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry. Although this thesis does
not focus on organisational culture, the centrality of organisational culture to successful
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strategy implementation warrants a brief discussion on how it affects the adoption of
Lean strategy.

1.4 Scheduling practices and organisational culture
It is widely acknowledged that organisational culture influences human decisions
in organisations (Deal & Kennedy 1982; Schein 1992; Trice & Beyer 1993; MacDuffie
1995; Alvesson 2002; Schein 2004; Hofstede 2005). While there is no agreed definition
of organisational culture in the literature (Alvesson 2002), many researchers (O’Reilly,
Chatman & Caldwell 1991; Quinn & Spreitzer 1991; Schein 1992; Alvesson 2002;
Yauch & Steudel 2002) agree that:
(1) Organisational culture is shared by the organisational members
(2) Organisational culture dictates members’ behaviour
(3) Organisational culture forms over time and shared history, and
(4) Organisational culture is difficult to explicate into words.
This view, however, does not provide a pragmatic understanding of how
organisational culture influences practical behaviours that support or impede the
adoption of Lean strategy. In order to gain an understanding of the influence of
organisational culture on the adoption of Lean strategy, this study examines assumptions
shared amongst organisational members that affect scheduling decisions.
Shared assumptions about “the nature of truth, time, space, human nature, and
human relationships” guide individuals’ visible behaviours (Schein 2004, p. 85).
However, the adoption of Lean strategy requires changes in assumptions that are less
abstract and more practical: the nature of value and business success, the way to achieve
high production volume, and length of production lead time. These assumptions are
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likely to guide scheduling practices such as determining batch sizes and changeover
numbers, and affect resulting inventory levels, and the overall enactment of Lean
strategy. These assumptions are a part of the organisational culture, as according to
Schein’s definition, “culture is pervasive and ultimately embraces everything that a
group is concerned about and must deal with” (Schein 2004, p. 85). This study therefore
identifies specific assumptions relevant to the adoption of Lean scheduling practices, and
how they are reflected in specific common practices. The study also identifies how these
common practices affect scheduling decisions. The last research sub-question therefore
seeks to identify these assumptions (summarised in Table 1.2):
RSQ3: What shared organisational assumptions support or impede the adoption
of Lean scheduling practices in the steel industry, and how are they reflected in common
practices?
Table 1.2: Summary of research questions

General Research
Question

What impedes the successful and sustainable adoption of
Lean strategy in the steel industry?

Sub-Question 1

What role do schedulers in the steel industry play in the
enactment of Lean strategy, and how does it compare with
schedulers’ previously described roles?

Sub-Question 2

What factors – individual, task, and contextual – support or
impede the adoption of Lean scheduling practices in the steel
industry, and how do they influence scheduling decisions?

Sub-Question 3

What shared organisational assumptions support or impede the
adoption of Lean scheduling practices in the steel industry, and
how are they reflected in common practices?

1.5 Research justification
This study has theoretical and managerial implications. From a theoretical
perspective, this study addresses a gap in operations-management literature. While the
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literature has begun to examine human aspects that are relevant to the adoption of Lean
strategy, it has not examined aspects that are simultaneously (a) unique to process
industries, and, more specifically, the steel industry, (b) relevant to scheduling, and (c)
related to human decision-making. This research examines a case study that
simultaneously addresses all these aspects, and thereby provides an important extension
to current theory.
From a managerial perspective, this study addresses the reasons sought by
researchers (Dennis & Meredith 2000) for the low uptake of Lean strategy in process
industries. Process industries can benefit immensely from adopting Lean strategy, as
they typically hold high levels of WIP, have extensive lead times, and suffer from low
material efficiency (i.e., little raw material ends up as finished product) (Shah, N. 2005).
A reduction of inventory and WIP levels provides direct financial benefits, as the cost of
holding inventory is the single highest cost in the supply chain, adding up to 50% of
total costs (Lancioni 2000). In addition, a reduction of WIP levels reduces the time
required to process and deliver a product (i.e., production lead time), and serves to
expose quality problems.
It has been suggested that the reason behind this low uptake is the conservative
culture of process industries, biasing managers’ decisions against Lean practices (Shaw
et al. 2005). However, this claim was not supported by evidence that process industries
are more conservative than discrete industries. In addition, no description of how this
conservative culture impedes Lean practices was provided. This study, however,
examines the cultural elements that have impeded the proliferation of Lean strategy in
process industries.
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Chapter 2

Literature review

There is no single body of literature that addresses the research questions posed
by this study. The adoption of Lean strategy is multifaceted, and involves individual and
organisational aspects of scheduling processes, decision-making, and strategy
implementation (Shah, R. & Ward 2003; Womack & Jones 2003). Addressing such a
complex question requires a broad approach.
This chapter reviews three major bodies of literature. The first defines and
examines the role of schedulers, defines their role, and addresses the conditions that
surround them. The second examines behavioural decision-making literature, and
develops a framework for production-scheduling decisions. This framework includes
individual-related, task-related, and context-related aspects, thus addressing both
analytical and behavioural aspects guiding scheduling decisions. The third examines
human aspects relevant to the adoption of Lean manufacturing in discrete industries,
identifying aspects to consider in process industries as well.

2.1 Schedulers and scheduling decisions
Despite schedulers’ centrality and importance to production organisations,
literature describing them in practice is relatively scarce (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy
2004; Berglund & Karltun 2007). However, these studies of schedulers concur that the
human contribution of schedulers is essential and extends beyond mere sequencing (i.e.,
pure “scheduling”). This section describes this contribution and provides an
understanding of how scheduling is performed in practice.
Scheduling encompasses three distinct functions: planning, scheduling, and
controlling, each is responsible for a different aspect of the schedule. Section 2.1.1
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describes these functions and the tasks they comprise. Section 2.1.2 describes the roles
schedulers perform that extend their sequencing activities: information node, problem
anticipator and solver, as well as an interpersonal role that involves negotiation and
influencing other parties in the development and enactment of the production schedule.

2.1.1
The scheduling team – planning, scheduling, and
controlling
Scheduling is a complex activity, requiring the integration of human and
computerised input and decisions (McKay & Wiers 2003; Fransoo & Wiers 2006).
Schedulers operate as part of a team comprising three inter-dependent functions:
planning, scheduling, and controlling (or dispatching), as illustrated in Figure 2.1. While
the three functions operate in concert, they are distinguished by different time horizons
and pressures, autonomy of decision-making, and information availability. A description
of these functions and their task characteristics is drawn from McKay and Wiers (2003),
a rare example of a study conducted in a discrete industry sector.

Figure 2.1: Scheduling functions and levels

Planners
Planners are concerned with the longest time horizons in the decision-making
process. They focus on an aggregated level of production, grouping similar products
into “buckets” that need to be produced according to a distant horizon (i.e., months,
quarters, or years). Planners therefore do not operate under high time pressure; however,
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they are expected to produce multiple planning scenarios quickly and accurately.
Planners’ work is mostly proactive, as they are expected to set future production targets.
Planners’ decisions do not have a high and immediate impact on the lower levels
of the scheduling functions (i.e., scheduling and controlling), and therefore their
decisions are considered to have a high degree of autonomy. In addition, planners have a
high degree of information availability. They are aware of demand volume, requested
products, due dates, and deliveries. They also have control over both supply and demand
parameters. On the supply side, planners can negotiate additional hours, or schedule
overtime. On the demand side, they can balance demand with available capacity and
existing inventory.
Schedulers
Schedulers are concerned with a shorter time horizon, typically around one week.
They are therefore under greater pressure than planners, since their decisions are
subjected to greater uncertainty, which must be addressed in a relatively short time
period. The autonomy of schedulers’ decisions is limited, as they are closely linked to
the decisions of controllers, and if capacity utilisation is maximal (i.e., close to 100%),
scheduling decisions can affect planning decisions. This study (McKay & Wiers 2003)
reports that less information is available to the scheduler than to the planner; the
information aspect in scheduling tasks is further discussed in Section 2.1.2. Schedulers’
decisions are both proactive, aiming to prepare a schedule for production, and reactive,
addressing uncertain events and unexpected input. For example, schedulers must
accommodate changes to customer orders, as well as machine breakdowns and material
shortage.
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Controllers
Controllers are concerned with the shortest time horizon of all functions. They
are mostly reactive and are typically concerned with the next few minutes, hours, and
days, and thus they are under the highest time pressure. Because of this, controllers
typically do not explore options in depth. Rather, they tend to be concerned with
operations continuity, and their decisions are triggered by job completion, staff
problems, machine breakdown, processing duration variability, and material
incompatibility. Controllers’ decisions can affect scheduling decisions; however, they
do not have a great impact on planning decisions, as the aggregation level of these
decisions is far greater than that of the immediate decisions made by controllers. Thus
controllers’ decisions are moderately autonomous.
Controllers deal with detailed contextual data, such as environmental factors
(e.g., weather), human aspects (e.g., the impact of holiday season on absenteeism), recent
performance (e.g., performance of different shifts over the last week), and standard
engineering data (e.g., material specifications and processing descriptions). In addition,
controllers are typically sensitive to information floating around them, such as gossip
and conversations, and have been described in at least one study as , “generally being
nosey” (McKay & Wiers 2003, p. 89). However the controller does not have access to
information regarding customer demand, due dates, and product volumes.
Table 2.1 summarises these differences.
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Table 2.1: Differences between planners, schedulers, and controllers

Time horizon and
pressure

Proactive/
Reactive

Autonomy of
decisionmaking

Information
availability

Planners

Lengthy (one month – to
several years), low

Mostly
proactive

High

High

Schedulers

Short (one week), high

Proactive
and
reactive

Low

Low

Controllers

Real-time, highest

Mostly
reactive

Moderate

Low

(Source: McKay and Wiers 2003)

Although the effectiveness of the scheduling team relies on the three functions to
work in concert, most descriptive studies of the scheduling team focus on schedulers.
The schedulers’ job is the most complex due to the need to be both proactive and
reactive, and due to the involvement of the other two functions (planning and
controlling). The next section examines schedulers’ roles, which go beyond mere
production sequencing.

2.1.2

Schedulers’ roles
The core responsibility of schedulers is to provide an efficient sequence of

production that addresses customer demand. However, in many cases, schedulers are
also responsible for facilitating the execution of this sequence. Schedulers perform
several roles that support and enable facilitation, including an information node, a
problem anticipator and solver, and a negotiator and influencer.
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2.1.2.1 Information node
Schedulers perform the role of an information node, which means they (1)
receive up-to-date information from various sources, (2) disseminate information to the
production units, and ensure that information is accessible and visible (Jackson, Wilson
& MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun 2007), and (3) manipulate the information they
use in order to make it fit reality. Schedulers are described as filtering information using
“a range of behaviors, including … selection, smoothing out, verification, [and]
interpolation” (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004, p. 543). These behaviours
demonstrate the close link between schedulers and information concerning plant
operation.
Behaviours relevant to this role draw on the schedulers’ expert knowledge, as
well as intuition (as opposed to analytical computation). This point is further discussed
in Section 2.2.

2.1.2.2 Problem anticipator and solver
Schedulers are constantly aware of the production situation. Their understanding
of how potential problems can affect the execution of the schedule guides them to
engage in problem prevention or minimisation of impact (McKay & Wiers 2003;
Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004). Schedulers are expected to solve problems
resulting from unexpected events, and to coordinate different production units (Berglund
& Karltun 2007).
In some cases, schedulers engage in problem-solving for a considerable amount
of their time (Berglund & Karltun 2007). Several authors noted that from an operational
perspective, scheduling is a problem-solving activity, and not a sequencing activity
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(McKay & Wiers 1999; Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004). Schedulers, then, use
various techniques and options to handle interruptions, such as re-allocation of resources
and re-arrangement of sequencing details (Fransoo & Wiers 2006). However, schedulers
often need to sacrifice some goals in order to achieve others (Cegarra 2008; Guinery &
MacCarthy 2009). Thus, scheduling goals are not necessarily static and clearly defined
in the schedulers’ mind; rather, they are contextual, situation-dependent, and constructed
as the situation unfolds.

2.1.2.3 Negotiator and influencer
Schedulers expend time, effort, and attention to develop interpersonal
relationships with the stakeholders involved in production, delivery, and customer
service (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun 2007). Such
relationships facilitate the execution of the schedule, as schedulers typically do not have
formal authority over these functions (Berglund & Guinery 2008). Schedulers use
bargaining and favours, and rely on stakeholders’ trust and respect to influence their
actions (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004). As part of this role, schedulers often
engage in negotiated group decision-making, where different parties often have
conflicting goals and agendas (Guinery & MacCarthy 2009).

2.1.2.4 The scheduler and a new strategy
Although the scheduling team is critical to the determination of processing
sequence, batch sizes, and inventory levels, no academic study examined their
adjustment to a new strategy, such as Lean strategy (Sheldon 2005). While
computerised support to schedulers transitioning into Lean strategy is possible (e.g., van
der Krogt et al. 2010), ultimately it is up to the human scheduler to make decisions that
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either accept computerised recommendations for scheduling decisions (and thus, support
Lean strategy), or reject them. This study addresses this gap by examining schedulers’
role in the implementation of Lean strategy.

2.1.3

Summary
Scheduling, a complex task performed by a scheduling team, is comprised of

three levels: planning, scheduling, and controlling. These levels vary in terms of time
horizon and time pressure, decision autonomy, and information availability. Of these
three levels, the schedulers are in charge of the most complex role due to the
interrelations between their schedule and the tasks of the other two levels.
The schedulers’ job goes beyond mere sequencing: schedulers are responsible for
enabling the execution of the production schedule. They often do not have the formal
power to carry out this responsibility, and thus influence others through relationships.
Schedulers often negotiate between conflicting organisational functions, and are
expected to anticipate and solve problems that can affect the production. Schedulers are
also required to interpret information and balance conflicting needs and priorities.
Through these roles (negotiation, problem anticipation and solving, information
interpretation, and needs’ prioritisation), schedulers influence the alignment of the
organisation’s activities with Lean principles, and can potentially affect the enactment of
Lean strategy.
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2.2 Behavioural decision-making and human schedulers
Decision-making cannot be ignored when attempting to understand the human
aspects involved in adopting Lean strategy, as daily human decisions ultimately
determine the success and sustainability of this adoption. Lean strategy relies on the
support of human behaviour and decisions to sustain its effectiveness (Ohno 1988;
Rother & Shook 2003). Among those human decisions, scheduling decisions are critical
to the enactment of Lean principles (van der Krogt et al. 2010). Therefore, this section
relates decision-making literature to scheduling decisions critical to Lean strategy.
The operations-management literature mainly treats scheduling decisions as
rational, computational, and combinatorial, and as drawing on factual considerations
(e.g. processing times, setup sequences, and product characteristics) in their attempt to
optimise business activities (Baker & Trietsch 2009). However, the literature amply
shows that when facing complex decisions (such as scheduling decisions), humans rarely
rely on pure analytical decision-making, as it requires more time, effort, attentions,
information, and information processing than generally available to human decisionmakers (Simon 1965; Kahneman 2003), and the human scheduler in particular
(MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Cegarra 2008). Schedulers need to draw on a broad range
of contextual factors, such as the day of the month and week, the time of day, the
individuals working on the shift, the transportation means available, and many other
factors (Higgins 1996; Stoop & Wiers 1996; McKay & Wiers 1999). In addition, some
of the information used for scheduling decisions is often uncertain, and schedulers’
processing capacity is often limited in terms of time and attention (MacCarthy & Wilson
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2001; Cegarra 2008). These conditions limit the effectiveness and efficiency of
analytical decision-making.
Humans employ different heuristics and strategies to overcome the limitations of
analytical decision-making (Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993; Payne, Bettman &
Johnson 1997; Kahneman 2003; Hogarth & Karelaia 2006). These heuristics are
influenced by various factors, and often lead to systematic biases in decision-making
(Hogarth 1987; Kahneman 2003). This research draws on analytical and behavioural
decision theories in order to identify factors that influence scheduling decisions. Before
presenting the prominent factors, the rest of this section justifies the use of three bodies
of research: (1) analytical decision-making, (2) an underlying framework for behavioural
decision-making, and (3) factors biasing behavioural decision-making.

2.2.1

Analytical decision-making
Analytical decision-making is included in this framework for two reasons. First,

scheduling decisions pertain to a rational domain (Baker & Scudder 1990; Baker &
Trietsch 2009) that draws on and analyses factual considerations (Loewenstein & Lerner
2003). Second, scheduling decisions are performed in an organisational context, and
organisational decisions often draw on analytical decision strategies (Keeney & Raiffa
1993; Clemen 1996).
A framework for organisational decision analysis can aid in the investigation of
the analytical aspect of scheduling. This framework includes the following decision
stages: defining decision objectives, defining the values and objectives of the decisionmakers, identifying uncertain events during the decision process, and identifying
decision consequences (Clemen 1996). Following these stages of analytical decision-
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making can help organisational decision-makers get better results when addressing
problems involving multiple objectives and uncertain events (Keeney & Raiffa 1993).
This framework is suitable to scheduling decisions, as they are often driven by overall
organisational objectives and values and are subject to uncertain events, and their
consequences for the organisation are considered at the time of decision-making (McKay
& Wiers 1999; MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004;
Cegarra 2008). These different decision elements are integrated into the overall
framework used in this study, which is based on a model of behavioural decision-making
developed by Payne et al. (1993).

2.2.2

A framework for behavioural decision-making
Behavioural decisions are influenced by a host of factors that can induce and

reinforce systematic decision biases (Hogarth 1987; Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007).
These factors pertain to three distinct categories: (1) individual, (2) task, and (3) context
(Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993). “Individual” factors include the characteristics of the
person making the decision: their attitudes towards a decision alternative (in this case,
Lean practices), their motivation for a particular, their experience, and their capabilities.
“Task” factors include the characteristics of the problem addressed: structured or
unstructured, familiar or new. In addition, task factors can include characteristics such
as task content domain (Weber & Johnson 2009), information mode (Hogarth 1987; BarHillel 1990; Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007), and time availability (Gilbert 1991).
Finally, “context” factors include those relating to the conditions in which the decision is
made: events surrounding the decision (Kahneman & Lovallo 1993; Kahneman 2003),
implications of the decision (Simonson 1989), and the number of available alternatives
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(Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993). Based on this categorisation of behavioural factors,
the current research develops a framework for studying scheduling decisions that support
or impede the adoption of Lean strategy. The applicability of this framework to the
discipline of operations management was recently supported in a study of make/buy
decisions wherein a survey-based experiment confirmed the influence of behavioural
factors on such decisions (Mantel, Tatikonda & Liao 2006). Research thus suggests that
this framework is suitable for studying scheduling decisions.

2.2.3

Behavioural decision biases
This research also includes factors that lead to decision biases. Human decisions

are influenced by various factors that lead to a long list of documented decision-making
biases (Hogarth 1987). This list of biases was recently organised into a taxonomy for
supply-chain decisions (Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007), resulting in nine groups of
decision biases: availability cognition, base rate, presentation, control illusion, output
evaluation, commitment, confirmatory, persistence, and reference point. These bias
groups are integrated into the framework for scheduling decisions, and each bias group is
categorised based on its pertinence to individual, task, or context.

Figure 2.2 presents the proposed framework for scheduling decisions. The
framework considers task-related factors (decision objectives, time available, and
information available), individual-related factors (the individual’s attitudes, experience,
capability, and motivation), and context-related factors (justifiability, organisational
culture, and preceding events). The next section describes these factors and how they
affect scheduling decisions (summarised in Table 2.2 at the end of the section).
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Figure 2.2: Proposed scheduling decisions-making framework

2.3 Individual (Person)
Individual decision-makers in an organisation differ in their: (1) attitudes (2)
motives and goals relating to the decision, (3) experience, and (4) capabilities. These
individual differences have been extensively examined in studies of human and
organisational psychology, and a review of their relevance to production-scheduling
decisions is warranted.

2.3.1

Attitudes
The decision-maker’s attitudes have long been studied as antecedents to decisions

and behaviours (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1991). Attitude is extensively recognised as having
an evaluative role (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 1977;
Ajzen 1991). It has been suggested that “attitudes serve as heuristics, with positive
attitudes invoking a favoring strategy toward an object and negative attitudes creating
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disfavouring response” (Slovic et al. 2007, p. 1346). Attitude is defined as a learned
predisposition to respond to an object in a favourable or unfavourable manner (Fishbein
& Ajzen 1975). Attitudes stem from beliefs about the evaluated object (Fishbein &
Ajzen 1975), and are composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioural components, are
stable over time, and affect judgement, decisions, and risk behaviours (Slovic et al.
2007). The immediate and powerful effect of evaluation was illustrated in a behavioural
experiment, where participants were required to push or pull a lever as fast as they could
when a word appeared on a screen (Bargh 1997). Participants’ speed of reaction was
found to depend on the nature of the word and the action they were required to take:
participants pulled the lever towards them faster when the word on the screen resulted in
a positive evaluation (e.g., cake) than when the word resulted in a negative evaluation
(e.g., death) (Bargh et al. 1992). Since scheduling decisions involve judgement, risks,
and time constraints, the influence of attitudes is relevant.
When Lean strategy is implemented, schedulers are required to schedule smaller
batches, and maintain lower inventory levels. A negative attitude towards these practices
can be expected to impede their adoption. In addition, a positive attitude towards
traditional practices of maintaining large batches and high inventory levels can also be
expected to impede the adoption of Lean strategy.

2.3.2

Motives
Individual motives can lead to the following cognitive biases: commitment bias,

confirmatory bias, and persistence bias (Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007).
Commitment bias occurs when the decision-maker is reluctant to abandon a path dictated
by previous decisions, even if this path has proven unfavourable (full review at Arkes &
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Ayton 1999). As a result, the decision-maker chooses to continue or escalate a path
already undertaken. An example relevant to this study would be a scheduler who
approves additional maintenance on a machine, because time and effort have already
been invested in fixing a quality problem caused by that machine, instead of changing
over to produce a different product. The investment of resources commits the scheduler
to producing a successful result, despite evidence showing this course of action is not
optimal. Confirmatory bias occurs when the decision-maker has already formed a
decision, and now focuses on searching for information that confirms the initial decision,
restricting the search (or the impact) of disconfirming evidence (Bruner, Goodnow &
Austin 1986; Karelaia 2006). For example, a production scheduler may use evidence of
low reliability of a production process to confirm a decision to avoid producing the
product.
The last type of bias related to motives is persistence bias, leading to the selection
of an action only because it has been selected before. This bias supports “status-quo”
decisions, where the decisions of the past are repeated. For example, a production
scheduler may continue to produce large quantities simply because that has always been
the mode of operation, regardless of whether large quantities are ordered. Additional
tendencies that support adherence to status-quo decisions are discussed in Section 2.5.1.
Different decision theories attribute different motives to the decision-maker.
Expected Utility Theory (EUT), which is the underlying theory of most economic
models (Kahneman 2003), assumes humans seek to maximise their own wealth. In
contrast, Prospect Theory demonstrates that humans seek to avoid loss (Kahneman &
Tversky 1979; Kahneman 2003). This difference in motives predicts different choices
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among alternatives, when there is uncertainty associated with each alternative. Contrary
to EUT, Prospect Theory systematically demonstrates that humans prefer certain small
gains over potential high gains, and that they prefer to take the risk of a high loss over a
certain small loss (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The fact that different motives lead to
different decisions is important for predicting decisions.
The systematic human inclination to avoid risks when losses are possible can be
relevant to the adoption of Lean strategy. When Lean strategy is implemented, losses
associated with Lean practices should be emphasised more strongly than prospects of
gains. For example, stopping production for kanban adherence involves a risk of future
stock outage. The loss associated with stock outage is expected to be overweighted
compared to the gains associated with the achievement of low inventory levels. The two
possibilities are perceived asymmetrically in the decision-maker’s mind, and thus should
be addressed asymmetrically.

2.3.3

Experience
It takes little more than a browsing of the positions-vacant section in a local

newspaper to recognise that employers prefer experienced professional decision-makers
over novices. Experienced decision-makers display more efficiency than novices, who
are prone to errors and use more resources to compute and work out a solution (Haier &
Siegel 1992). A suggested explanation is that experienced decision-makers ‘train’ their
intuitive system, by ‘tagging’ choices as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, depending on the
outcome and impact it had on the decision-maker’s emotions (Slovic et al. 2007).
According to the dual-processing model, it takes longer to train the intuitive system,
which is guided by experience, as opposed to the rational, logic-based system, which is
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relatively flexible in applying new rules (Kahneman 2003). This makes experienced
decision-makers better at making decisions intuitively, while novices rely on more
laborious and error-prone computations.
Decision-making processes of experienced individuals have been extensively
studied in a stream called “Naturalistic Decision Making” (NDM). This stream of
research examines how experienced decision-makers behave in realistic situations. This
stream has resulted in a decision-making model called the Recognition-Primed Decision
(RPD) based on field studies of experienced decision-makers from various domains,
such as fire-fighting, tank platoon leaders, and design engineers (Klein, G. A. 1993). A
major strength of the RPD model is that it is based on realistic observations of
experienced decision-makers, and thus describes the contribution of the decision-makers’
experience to the decisions.
The decision-making process described by the RPD model is different to the one
described by the analytical approach (presented in Section 2.2 above). According to
RPD, the decision-maker uses a mental simulation, or a “mental model”, of the action
and the situation at hand, to evaluate the decision. The decision is made in four stages:
(1) identifying the goals that are achievable in the situation, (2) identifying cues salient
to the situation, (3) forming expectations against which the situation is compared, as a
check of the situations’ assessment accuracy (i.e., if these expectations are violated,
they serve as an indication that the assessment of the situation was incorrect), and (4)
identifying a typical action to take. This is in contrast to the evaluation strategy
prescribed by the analytical approach, which requires contrasting options’ strengths and
weaknesses.
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A clear benefit to the decision-maker from using RPD strategies is the ability to
initiate a course of action without evaluating all possible options. This is an important
benefit for decision-makers under time pressure; however, research suggests that this
benefit remains attractive even when time pressure is not present: evidence supports that
engineers, even without time pressure, still use RPD strategies (Klein, G. A. 1993).
The decisions studied in developing NDM and RPD share many characteristics
with the nature of scheduling in practice, and NDM has been used as a framework
guiding studies of schedulers and scheduling decisions (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy
2004). The RPD model applies when “there is reasonable experience to draw on, when
the decision maker is under time pressure, and when there is uncertainty and/or illdefined goals” (Lipshitz et al. 2001, p. 337). This description applies to experienced
schedulers, who typically draw on lengthy experience (Higgins 1996; Jackson, Wilson
& MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun 2007; Berglund & Guinery 2008), and whose
goals and objectives are often uncertain and conflicting, as previously discussed. While
time pressure is certainly present in many scheduling situations, schedulers were found
to spend a “considerable amount of time on nonformalized tasks” such as maintenance
and auxiliary work tasks, indicating that time pressure is not extreme, and not constant
(Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004, p. 541). However, the lack of constant time
pressure alone does not eliminate RPD as an appropriate description of scheduling tasks
– the RPD model was found to be used by “experienced design engineers who were not
under time pressure”, and who were found to rely “heavily on recognitional decisionmaking for difficult cases (60%)” (Klein, G. A. 1993, p. 145).
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Another possible objection to the use of NDM and RPD decision-making
models for scheduling is the fact that “RPD strategies are less likely to be used with
highly combinatorial problems” (Lipshitz et al. 2001, p. 337). Scheduling problems are
defined in operations research as highly combinatorial problems (Baker & Trietsch
2009). However, scheduling tasks in reality are not combinatorial in nature. Field
studies of scheduling show that an initial schedule is generated by computerised tools,
after which humans are required to address problems that prevent the implementation of
this initial, computer-generated schedule in practice. In addition, schedulers are
required to and deciding on priorities when interruptions prevent the virtual schedule
from being fully executed (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004; Cegarra 2008).
Therefore, RPD is an appropriate theoretical representation of production-scheduling,
and can be beneficial to the understanding of scheduling decision-making.
The Naturalistic Decision-making model differs from models of analytical
decision-making in the following aspects:
1. Decision focus: The RPD model focuses on situation assessment, whereas
analytical decision-making focuses on ranking options of response.
2. Unlike analytical decision-making, which relies on selecting an optimal action
after generating options randomly (or semi-randomly), NDM shows that experienced
decision-makers usually identify a reasonably good option as the first course of action.
3. While analytical decision models aim to optimise, RPD asserts that the action
chosen by the decision-maker “satisfices” (Simon 1965) rather than optimises.
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4. According to RPD, the decision-maker uses a mental simulation, or a “mental
model” of the action and the situation to evaluate the decision, rather than contrasting
options’ strengths and weaknesses, as in an analytical approach.
These differences do not exclude the use of analytical decision-making for
studying scheduling decisions: analytical decision-making and RPD both have their
strengths, serve different functions, and can be applied to the same decision task (Klein,
G. A. 1993). Thus, both models are considered in this framework for scheduling
decisions.
The NDM model contends that experienced decision-makers identify salient cues
in the situation at hand, and based on these cues they construct a “mental model” of it
(Endsley 1997). This mental model highlights to the experienced decision-maker what
critical information is still missing. The mental model is based on a “skeleton”
constructed from very specific past experiences, but their details do not need to exactly
match the details of the current situation. Once critical information gaps are filled, the
experienced decision-maker matches a course of action to the identified situation.
The decision-making process described by NDM is expected to moderate the
influence of the following biases: availability cognition, reference point, and selective
perception. Availability cognition means that information more familiar to the decisionmaker will be treated more favourably (Tversky & Kahneman 2003; Carter, Kaufmann
& Michel 2007). Familiar information is more available for problem-solving as it is
easier to search for, retrieve from memory, and imagine (Tversky & Kahneman 1974).
Experienced decision-makers have a greater repertoire of mental models to draw from,
as this repertoire is constructed based on a wider range of experiences and situations.
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Availability therefore in fact serves experienced decision-makers, rather than biases
them.
Experience can also moderate the impact of reference-point bias. To simplify
judgement, humans use an initial reference point, which they later adjust; however, such
adjustments have been shown to be insufficient and to bias the resulting decision
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Experienced decision-makers are expected to make better
adjustment than novices.
Another aspect of experience relates to the professional experience of the
scheduler. It has been found that “people structure problems on the basis of their own
experience” (Hogarth 1987, p. 216), leading to a selective-perception bias. Thus,
marketing managers can see a problem as a marketing problem, whereas financial
managers will examine the same problem and perceive it as a financial problem.
Schedulers who come from different organisational backgrounds (i.e., customer service,
engineering, or production) can handle the same decision situation with different
approaches. This could bias their decisions to align with the functions of their
background.
Although NDM was used in the past to inform studies of scheduling, NDM does
not perfectly apply to scheduling activities. Two limitations of the RPD model reduce its
applicability to production-scheduling: (1) justification and (2) other stakeholders’
views. These limitations are further discussed in Section 2.5.1, as part of the decision
context.
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2.3.4

Capability
Complex cognitive tasks draw on capabilities that differ between individuals. As

decision-makers vary in their cognitive capabilities, and in general strive to reduce
cognitive load (Simon 1978), the cognitive mechanisms they select will be the ones they
find easiest to employ. However, supply-chain literature views decisions such as
production-scheduling as rational decisions, and provides tools such as scheduling
algorithms (Brucker 2004) to optimise them; many organisations employ such tools to
reduce cognitive effort (Fransoo & Wiers 2006). The task schedulers often face is then
to make the adjustments necessary to the computer-generated schedule, so that it fits
realistic conditions. The extent to which individual capability influences productionscheduling decisions therefore needs to be examined.

2.4 Task (Problem)
The problem, or task, comprises three factors: (1) decision objectives, (2)
available time, and (3) the information available to the decision-maker. These taskoriented factors play a key role in production-scheduling decisions.

2.4.1

Decision objectives
The first step in analytical decision-making is “defining decision objectives”

(Louviere 1988; Keeney & Raiffa 1993; Clemen 1996). The objectives of the problem
are crucial to its definition, as they determine the aspects of the decision that need to be
addressed.
Scheduling objectives and goals are typically defined by higher organisational
levels, external to the scheduling team. The schedulers are responsible for translating
these objectives into practice (MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Jackson, Wilson &
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MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun 2007; Berglund & Guinery 2008). In addition,
scheduling goals are often dynamic, and interrelated with situational constraints. A
common illustration of this point in scheduling literature is that the same schedule can be
considered “good” for Monday morning, but “bad” for Friday afternoon (Higgins 1996;
Stoop & Wiers 1996; McKay & Wiers 1999).
Business objectives often conflict with and contradict one another. Schedulers
are required to maintain high efficiency levels, and at the same time, satisfy the demand
for timely delivery. If achieving both objectives is impossible, scheduling decisions
involve tradeoffs. The weight of the different objectives defines the trade-off that the
scheduler is required to make. However, this weighting is not necessarily clearly
defined.
Business objectives are communicated through control mechanisms such as
policies, procedures, performance measures, and authority (Beamon 1998; Delbridge
1998; Cachon 1999; Mentzer 2001; Gunasekaran, Patel & McGaughey 2004). This
research seeks to examine how each control mechanism contributes to the weighting that
schedulers assign to each objective.

2.4.2

Time
Time available for decision-making dictates the resources dedicated to the

decision task. Time pressure leads to inconsistency of judgement and superficial
information processing (Hogarth 1987). For example, when little time is available,
decision-makers are less likely to doubt and reject information (Gilbert 1991).
However, evidence also shows performance under time pressure improves with
experience with the decision task (Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993). This finding is
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consistent with NDM, showing that experienced decision-makers are able to
immediately identify a reasonable course of action, without having to analyse many
alternatives. A number of researchers assert that managerial decision-making in
conditions of limited time (and information) relies on intuition and emotions (Sayegh,
Anthony & Perrewé 2004; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005). Since scheduling decisions
often take place under time pressure, these aspects are expected to influence schedulers
as well.
Moreover, devoting additional time to decision-making does not necessarily
result in better decisions. Additional time is not necessarily used for decision
refinement, but rather for decision confirmation (Karelaia 2006). Research has
suggested that when more time is available for decision-making, subjects use it to
confirm a decision they have already made intuitively. Confirmatory bias, discussed in
Section 2.3.2 above, has an influence on decisions, through “thirst for conformation”
(Bruner, Goodnow & Austin 1986).
Another time-related aspect found to influence decision-makers is the time
horizon. When decision outcomes were expected in the near future, subjects were more
risk-averse than when decision outcomes were expected further in the future (Payne,
Bettman & Johnson 1993). This finding is relevant to the scheduling team, where each
level is concerned with results that are measured (and thus, experienced) at different time
horizons(McKay & Wiers 2003). Planners are often concerned with a time horizon of
months, whereas schedulers are concerned with weeks, and controllers with hours and
days. The difference in time horizons is expected to affect the degree of risk aversion
between the levels. Since Lean strategy involves greater risk in the short term, the risk
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aversion of the people in charge of decisions with immediate consequences (such as
controllers) can act against the successful adoption of Lean strategy.

2.4.3

Information
Information is a critical aspect of decision-making. Since schedulers perform the

role of an information node, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, it is expected that they enjoy
information completeness in terms of information available at the time of the decisionmaking. However, information processing and interpretation can be subject to biases
based on information characteristics. Two types of relevant biases are identified: baserate bias and presentation bias (Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007).
Base-rate bias means that information of a general nature is ignored for the sake
of more specific, less relevant, information (Bar-Hillel 1990). An example relevant to
this study would be a scheduler making a decision based on a known, tangible cost, as
opposed to an unknown cost: the cost of a changeover is tangible and well-known to the
scheduler, whereas the “cost” of an unsatisfied customer, whose order has been delayed
due to the avoidance of a changeover, is often unknown to the scheduler. This “cost” is
certainly not tangible and not specific. Due to base-rate bias, the cost of a changeover
will be avoided, even if in the long run, an unsatisfied customer carries a higher cost to
the business.
Presentation bias is derived from elements such as information order, mode, scale
or mixture, and leads to systematic bias in decision-making (Carter, Kaufmann & Michel
2007). Research shows that first and last items presented are given greater emphasis
(Hogarth 1987). The mode of information has been shown to have a systematic
influence on its impact (Vessey 1994). For example, decision-makers give verbal

Irit Alony

Masters by Research

Page 42 of 224

communication more weight than written reports. Another important aspect of
presentation bias is the well-known “framing effect”. Evidence persistently shows that
humans act on information that is framed favourably (or given a positive spin)
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979), even when they find the less-favourably framed
information more believable (Keren 2007).
Schedulers obtain information through various channels, including face-to-face
and phone conversations, emails, and information systems. If information obtained
through verbal communication systematically outweighs information obtained through
written communication, this can have a consistent influence on scheduling decisions.
The framing of information by certain parties can also have a systematic impact on
scheduling decisions. For example, if production managers consistently frame
information in a way that highlights efficiency over delivery performance, the resulting
scheduling decision could be biased to favour production efficiency.

2.5 Context
Context is a difficult term to define, and indeed decision-making studies often
choose to avoid it by turning to experimental studies (for example, Kahneman & Tversky
1979; Mantel, Tatikonda & Liao 2006). This study defines ‘context’ as the environment
that surrounds a decision, including the implications relating to the decision, and the
overall situation of which a scheduling decision is a part. Decision context is associated
with two factors: (1) justifiability, and (2) preceding events. These two context-oriented
factors of decision-making are integrated into the framework of scheduling decisions.
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2.5.1

Justifiability
When decisions need to be justified to others, the decision-maker becomes

sensitive to certain aspects and considerations (Simonson 1989): individuals who know
their decision will be reviewed by others select an option that is less likely to be
criticised. Scheduling is made in an organisational context, and therefore decisions are
typically visible to others. The type of criticism decision-makers receive is expected to
drive their decisions. Depending on the criticism aspects, schedulers are expected to
make decision that can be justified. For example, in process manufacturing
organisations, which are frequently concerned with operating costs, decisions-makers are
expected to schedule an “expensive” sequence only when they can provide a reason
accepted by the decision reviewers.
Justifiability was also found to lead to status-quo bias (Simonson 1992). In
purchasing decisions, subjects were found to prefer a “safe” option that is easier to
justify, over a risky option that may have been more favourable. Thus, since schedulers
are often expected to justify their decisions, a deviation from status-quo decisions due to
a new strategy may prove difficult.
Justification and the involvement of other stakeholders reduce the applicability
of NDM (discussed in Section 2.3.3) to scheduling decisions. The RPD model is less
applicable “in situations where justification is required, and in cases where the views of
different stakeholders have to be taken into account” (Lipshitz et al. 2001, p. 337).
Schedulers are not typically required to justify their decisions; however, since their
decisions are made in organisational context, their results often do require justification
and explanation to higher levels. For example, in a detailed case study of a
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manufacturing-cell scheduler, the scheduler needed to justify the cell’s performance
weekly (Crawford 2001). This suggests that while a justification is not required for
every action, a justification of the results is present in schedulers’ minds.
The second limitation of RPD applicable to scheduling is the need to take the
view of different stakeholders into account. It has been recognised that schedulers are
part of a social system, and this system is inter-related with scheduling: the scheduling
activity takes into account the impact on other stakeholders such as customers,
production managers, and higher management (Dutton 1964; Berglund & Guinery
2008). These limitations to the applicability of NDM models to scheduling decisions
suggest that scheduling decisions may follow a different process to those NDM
describes. For this reason, other decision factors are considered and integrated into this
study’s decision-making model.

2.5.2

Preceding events
Scheduling decisions are highly contextual in the sense that they affect and are

closely related to many factors concurrent with the decisions (Higgins 1996; MacCarthy
& Wilson 2001; McKay & Wiers 2003; Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004).
Scheduling decisions also affect the two other levels of the scheduling process, i.e.,
planning and controlling. Scheduling decisions are thus subject to many constraints that
are interdependent and defined by timing. This can lead to two cognitive biases: recency
bias and reference-point bias (Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007). Recent events are
often more prominent in the decision-maker’s mind, and thus the decision-maker tends
to overweight them compared with events that have occurred in the more distant past
(Carter, Kaufmann & Michel 2007). These recent events can also bias individuals’

Irit Alony

Masters by Research

Page 45 of 224

reference-points. The reference point bias discussed in Section 2.3.3 can also be affected
by short-term preceding events. One of the simplifications humans use to make
decisions is to start from an initial reference point, and gradually adjust it to make a
decision (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). This adjustment has been shown to be often
insufficient, introducing a bias into scheduling decisions. For example, schedulers may
overproduce after a recent stock outage.

2.5.3

Organisational culture
In a broader sense, the context of scheduling decisions relates to the culture of the

organisation in which they are performed (Berthon, Pitt & Ewing 2001). While there is
no agreed definition of organisational culture in the literature (Alvesson 2002), many
researchers agree that it is shared by the organisational members, that it dictates their
behaviour, that it takes time and shared history to form, and that it is difficult to put into
words (O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell 1991; Quinn & Spreitzer 1991; Schein 1992;
Alvesson 2002; Yauch & Steudel 2002). This study seeks to capture the influence of
organisational culture on the adoption of Lean strategy by identifying shared
organisational assumptions that affect scheduling decisions.
Capturing the impact of organisational culture on the adoption of Lean strategy
has not been simple. Previous studies that attempted to quantify this impact achieved
inconclusive or insignificant results (McDermott & Stock 1999; Shah, R. & Ward 2003;
Nahm, Vonderembse & Koufteros 2004). Most measures of organisational culture are
too abstract, and their direct impact on the adoption of Lean strategy cannot easily be
identified. For example, a common measure of organisational culture, the Organisational
Cultural Profile (OCP) (O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell 1991), measures the importance

Irit Alony

Masters by Research

Page 46 of 224

of concepts like “flexibility”, “adaptability”, and “being careful”, which are difficult to
link to practical incompatibilities between the existing organisational culture, and Lean
practices. Another common measure of organisational culture is the Competing Values
Framework (Cameron & Quinn 1999), which examines the dominant values in different
aspects of a business, such as leadership, control mechanisms, and interpersonal
relationships. This framework was used to identify cultures that are most supportive of
Lean strategy in US manufacturing plants (McDermott & Stock 1999); however, the
results were not definitive.
Another study attempting to identify cultural aspects that affect the successful
adoption of Lean principles was more successful at attaining meaningful and practical
results (Yauch & Steudel 2002). This study adopted Schein’s framework of levels of
culture (Schein 1992), and was able to identify specific behaviours that impede the
successful adoption of cellular manufacturing in discrete industry plants.
Accordion to Schein’s framework (Figure 2.3), cultures exist and operate on
three levels. The lowest level is the level of underlying assumptions, which are shared
amongst organisational members and guide their behaviour. The second level is the
level of espoused values, which are unspoken beliefs of “what ought to be” the
behaviour. The third and final level of organisational culture is the visible behaviour
itself, as well as tangible artefacts (Schein 1992).
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Figure 2.3: Levels of organisational culture (adapted from Schein 1992, p. 14)

This framework illustrates how complex organisational culture is, and why it can
be hard to identify, measure, and link to the adoption of Lean strategy. Since the
successful enactment of Lean strategy depends on behaviours that align with this
strategy, it requires an alignment of the visible level of culture with Lean principles.
However, on one hand, observing behaviours does not necessarily lead to a deep
understanding of the underlying assumptions and espoused values that are driving them,
and on the other hand, with the same underlying assumptions and even espoused values,
culture could be manifested in different behaviours. Therefore, a direct link between the
three levels of organisational culture and Lean principles is not easily identified. This
difficulty is evident in another study that attempted to quantify the link between culture
and the successful adoption of Lean principles. The study examined the espoused-values
level of culture (Nahm, Vonderembse & Koufteros 2004); however, it showed mixed
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results, with some Lean practices significantly linked to dimensions of organisational
culture, others not.
The meaningful results attained from qualitatively examining the visible
behaviours level of culture, along with the exploratory nature of studying the human
factors in the steel industry that are involved in the implementation of Lean strategy,
calls for a qualitative methodology. Such a methodology also enables the identification
of factors that have not previously been identified, and provides a rich description of
how these factors interact with one another. Scheduling decisions and behaviours related
to them are therefore treated here as the visible level of the organisational culture. In
addition, this study examines assumptions shared amongst organisational members that
are relevant to the enactment of Lean strategy: the nature of value and business success,
the way to achieve high production volume, and length of production lead time (Ohno
1988; Rother & Shook 2003; Womack & Jones 2003).
Organisational culture has the potential to impede the adoption of Lean strategy
through status-quo bias, which impedes the adoption of any new practices. New
behaviours required by Lean strategy (i.e., scheduling small batches and maintaining low
inventory levels) can be rejected due to fear of negative consequences. For this fear to
guide individuals, they do not need to experience such negative consequences
themselves. Organisational culture is socially transmitted (Schein 1992), and thus
influences organisational members without them directly experiencing consequences.
This view is supported by Bate’s study, showing how organisational culture can
constrain problem-solving behaviour (1984), not through individual experiences, but
rather through the socially acceptable norms and behaviours in the organisation. In other
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words, a member of the organisation does not have to attempt a new behaviour in order
to learn to avoid it.
This culturally-induced bias reinforces the status-quo bias mentioned in Section
2.3.2 (Kahneman & Tversky 1982; Inman & Zeelenberg 2002). Individuals perceive bad
results from non-status-quo decisions as worse than bad results that conform to statusquo decisions. This fear of deviating from status-quo decisions can impede the adoption
of Lean practices in scheduling, as they deviate from the status quo established in
traditional production organisations.

2.5.4

Summary
Decision-making literature suggests that many factors and cognitive biases can

impede the successful adoption of Lean practices by schedulers. Individual-related
factors can impede the adoption of Lean scheduling practices through the schedulers’
motives and experience. The characteristics of the scheduling task can also impede the
adoption of Lean scheduling practices, such as the weight given to different sources of
information, and the time horizon of the expected consequences of scheduling decisions.
Finally, context-related factors can impede the adoption of Lean practices, through the
need to justify decisions, and the influence of recent events. In addition, organisational
culture can provide a contextual environment that does not support Lean practices, by
upholding shared assumptions that promote status-quo scheduling decisions, rather than
supporting new and different Lean scheduling practices. Table 2.2 summarises the
various factors and biases.
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Table 2.2: Factors relevant for production-scheduling decisions

Context

Task

Individual

Factor
Attitudes
A learned evaluation of an
object
Motives
The motivational drivers of
the decision-maker

Relevant biases

• Commitment
• Confirmatory
• Persistence

Experience
Previous attempts and
involvement in similar
tasks
Capability
Cognitive ability to address
the problem
Decision objectives
The final outcomes sought
by the decision-maker
Time
Time available for
decision-making

• Availability
• Reference point
• Selective
perception

Information
Information available to
the decision-maker

• Base rate
• Presentation
o Mode
o Order
o Scale
o Mixture
o Framing

Justifiability
The need to explain and
justify a decision to
another
Preceding events
Short term – events
occurred prior to the
decision, temporarily
influencing the decision
Preceding events
Long term– events and
consequences occurred
prior to the decision,
embedded in the
organisational culture
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2.6 Human aspects in Lean manufacturing
Although schedulers have not been studied in the context of the adoption of a
new strategy, operations literature has examined human aspects relevant to this adoption.
Naturally, most of these studies were conducted in discrete industries, as Lean strategy is
far more prevalent in those industries. In order to understand possible human and
behavioural issues influencing the adoption of Lean in process industries, these studies
are discussed below.
The operations-management literature refers to Lean manufacturing also as “justin-time” (JIT), using these terms interchangeably, as they represent similar concepts:
elimination of waste, maximisation of efficiency, and continuous improvement. Other
studies have examined the conversion into cellular manufacturing (CM), where the
organisation is divided not into functional departments, but rather into “cells” according
to product families. These terms – Lean, Just-in-time, and cellular manufacturing – are
the key concepts guiding the review of literature in this section. Since most studies were
conducted in discrete industries, not all aspects apply to process industries. This point is
addressed in more detail in Section 2.6.5.
The adoption of Lean manufacturing requires major organisational and
operational changes (Power & Sohal 1997). From an operational perspective, it requires
a shift from production of large quantities to small batches. Rather than having large
safety inventories that act to buffer demand, organisations must retain low levels of “inprocess” material (or WIP). Processes must be efficient and reliable, so that defects are
avoided. Movements of people, parts and material must be minimised. All this, in turn,
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can help eliminate the waiting time for material, people, and equipment (Ohno 1988;
Rother & Shook 2003; Womack & Jones 2003).
From an organisational perspective, several changes are required for the
successful adoption of Lean manufacturing. Structural changes are required, since work
needs to be organised around product families instead of functional areas. The
workforce has to shift from functional divisions into “cells” – each cell responsible for a
product’s entire manufacturing (Womack & Jones 2003). This requires a diversification
of workers’ skills. Moreover, the multi-skilled operators in a cell need to work as a
team, and the teams, ideally, need to be self directed. Workers are expected to focus on
a continuous improvement of the process, constantly striving for perfection.
These changes can be difficult to implement. Shifting into work teams means
organisational restructuring, which often invokes fear and resistance. A requirement to
diversify skills can also create resistance among workers. Although the proponents of
Lean manufacturing claim these changes result in an enriched and engaging work
environment, organisational changes can be challenging (Hackman & Oldham 1980;
Kotter 1996; Morgan, D. E. & Zeffane 2003; Price et al. 2006). Areas of difficulty
identified when Lean manufacturing is implemented are: (1) changing to work in teams,
(2) developing a multi-skilled workforce, (3) implications of role changes in selfdirected teams, and (4) continuous improvement (Karlsson & Åhlström 1995; McLachlin
1997; Humphreys, McAleer & McIvor 1999; Yauch & Steudel 2002; Fraser, Harris &
Luong 2007). These areas of difficulty are discussed next.
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2.6.1

Change to working in teams
Since working in teams is an important part of cellular manufacturing, the impact

of the conversion of the work environment is important.

2.6.1.1 Relationships in work teams
McLachlin’s 1997 quantitative longitudinal case study demonstrates the
importance of relationships in work teams. Workers’ production, quality, and labour
productivity were compared before and after traditional divisions were divided into
teams. The most cohesive team demonstrated the highest increase in all three measures
of performance, whereas the team with the most conflicts did not display any
performance improvement. The third team in the study fell between the two extremes in
terms of both team relationship and performance. These findings are consistent with
other findings showing that the promotion of teamwork is a necessary condition for
successful implementation of just-in-time and quality (Karlsson & Åhlström 1995;
Yauch & Steudel 2002).
One of the difficulties in team formations comes from team members’ historical
perceptions of one another. Teams in Lean manufacturing often include people who in
the past worked in separate, and sometimes hostile, departments. Integrating these
individuals into one operating team can result in conflict, illustrated by the following
example (Humphreys, McAleer & McIvor 1999): an engineer and an operator, who were
previously members of different organisational units, are made members of the same
team. Their preconceived ideas about one another, however, sabotage potential
collaboration: the engineer perceives the operator’s questions as a threat to his authority,
whereas the operator perceives the engineer’s defensive response as being
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condescending and insulting. This example shows the need to address social aspects
when shifting into work teams, in order to reap the potential benefits of the integration of
the various functions into a single team. This is consistent with the findings of Yauch
and Steuel (2002), which showed that rigid group boundaries impede the conversion to
cellular manufacturing.

2.6.1.2 The importance of teamwork
Workers have ranked “teamwork” as one of the most important human-related
factors in cellular manufacturing companies (Fraser, Harris, & Luong, 2007). The more
experienced workers (three years of service and above) claimed to have more humanrelated problems than technical problems. This finding shows that while over time
workers become more comfortable with their area of expertise, the area of human
relations remains problematic. This result suggests that an intervention may be required
in order to improve human relationships.
In summary, the studies in this section (2.6.1) show the importance of
relationships and harmonious teamwork, both to operational performance and from
workers perspective. A criticism of Lean manufacturing in this respect has been that
despite this importance, Lean manufacturing imposes a work environment that does not
enable the social interactions necessary to establish such relationships (Delbridge 1998).
The lack of time and conditions in which social interactions can develop thus negatively
affects relationships between workers. Since positive interactions and cohesive
relationships are the human foundation of successful cellular manufacturing, operational
efficiencies may need to be occasionally sacrificed in order to sustain these crucial social
aspects.
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2.6.2

Multi-skilled work force
To increase production flexibility, just-in-time emphasises the need for multi-

skilled employees. This enables dynamic allocation of human resources according to
production needs (Billesbach 1994). The benefits of a multi-skilled workforce were
found to go beyond this dynamic allocation, and to increases employee awareness of
potential quality problems resulting from machine setup and operation (Olorunniwo &
Udo 2002). Another contribution of multi-skilling may be job enrichment as well as
facilitation of working in teams, thus answering the needs for social interactions
(Monden 1994; Womack & Jones 2003). Sections 2.6.2.1-4 examine empirical results
regarding issues that are relevant to multi-skilled workforces in Lean manufacturing.

2.6.2.1 Training
Not all companies provide formal training to diversify employee skills. Some
companies rely on on-the-job training, previous experience, and learning by doing
(Fraser, Harris & Luong 2007). However, formal training has been found to have a
significant impact in cellular manufacturing success (Olorunniwo & Udo 2002). This
study found that cellular manufacturing was more successful when employees were
“cross-trained”.
“Training” was also ranked as a high-importance subject for cellularmanufacturing employees (Fraser et al. 2007), as well as among managers of cellular
manufacturing (McLachlin 1997). Technical and operational training provides workers
with the tools to cope with their role-requirements. The importance of this justifies the
allocation of resources (for financial and non-financial) to promote cross-training.
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2.6.2.2 Organisational characteristics
Organisational characteristics such as plant size, age, and unionisation also have
an effect on whether a work force is successful at being multi-skilled, or crossfunctional. Unionised plants, as well as older plants, have been found to be negatively
correlated with a cross-functional work force (Shah, R. & Ward 2003). Both
unionisation and plants’ age were found to impede organisational adoption of changes in
general, and the adoption of Lean practices is thus more difficult in such plants.
Evidence regarding the impact of company size on the diversification of workers’
skills is mixed. White, Pearson, and Wilson (1999) found that small companies are more
likely to have multi-skilled employees than large companies, explaining that small
companies are more likely to diversify the skills of their work force. Shah and Ward
(2003) found no such difference in likelihood. However, compared to other Lean
practices studied, Shah and Ward found the association of multi-skilled work force and
with company size was weak. In general, large companies have more resources to enable
the implementation of Lean practices; however, smaller companies need a multi-skilled
work force, to achieve economies.

2.6.2.3 Incentives
The need to align incentives with Lean strategy is demonstrated in a case study of
a discrete manufacturer that adopted Lean strategy (Karlsson & Åhlström 1995). In this
study, when just-in-time was first implemented, employees were required to learn new
skills in order to increase the production teams’ flexibility. However, this requirement
was not initially linked to an incentive scheme. A misalignment between Lean strategy
and the incentive scheme was identified as an obstacle to the successful adoption of Lean
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strategy. As a result, the incentive scheme was adjusted, linking the number of an
employee’s different skills to their base pay. This new link between employees’ skills
and pay rates motivated employees to learn new tasks, which led to greater team
flexibility. This case study demonstrates how an alignment of employee incentives with
the objectives of Lean strategy can support the formation of a multi-skilled work force.
Karlsson and Åhlström’s 1995 study does not examine whether the motivation
for cross-training, to obtain cross-functional skills, led to cross- functional work as well.
There is evidence to suggest that switching roles is not always “enriching” for
employees, but rather disruptive (Delbridge 1998). The pressure to keep up with time
and quality demands encourages workers to prefer to specialise at performing a limited
number of tasks in order to successfully complete them. Rather than job enrichment,
multi-skilling is reported in Delbridge’s 1998 study to inflict additional pressure and
intensify workload. Even in Karlsson and Åhlström’s 1995 study, no intrinsic
motivation to acquire additional skills was demonstrated: financial incentives needed to
be present in order to facilitate this aspect of Lean strategy.

2.6.2.4 Cross-functional managers
Another aspect of cross-functional work is not the cross-functional worker, but
rather the cross-functional manager. Fawcett, Magnan, and McCarter (2005), after
interviewing 51 senior-level supply-chain managers, emphasise the need for managers
who have an understanding of the roles and challenges of the various value-adding
activities across the organisation. This understanding can reduce the impact of the
selective perception bias discussed in Section 2.3.2 above, which can result from
managers’ previous work experience. By exposing managers to various problem
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domains, their selective perception can be broadened to include the additional domains
in their interoperation of problems.

2.6.3

Role change in self-directed teams
Cellular manufacturing entails a change of role for workers and managers alike.

Workers are required to assume more responsibilities, whereas managers are required to
shift from “policing” to “coaching”. These changes require employee empowerment,
which does not necessarily lead to favourable results. A study of employees’ reaction to
change into self-managed work teams showed that employees’ concerns about
undesirable job assignments and added responsibilities led to higher resistance to the
change, and to a reduction in job satisfaction and organisational commitment (Kirkman
& Shapiro 2001). In addition, employers operating in traditional functional roles
demonstrated a higher job satisfaction and stronger organisational commitment
compared with cellular-manufacturing employees (Shafer et al. 1995). These results
suggest that self-directed work teams are not necessarily favoured by employees.
The requirement in cellular-manufacturing, and in Lean strategy in general, to
empower employees and to get them to assume greater responsibilities can be
problematic from a motivational perspective. McGregor’s (1960) Theory X and Theory
Y of human motivation provides an explanation of this discrepancy. According to this
theory, managerial decisions are made based on assumptions of human nature and
human behaviour. Theory X rests on the assumption that employees dislike work, prefer
to avoid responsibility, and must be coerced and directed in order to produce results that
are favourable to the organisation. This is the traditional way of viewing employees. In
contrast, Theory Y assumes employee and organisational goals are aligned, and thus
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employees are assumed to be intrinsically motivated to work, and their commitment to
learn can be stimulated by rewarding them for wanted results.
Lean strategy in general, and cellular manufacturing in particular, rely on Theory
Y employees to expend effort in order to advance organisational goals. However, when
shifting from traditional functional roles, which relied on Theory X methods of
motivation, Theory Y motivational methods and expectations may not be appropriate.
Supporting this assertion is the finding that unionised and old plants were less likely to
implement self-directed teams (Shah, R. & Ward 2003). Although unionisation can
empower employees and therefore can be expected to assist in the adoption of selfmanaged work teams (Karger 1990), unionisation indicates a coercive relationship
between workers and management, consistent with Theory X. In addition, old plants
pose difficulties when adopting new work practices (Nelson & Winter 1982), and thus
workers and managers can find it more difficult to adopt a new motivational perspective.
Another important aspect of Lean strategy that relies on Theory Y motivational
practices is the continuous search for improvement. This aspect is examined next.

2.6.4

Striving for perfection – continuous improvement
Many continuous-improvement schemes, such as ISO, Six Sigma, Business

Process Renovation (BPR), and Total quality Management (TQM), have been adopted
by organisations along with Lean manufacturing. Such continuous-improvement
programs, as suggested by Detret, Schroeder, and Mauriel (2000), require various
supporting cultural values: relying on long-term orientation, belief in intrinsic employee
motivation, constant aspiration for improvement (as opposed to reaching stability),
internal process improvement aiming to achieve results, internal and external
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collaboration and cooperation, and strong customer orientation. Studies reveal the
influences of different organisational factors and practices on the perfection aspect of
Lean manufacturing.

2.6.4.1 Impeding factors
Many organisational factors can impede continuous-improvement efforts. A
study by Yauch and Steudel (2002) revealed seven organisational factors that impede
conversion to cellular manufacturing, and in particular, inhibit continuous improvement
of the operation: under-organising, avoidance, lack of mutual respect and trust, lack of
crisis urgency, complacency, rigid group boundaries, and overemphasis on core
activities. Under-organisation not only hindered the conversion to cellularmanufacturing, but also caused waste of workers’ time and effort. Avoidance
undermined workers motivation to make improvement initiatives, as the organisational
culture tends to punish people for mistakes. Lack of mutual respect and trust between
workers and management also stops workers from taking improvement initiatives. Crisis
urgency (or lack of) and complacency are two inter-related factors, both undermining
workers’ motivation to improve. In the lack of crisis urgency, complacency about and
resignation to existing problems are accepted.
Rigid group boundaries make the flow of information and improvement ideas
difficult. Finally, overemphasis on core activities, rather than on improving processes or
systems, was also found to negatively influence continuous improvement.

2.6.4.2 Supporting factors
The only factor Yauch and Steudel (2002) identified as having a positive effect
on conversion to Lean manufacturing was external customer focus. The study found
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customer orientation supported initiatives for change, if the change would directly affect
customer satisfaction. This is consistent with a survey of 224 companies (Nahm,
Vonderembse & Koufteros 2004) showing that companies with strong customerorientation values correlate with the adoption of Lean manufacturing, and that these
values are positively related to performance.
Financial incentives were also found to affect continuous improvement, as shown
by Karlsson and Ahlstrom (1995). In their study (mentioned in Section 2.6.2.3), the
remuneration system was changed along with the adoption of Lean production. Apart
from a fixed component of employee salary, a bonus component was designed. It
depended on the team achieving: productivity, quality, and timely delivery. In this study,
productivity was measured as production time compared to standard production time.
Quality was measured as number of defects, and only zero defects resulted in a bonus.
Timely delivery was measured in terms of orders delivered on time. The bonus that was
conditioned on zero defects had a visible impact on workers focus. Employees took
measures to correct defective parts and avoid their delivery. They were observed to
become more efficient, not tolerating missing parts, in order to achieve the timeliness
bonus. This demonstrates a possible way to get workers motivated and involved in
improving operations. However, this study only observed a short period of time after the
adoption of Lean startegy– a limitation acknowledged by the authors. It may be difficult
to maintain constant, unstructured efforts for improvement over longer periods of time.
Further research to discover other supporting organisational factors is required.
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2.6.4.3 Maintenance
Although preventive maintenance has been identified as critical for the successful
implementation and sustainability of just-in-time (Spencer & Guide, 1995), evidence
shows that maintenance practices are generally not adjusted (Swanson, 1999). This is
explained by the need for different maintenance practices being less apparent to
managers, since just-in-time does not involve major changes in technology. This lack of
attention to maintenance is reflected in the equally poor focus in the literature in this
field (Pintelon, Pinjala, & Vereecke, 2006).

2.6.5

Relevance to process industries
Some aspects of Lean strategy discussed in the literature are not applicable to the

steel industry: cellular-manufacturing cannot be adopted in the steel industry due to large
and capital-intensive equipment, which prevent the possibility of rearranging
manufacturing according to product families (Abdullah & Rajgopal 2003; Dhandapani,
Potter & Naim 2004; Belvedere & Grando 2005; Harrison 2005). Cross-functional
workers are not necessary for flexibility, as the main source of value-add in process
industries is not through human activities but rather through a chemical process (Dennis
& Meredith 2000; Crama, Pochet & Wera 2001).
However, findings from this industry section remain critical to the successful
adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry. Collaboration between different
functions (such as engineering and production, or engineering and sales) remains critical
to successful operations. Even when not performed in a cellular setting, collaboration
between different functions in the business unit is still necessary for effective production.
Since the production process involves many stages which can affect one another, cross-
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functional awareness and a collaborative focus provide schedulers with the context
necessary to facilitate scheduling decisions that take into account an overall perspective,
and to justify decisions that have a negative impact on some localised functions.
Other contextual factors highlighted by these studies is the importance of
maintenance practices, which can facilitate a predictable and stable environment for the
scheduler to operate in, and cultural elements that support collaboration and continuous
improvement in the organisation. These factors ( under-organising, avoidance, lack of
mutual respect and trust, lack of crisis urgency, complacency, rigid group boundaries,
and overemphasis on core activities) can impede collaboration and continuous
improvement in steel-manufacturing organisations that seek to adopt Lean strategy.
Another relevant aspect of organisational culture is the discussion of Theory X Theory Y
employees. Lean strategy requires Theory Y employees; however, steel industry plants
are typically old and unionised, which corresponds with Theory X managerial approach.
In addition, these studies show that incentives structures need to be revised and
aligned with Lean practices. The traditional incentives in process industries are designed
to encourage production of large quantities and high product quality (Narayanan &
Raman 2004), which encourages local optimisations rather than cross-organisational
performance. Incentives therefore need to be modified to reflect the goals of Lean
strategy, in order to motivate behaviours that align with it. These human aspects are
expected to play a role in the process of adopting Lean strategy in the steel industry.
Finally, schedulers, who are central to the operational decisions that are vastly
affected by the adoption of Lean strategy, are not mentioned in studies examining human
issues accompanying this adoption. This raises the question, how would schedulers in
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the steel industry, who rely on practices thoroughly different to those required by Lean
strategy, deal with this adoption? This warrants a comparison of the role of the
schedulers in the steel industry with previous descriptions of schedulers, examined in
Section 2.1. This comparison is addressed by research sub-question 2 (Table 1.1).

2.7 Making scheduling decisions that support Lean strategy – a
summary of relevant literature
In order to address the general research question guiding this research, and to
identify factors that impede a successful and sustainable adoption of Lean strategy in the
steel industry, this chapter has examined three main bodies of literature: (1) literature on
schedulers, (2) literature on decision making, and (3) literature on adoptions of Lean
strategy in discrete manufacturing industries. This section summarises the main points
that have been identified.
Literature reviewed in this chapter shows that scheduling is a complex task
performed by a scheduling team. Although these teams have a significant accumulated
influence on the execution of business strategies, their role in the adoption (or rejection)
of Lean strategy has never been studied before, and very few studies of their influence in
the process industry exist. This gap guides RSQ1 (Table 1.1).
When examining the decisions that schedulers make, decision-making literature
suggests that many factors and cognitive biases can impede the successful adoption of
Lean practices by schedulers. Individual-related factors can impede the adoption of
Lean scheduling practices through the schedulers’ motives and experience. Literature
on the implementation of Lean strategy focuses mainly on financial incentives, however
their influence on schedulers has never been examined. Other individual factors that
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may bias schedulers’ decisions, such as experience, attitudes, and capabilities, have also
not been previously examined.
Decision making literature suggests that other factors, grouped into Task and
Context factors, may have an influence on schedulers’ decisions. The characteristics of
the scheduling task can also impede the adoption of Lean scheduling practices, due to the
weight given to different sources of information, and the time horizon of the expected
consequences of scheduling decisions. Indeed, previous studies of schedulers show that
scheduling teams often do not have the formal power to carry out their responsibilities,
and they thus use relationships to influence other parties involved in the production.
These relationships with various business functions (i.e., sales, engineering, and
production) and with various business units along the supply chain impact on how
schedulers interpret the scheduling task, and how they construct a decision. In addition,
context-related factors can also impede the adoption of Lean practices, through the need
to justify decisions, and the influence of recent events. Literature on the adoption of
Lean strategy emphasises the need to create a predictable and stable production
environment, which provides a specific context for scheduling decisions. However, the
influence of such contextual factors on the decisions of schedulers has also never been
studied. This gap in literature requires an answer to RSQ2 (Table 1.1).
Contextual factors are perhaps the most complex group of decisions factors to
study. These factors include the need to provide justification for the decisions, and the
influence of organisational culture. Both these issues suggest potential impedances to
the adoption of Lean practices. The need to provide justification for decisions means
that decision makers need to take into account the views of other stakeholders, which
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may have their own agenda with regards to Lean practices. Organisational culture has
been identified as a potential impedance to the adoption of Lean strategy through statusquo bias, which impedes the adoption of any new practices (Kahneman & Tversky 1982;
Inman & Zeelenberg 2002). Literature on organisational culture also identifies a level of
shared assumptions (Schein 1992), whereas literature on the adoption of Lean strategy
identifies how such assumptions can affect the successful adoption of the strategy
(Nahm, Vonderembse & Koufteros 2004). Although the influence of organisational
culture on the successful adoption of Lean strategy has been examined, no examination
of this influence on schedulers’ decisions during such adoption has been conducted,
neither in discrete industries, nor in the steel industry. This gap raises the final research
sub questions, RSQ3 (Table 1.1).
The research questions in this study require an in-depth investigation of many
inter-related and complex issues. This investigation is conducted using a methodology
of a qualitative case study. The methodology and the methods used to thoroughly
address these questions are elaborated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3

Research methodology and design

This chapter describes the methodology employed in this research. It provides a
detailed description, analysis and interpretation of the human aspects relevant to
scheduling decisions that support or impede the adoption of Lean strategy. This research
is exploratory in nature, and identifies the reasons that undermined the sustainability of
Lean strategy in a steel-manufacturing organisation. This research also employs a
descriptive approach to identify and depict the factors in the steel industry that currently
influence the performance of Lean scheduling practices. Data were collected from
interviews, focus groups, and organisational documents. A thematic analysis was used
to extract meaning from the data, and to identify factors relevant to the research
question. This chapter describes and justifies this research design.

3.1 Research approach
Thus far, this thesis has emphasised the importance of schedulers’ decisions to
the operations of a production and manufacturing organisation. However, scheduling in
the context of adopting a new strategy has not been previously studied. Therefore, this
study aims to uncover the individual, task-related, and contextual factors that support or
impede schedulers’ adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry.
For this purpose, case study research was chosen. Case study research enables
the researcher to gain a deep understanding of scheduling decisions and factors that
influence these decisions in real work setting. It is particularly valuable when the
intention is to examine phenomena in their natural setting (Meredith 1998), and it is a
powerful approach that can provide a rich set of data on real-world practice (Voss, C.,
Tsikriktsis & Frohlich 2002; Berglund & Guinery 2008). Case studies are used to
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explain phenomena when the researcher has limited, if any, control over events,
behaviours, and conditions, and when the focus is on contemporary and contextual
events (Yin 2003). In addition, the formulation of the research questions also guides the
selection of a research approach. According to Yin (2003), case studies are appropriate
when the research seeks to address “how” and “why” questions. The questions of this
research are mainly interested in how and why Lean strategy is accepted or rejected in
the steel industry, therefore suggesting case study research is appropriate.
The type of case study research employed in this study is a combination of a
retrospective and longitudinal case study of a single company. This research perspective
enables a thorough, in-depth analysis of the human aspects involved in the adoption of
Lean strategy (Klein, H. & Myers 1999; Voss, C., Tsikriktsis & Frohlich 2002), by
examining retrospective views of an unsuccessful attempt to implement Lean strategy.
This examination identified factors that influenced scheduling decisions, as they were
revealed during the implementation of Lean strategy.
A major benefit of a retrospective approach is the reliability of the case’s
selection. Since the success, and particularly the sustainability, of strategy
implementation can only be evaluated in retrospect, a retrospective case selection is
more reliable in terms of identifying this success (or sustainability) (Voss, C., Tsikriktsis
& Frohlich 2002).
A retrospective case study, however, is subject to the following potential
problems (Voss, C., Tsikriktsis & Frohlich 2002):
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1. Interview inaccuracies – participants may not recall important events, or their
recollection may be biased. A particular problem is post-rationalisation: events are
interpreted differently in hindsight, compared to how they were interpreted at the time.
2. Archival inaccuracies – archival data, such as meeting minutes and other
documentation, may not always reflect the whole truth, as difficult or controversial items
may not appear.
To address these problems, Voss et al. (2002) suggest employing a longitudinal
approach. Therefore, the study also examined contemporary scheduling practices in the
organisation’s business units, in order to gain contemporary perspective on the forces
that support or impede Lean strategy. Another reason to examine factors influencing
current scheduling factors is availability. Schedulers involved in the adoption of Lean
strategy were not available. However, current schedulers were able to provide their
perspective on the factors that influence their decisions to adopt (or reject) Lean
scheduling practices.
This study gained a longitudinal perspective by a "combination of retrospective
and real time analysis" (Pettigrew 1990, p. 271). By comparing retrospective views on
past scheduling practices with current scheduling practices in the same organisation, this
study gains a longitudinal perspective of these practices. Since the practices were
studied in different units, the study sought to identify similarities between past and
present. In addition, current schedulers often provided an insight on past practices in
their units, which were compared with past practices identified in the retrospective
accounts. Most interviewees had tenure of over 10 years in the company, and typically
worked in more than one unit. Therefore, their experience and knowledge extended the
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practices common in their unit only. This provided a longitudinal view of scheduling
practices that were common throughout the entire organisation, and not only in specific
unit. This is a great benefit of the case study approach – it provides a richer historical,
contextual, and processual perspective, which are critical to the understanding of
organisational change (Pettigrew 1990).
To gain a comprehensive understanding of factors influencing schedulers’
decisions, contemporary scheduling practices were studied in two different units. The
selection of these units, or sampling, was based on the similarity of their operations to
the operations in the unit of Lean implementation, and is further described in Section 3.2.
This case provides a unique opportunity to learn about factors that impede the
sustainability of Lean strategy over time in a process industry, as it describes an
implementation of Lean strategy that was initially successful, but over time was rejected
due to constant resistance. This is in contrast to most cases in the literature, which
describe a snapshot in time of a successful implementation (e.g., Abdulmalek &
Rajgopal 2007). Other descriptions of the implementation of Lean strategy report
failures (e.g., Yauch & Steudel 2002). However, a rich description of the factors that
can lead to a rejection of Lean strategy after initial success extends the understanding of
factors that have a prolonged and persistent effect on its enactment.
Examining a past attempt to implement Lean strategy provides an understanding
of human factors that influence its adoption. Examining current scheduling practices
enables triangulation of the findings identified in the implementation case, and reveals
contextual factors involved in scheduling decisions that influence the execution of Lean
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strategy. Examining contemporary scheduling practices also shows longitudinal changes
in the organisation that are relevant to the adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry.

3.2 Case selection
The organisational units and data sources selected for this study enables
exploration and comparison of human aspects that are specific to the adoption of Lean
strategy in the steel industry, as well as an in-depth understanding of factors that
influence schedulers’ decisions. Two types of organisational units were selected for this
study. One unit was involved in a past attempt to implement Lean strategy in a steelmanufacturing organisation (i.e., a retrospective case study: Lean implementation at the
mill). This unit was selected due to the extreme degrees of effort, expertise, and
resources devoted to this implementation (see Appendix B) on one hand, and the gravity
of the consequences of rejecting the strategy on the other hand. Examining this
implementation in depth provides an important opportunity to identify challenges unique
to the adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry.
The other type provides a longitudinal perspective on the adoption of Lean
strategy in the steel industry, as well as a more detailed understanding of factors that
influence scheduling decisions. This type includes two business units along the supply
chain of the same steel manufacturer, whose traditional manufacturing has been
modified to include some Lean aspects. These two units, here called Unit A and Unit B,
were selected based on the Lean practices that apply to them. Both units are able to
adopt Lean practices that are similar to the practices implemented in the unit of
retrospect. Like that unit, the two other units regularly process discrete products. These
products are different to discrete-industry products in terms of size, and therefore cellular
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manufacturing is not possible (Abdullah & Rajgopal 2003; Abdulmalek & Rajgopal
2007). In addition, these products undergo a process of changing the material’s physical
attributes, thus imposing limitations on changeovers and processing capacity. However,
paced production and lower WIP levels are possible and can be beneficial to these
production units. Examining scheduling practices in these units enables an in-depth
understanding of scheduling practices in the steel industry, and the factors that influence
schedulers when they make decisions influencing the adoption of Lean strategy.
Access to these units was suggested by a task force from the steel manufacturer.
This task force was involved in this study, and was founded in order to re-examine the
applicability of Lean strategy to the organisation’s supply chain. The task force was thus
interested in identifying human issues that had caused the adoption of Lean strategy in
the organisation to fail.

3.2.1

Selection of participants
No previous studies describing human issues that support or impede the

sustainable adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry had been done at the time of
this research. This called for exploratory study, to identify these issues and how they
operate. Thus, participants were interviewed in the order prescribed by Grounded
Theory, where similar viewpoints are sought first, in order to construct a basic
understanding of the examined phenomena (Glaser 1978). Then, after this basic
understanding is reached, the researchers seeks interviewees with perspectives and
viewpoints as different as possible, in order to identify differences to the formed
perspective and distil the main themes.
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For the retrospect case, the first two interviewees were senior members of the
Lean implementation team. Subsequent interviewees provided the perspectives of other
members involved in this implementation, including engineers and hands-on change
managers.
In addition to participants who were directly involved in this implementation,
participants offering a broader understanding of contextual factors were interviewed.
These participants (John and Collin, Table 3.1) informed this study of conditions that are
typical to the steel industry, to this organisation, and to the implementation of Lean
strategy.
For contemporary scheduling, members from the different units’ scheduling
teams were interviewed. Interviews were conducted with individuals who were
identified as key stakeholders in the scheduling process, and voluntarily agreed to
participate in this research. First, members of Unit A’s scheduling team were
interviewed, and after the data had been analysed, members from Unit B’s scheduling
team were interviewed. Fewer members from Unit B were interviewed as few relevant
were revealed in the Unit B interviews. At that stage, interviews were stopped.
Table 3.1 summarise participants, their unit of origin, and their role. Participants
appear in order of interviews.
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Table 3.1: Participants

Case study

Participant

Implementation Ross

Role
Program sponsor

Cameron

Program director

Collin*

Lean implementer

Fiona

Implementation team manager

John*

Senior HR manager

Ian

Team leader, implementation team member

Ron

Team leader, implementation team member

Vincent

Implementation champion, manager

Current

Lee

Planner and scheduler

scheduling –

Fred

Master scheduler

Sam

Unit scheduler

Paul

Unit scheduler

Ronald

Shift controller

Current

Owen

Planner and scheduler

scheduling –

Alice

Novice scheduler

Vera

Unit scheduler

Unit A

Unit B

∗ Participants external to the implementing unit, offering a broad perspective
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3.3 Data Collection
Data were collected through interviews, focus groups, and archival documents.
Combining data sources increases construct validity in case study research (Denzin &
Lincoln 1994; Yin 2003); this aspect is addressed in more detail in Section 3.5. Each
data source is addressed separately below.

3.3.1

Interviews
To provide standardisation, and thus contribute to the reliability of the findings of

this study, an interview protocol was developed for each interview set. The interview
protocols provided an explicit agenda for the researcher’s line of inquiry and aimed to
help the researcher to minimise errors and biases in conducting the interviews. These
protocols were set up to ensure that the interviews were conducted consistently across
participants, and hence substantiated the reliability of the study (Gibbert, Ruigrok &
Wicki 2008). Since the two interview sets differed in participants (implementation-team
members versus current schedulers), and in aims (exploring reasons for rejecting Lean
strategy versus understanding current influences on Lean scheduling decisions), different
interview questions and protocols were developed. These protocols are presented in
Appendix C. Although these protocols served as a guide for completeness of issues
addressed, in most interviews, participants led the conversation, with minimal
intervention. This interviewing strategy was selected in order to avoid biased and partial
responses (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008).
Prior to an interview, respondents were given an overview that explained the
goals of the project and the interviews. The company liaison gave the researcher a
description of the individual’s role, common motivators and decision drivers, as well as
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typical organisational conditions in the individual’s unit. This information enabled a
better focus during the interview. An interview was scheduled to last for up to an hour;
however, some interviews lasted up to ninety minutes. No other parties were present
during interviews (accept for one interview in Unit B, where the planner was joined by a
novice scheduler). The interviews were recorded and transcribed by an independent
transcription service. Transcriptions were edited by the researcher, as some terms were
incorrectly transcribed.
Due to a technical problem, half of the interview with one participant (Vera, Unit
B), was not recorded and thus not transcribed. At the end of the interview, the researcher
wrote the main themes discussed in the interview based on her memory. In addition, the
researcher regularly documented her reflections after interviews, in order to capture
general impressions and potential biases. These reflections were consulted during data
analysis, to remind the researcher of contextual effects.

3.3.2

Focus groups
An important source of data triangulation was regular focus groups conducted as

part of this research (Morgan, D.L. & Spanish 1984). This research was part of a larger
project. Part of the project involved regular focus-group meetings with members of the
organisation studied. These meetings were not recorded or transcribed. However, the
researcher took notes and minutes, which were then sent to the other participants for
approval.
Focus groups met regularly on a weekly basis for a period of six months. During
these meeting, the following issues were discussed:
§
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§

Schedulers’ performance measures

§

Business-unit performance measures

§

Collaboration across business units

§

Collaboration within business units

§

Schedulers’ control over production decisions in different units

§

Motivators for high inventory levels

§

Mechanisms of resistance to Lean practices

§

Operational factors involved in scheduling decisions

§

Shared assumptions regarding scheduling practices

§

Common scheduling priorities

Each focus-group meeting was summarised by the researcher, and the summary
was sent to the rest of the participants for comments. Periodic summaries were
presented to a larger forum, which included experienced and high-ranking managers in
the organisation, for validation.
These summaries were used for triangulation, to evaluate the completeness of the
data collected (Breitmayer, Ayres & Knafl 1993). The summaries were compared to
views presented by interviewees. Congruence between focus-group meeting summaries
strengthened interviewee views, whereas incongruence indicated that further
investigation is needed, until an understanding of the discrepancy has been reached.

3.3.3

Documents
Several organisational documents were examined in order to triangulate the

findings identified during interviews and focus groups. Most documents supported and
illustrated the researcher’s understandings. On occasion, documents presented themes
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that were new to the researcher. These documents were then discussed with the
company liaison, and the new theme was either integrated into the findings, or discarded,
if it was not pertinent to the understanding of the forces that determine scheduling
practices or to the understanding of the rejection of Lean strategy. Table 3.2 summarises
the documents, their content, and their relevance.

Table 3.2: Documents examined in this study and their relevance

Documents

Relevance

Lean strategy training and
education documents

Establishing implementation rigour

Reports on training
progress

Establishing implementation rigour

Current business-analysis
documents

Understanding current scheduling practices

Planning and scheduling
review

Understanding and confirming scheduling practices,
information sources, and processes

Irit Alony
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3.4 Analysis
The purpose of analysis is to draw meaning from the data (Miles & Huberman
1994). This process involves selecting data items, interpretation, and synthesising
findings. Data were selected and interpreted through thematic analysis, which seeks
meaningful extracts of data items. These extracts are “illustrative of the analytic points
the researcher makes about the data, and should be used to illustrate/support an analysis
that goes beyond their specific content, to make sense of the data, and tell the reader
what it does or might mean” (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 94). The way these extracts were
identified is described in the following sections, as their identification relies on the
selection of data items, their coding, and deriving meaning from them. These extracts,
along with the points that they indicate, are presented in Chapter 5 as the findings of this
thesis. The next section presents the process of analysis undertaken in this study.

3.4.1

Selecting data items
Selecting data to be analysed is endemic to the data-collection process (Miles &

Huberman 1994). For example, during interviews, data sources such as participants and
questions are selected deliberately. In contrast, such selection is not always deliberate
during observations as the researcher determines what to note and register. This renders
at least some of the data selection intuitive to the researcher.
The selection of interviewees and interview questions has already been discussed
in Section 3.2. In addition, documents were selected for analysis in this study based on
their utility in supporting understandings formed through interviews and focus groups.
These documents served as tangible evidence confirming statements and constructs
emerging from previous data. Documents were selected based on their pertinence to the
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scheduling process, their pertinence to the understanding of shared assumptions relevant
to the adoption of Lean strategy, and their illustration of the forces that operated during
the implementation of Lean strategy in the organisation.

3.4.2

Coding
Three levels of coding were used: descriptive, interpretive, and pattern (Miles &

Huberman 1994). All coding was done using a qualitative analysis software (NVivo 7
'Nvivo' 2007), which supports a smooth transition between the various stages.
Descriptive coding attributes a class of phenomena to a segment of text, with
little or no interpretation. For example, an answer to the question: “How was Lean
strategy introduced in the mill?” was coded under the category “Introducing Lean”. Due
to its content, this was also coded under sub-category “Teaching theory”.
Interpretive coding was far more prolific. This coding level involved the
researcher’s judgement, and meaning was extracted based on how the data item reflected
the theme addressed. For example, a document developed after Lean strategy had been
implemented, which explains how small batches do not reduce utilisation, but do reduce
production lead-time, demonstrates that resistance to Lean strategy in this unit was due
to the fear of falls in utilisation and production levels. The statements in this document,
which reinforces the effects of Lean strategy on lead-times, and its lack of effect on
utilisation and production levels, were coded as “Resistance to Lean”, under the subcategory “High utilisation and production”.
Finally, pattern coding requires matching the categories previously identified in
both research phases to produce a holistic picture of the underlying causes to the
rejection of Lean strategy. For example, several factors that impede Lean scheduling
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practices stemmed from emotional motivation. This led to the understanding that
emotional aspects are involved in scheduling decision-making, when schedulers are
required to adopt Lean practices.
These three stages were also applied when coding current scheduling practices.
Descriptive coding was used to categorise the task, individual, and contextual factors
influencing scheduling decisions, based on the framework summarised in Figure 2.2
(Appendix A contains the identified factors). In addition, schedulers’ roles were
identified based on predefined categories. These categories include information node,
negotiator and influencer, and problem anticipator and solver, as described in Section
2.1.2. However, one role of schedulers, which had not been defined explicitly before,
became evident – the scheduler as a strategy executor. These categories are presented in
Section 5.1.
Next, interpretive coding was used to identify the influences of various factors on
the adoption of Lean strategy. Influences were divided into supporting and impeding
influences. These codes were condensed into categories presented in Section 5.2.
The final stage of analysis sought to understand the assumptions shared by
members of this organisation that led to scheduling decisions that did not align with
Lean strategy. At this stage, pattern coding revealed assumptions that need to be shared
to enable the adoption of Lean strategy in a steel-manufacturing organisation. These
assumptions are presented in Section 5.3 and discussed in Section 6.3.

3.4.3

Creating codes
This research employs thematic analysis to identify the human aspects relevant to

the adoption of Lean practices by schedulers in the steel industry. Thematic analysis

Irit Alony

Masters by Research

Page 83 of 224

seeks to identify, analyse, and report patterns (themes) within the data (Braun & Clarke
2006). It demands that the researcher play an active role in the identification, selection,
and reporting of these themes. This analysis is conducted in three distinct stages
(Boyatzis 1998).
Stage I: Deciding on sampling and design issues. This stage has been addressed
in Sections 3.2 and 3.4. Participants were chosen based on the key role they played in
implementing Lean strategy, their influence on current scheduling practices, and their
ability to provide contextual information on industry and organisational characteristics.
Documents were selected for analysis based on their ability to testify to the validity of
the researcher’s understanding.
Stage II: Developing themes and codes. This stage requires deciding what
counts as a theme, and what approach the coding process is based on: deductive or
inductive. A theme is defined as “a specific pattern found in the data in which one is
interested” (Joffe & Yardley 2003, p. 57), or similarly, “[a] theme captures something
important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of
patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 82, italics
original). These definitions consistently describe a theme as a concept that researcher
sees as relevant, and which repeats itself systematically in the data set. This renders the
researcher’s judgement central to the coding process.
In addition, themes can be identified based on a predefined framework using a
top-down approach (Boyatzis 1998), or they can emerge bottom-up from the data, as
common in Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967). In this study, although both the
data collection and analysis stages had initial lists of codes (which was based on the
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factors identified in Chapter 2, summarised in Table 2.2), additional categories (or
themes) became evident during the analysis phase. These categories were instrumental
in addressing the research questions, as they helped in understanding the underlying
human factors that led to the rejection of Lean strategy in the steel-manufacturing
organisation studied, as well as the shared assumptions that can lead schedulers to
perform or avoid Lean practices at present. Thus, an inductive, data-driven approach
was beneficial in this study to arrive at novel insights.
Stage III: Validating and using the codes. At this stage, codes found in the data
are compared to codes derived from literature. Their presence or absence is examined
relative to exiting theory (Boyatzis 1998). This presence or absence indicates the
whether the findings support, refute, or extend theory. However, when the codes are
data-driven, they need to be validated (Miles & Huberman 1994). The next section
describes the steps taken to ensure construct validity in this study.

3.5 Validity and reliability of constructs
This study sought to address three types of validity (internal, construct, and
external) based on a framework for rigorous case studies (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki
2008).
Internal validity, also called “logical validity” is concerned with causal
relationships between variables and results (Yin 2003). It is concerned with the
researcher’s logical reasoning and compelling argument, to support their conclusions.
This type of validity is established by the researcher’s awareness of multiple theoretical
frameworks at the time of the analysis (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008). Data were
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analysed based on a decision-making framework and a change-management framework
(Appendices I and II).
The second type of validity addressed in this study is construct validity. This
refers to the quality of conceptualisation and application of the relevant concepts. To
establish construct validity, two measures were taken: data triangulation (by comparing
participants’ account to internal documents and reports), and constant review of the
findings by different experts (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008). After each focus group
(Section 3.3.2), a summary of the researcher’s understanding was sent to the
participants. Focus-group members then reviewed the document to ensure concepts
were correctly understood and presented. Discrepancies were pointed out, and the
findings were updated accordingly. In addition, these findings were aggregated and
presented to a wider audience on a yearly basis. Comments received from other
organisational members were taken into account and findings were revised accordingly.
External validity, or ‘generalisability’, refers to the ability to extrapolate from
the conclusions of the case study to theory that can be applied in other settings (Gibbert,
Ruigrok & Wicki 2008). To establish external validity, this study provides ample detail
on the context of this case study (see Chapter 4), as well as a justification for the
selection of this case study (Section 3.2). Table 3.3 summarises the measures taken to
ensure these types of validity.
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Table 3.3: Measures taken to ensure validity in this study

Validity type

Measures taken

Phase

Internal

§

Multiple theoretical frameworks

Analysis

Construct

§

Data triangulation

Data Collection

§

Review of findings by participants
and third parties

Validation

§

Details of case context

Reporting

External
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Chapter 4

Cases descriptions

The organisation studied is an Australian steel manufacturer that traditionally
operated based on push production strategy – processing large batches and queuing
orders. A background description of this organisation is provided in Section 4.1.
The organisation has attempted to implement Lean strategy in several units over
the past few years. The first unit in which Lean strategy was implemented was the mill.
A description of this implementation is provided in Section 4.2.
Finally, two business units were studied in order to understand their scheduling
practices. Figure 4.1 illustrates how the two units are positioned in the organisation’s
supply chain. It can be seen that the units are not at the beginning of the supply chain,
and that they have a similar positioning in regards to their customers. The units are
described in more detail in Section 4.3.

Figure 4.1: The organisation’s internal supply chain and studied units

4.1 Background – organisation studied
The organisation studied is a multinational steel-manufacturing business with
considerable experience of internal supply chains. The culture of the organisation can be
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implied from some of the following characteristics. It is a major employer in its region,
and many of the employees joined the organisation with little or no professional training.
The organisation is hierarchical and centralised, and has well-established control
mechanisms such as performance measures, policies, levels of authority, and financial
incentives. The workforce is mostly male, and tenure is commonly over 15 years.
However, most senior management positions turn over about every five years. Since the
1980s, the organisation has gone through three major restructures, during which the
workforce has dropped from over 20,000 employees to under 4,000.
The organisation constantly seeks to improve operational performance by
reducing production lead times, as well as increasing timely delivery, reducing inventory
levels, and achieving better product quality.

4.2 The implementation of Lean strategy – the mill
Lean strategy was implemented in the mill as a joint effort of a corporatesponsored Lean implementation team, and the mill’s top management. The
implementation team was educated in Lean strategy tools and techniques over a period
of 12 months. This education involved interactions with world experts and observations
of Lean organisations internationally. The team developed a detailed implementation
plan for employees’ education, and followed up to ensure workshops were attended as
planned. The team also developed policies and procedures that enforced Lean work
practices, such as kanbans, maintenance schedules, and layout modifications, and ensure
the practices were followed. A detailed description of the efforts invested in this major
change is provided in Appendix B.
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The initial adoption of Lean strategy was successful and operational results
improved significantly. Within six months, the unit’s production lead time fell from 57
to 23 days, and machine utilisation was raised from 80% up to 95%. In some cases,
machines were utilised above 100% i.e., utilisation exceeded machines owners’
expectations. In addition, the unit benefited from better quality, as low levels of
inventory revealed quality problems earlier (when products reached downstream units),
and thus enabled earlier repairs.
After a few months of successful Lean practicing, the implementation team left
the unit. However, without the supervision of the implementation team, the unit
gradually returned to its traditional practices. The implementation team was called back
into the unit and attempted to reinforce the changes that supported Lean practices. This
attempt was not sustained this time, as the unit’s top manager was promoted (ironically,
due to the successful results achieved by implementing Lean strategy in the mill), and
the new top manager did not support the methods and practices of Lean strategy. After
abandoning Lean practices, lead times climbed up to 90 days, and the mill’s performance
deteriorated. Eventually, the mill was declared non-economical and was closed down1.
The equipment was sold, and many of the employees were let go. The events of this
case study are summarised in the timeline presented in Figure 4.2.

1

In addition to the increase in production lead-times, there is evidence that suggest the closing of the mill

was influenced by additional political and economic factors. However, there was a significant capital
investment in new equipment, which was meant to upgrade the mill’s technical performance, indicating
that major efforts were exerted to sustain the mill. The role of other factors in the shutdown was
inconclusive, and not the primary concern of this study.
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Figure 4.2: Timeline for Lean implementation at the mill

4.3 Current scheduling
Current scheduling was studied in two different units: Unit A and Unit B (Figure
4.1). Unit A is a metallic painting and coating facility, providing supplies for building,
construction, manufacturing, automotive, and transport. The unit receives its raw
material from a mill upstream.
Unit B rolls steel slabs into flat products used in manufacturing, building,
construction, and mining. The capacity of this unit is relatively low. However, their
products have the highest profitability. Thus, this unit has the highest priority for feed
material from upstream units. The sequence of scheduling is constrained by process
requirements, prescribing a certain sequence of product types.
Current scheduling is based on strategic and sales plan. Planners are informed of
the strategic plan for the next three years and of the sales plan for the next year in
meetings with higher management. The planners then pass the relevant information to
the master schedulers. The master schedulers supervise the unit schedulers, who
produce the daily plan. Finally, shift controllers are in charge of moving raw material,
work-in-process, and finished product around the plant. Table 4.1 summarises this
scheduling hierarchy.
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Table 4.1: Scheduling hierarchy

Scheduling level

Time horizon

Time units

Strategic Plan

3 Fiscal years

Quarters

Sales and Operations Plan

1 Fiscal year

Months

Master Production Schedule

3 Months

Weeks

Production Plan

1 Week

Daily

Production Schedule

2 Days

Hourly

Control – Schedule
Execution

1 Shift

Minutes

Scheduling function
Planner
Master Scheduler
Unit Scheduler
Shift controller

The scheduling process at both units aims to satisfy customer orders on time
while maintaining full capacity utilisation. However, the two units differ in their control
over the functions surrounding the production process. Unit A does not have formal
control over its suppliers, sales, and logistics, while Unit B formally controls them. Unit
A planners and schedulers rely on communication and collaboration with their
surrounding functions, whereas Unit B coordinates the surrounding functions through
formal control. To assure appropriate supply, the scheduler at Unit B informs the
supplier unit of the type of raw material needed for the following days. The planner at
Unit B informs the sales team of the capacity that they are permitted to sell over the
following week. Finally, logistics and transportation are informed of the due dates and
special delivery needs (as some products require special vessels).
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Chapter 5

Findings

An analysis of the data collected from the case studies as described in Section 3.3
revealed various themes that address the research questions. These themes describe the
various roles of schedulers in this organisation, the various factors that influence their
performance of Lean practices, and the influence of assumptions shared by
organisational members on the adoption of Lean practices. This chapter integrates
themes that emerged from the implementation case study and from the current
scheduling practices of the organisation studied, and addresses the research questions in
the following manner: Section 5.1 addresses the first research sub-question, which seeks
to compare the role of the schedulers in the steel industry with previously described roles
of schedulers, and presents the roles of schedulers identified in this study.
Section 5.2 addresses the second research sub-question, which seeks to identify
and describe various factors that support or impede the adoption of Lean scheduling
practices. This section presents evidence of individual factors: emotional skills,
motivators, and intuition; contextual factors, including unit localised or collaborative
focus, prioritisation of customer needs or production, and performance measures; and
finally, task-related factors: priority for low or high inventory, prioritisation of orders,
and process requirements.
Finally, in relation to the third research sub-question, Section 5.3 addresses the
third research sub-question, presenting the assumptions shared amongst organisational
members that support or impede the successful and sustainable adoption of Lean
strategy. Section 5.3 provides a detailed examination of how factors identified in
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Section 5.2 are synthesised into these shared assumptions. However, a relation of the
assumptions to Lean principles is discussed in Section 6.3.

5.1 Roles of schedulers in the steel industry
This section addresses the first research sub-question: “How does the role of
schedulers in the steel industry compare with schedulers’ previously described roles?”
As described in Table 4.1, four levels of schedulers have been identified in the
organisation: planner, master scheduler, unit scheduler, and shift controller. While
planners and shift controllers are identical terms and roles to those described in
literature, master schedulers and unit schedulers differ slightly. The term “schedulers”
found in literature describes a role which is equivalent to master schedulers in the
organisation in this study (Fransoo & Rutten 1994; MacCarthy & Wilson 2001; Jackson,
Wilson & MacCarthy 2004). However, this organisation also includes unit schedulers,
who were not previously described in literature: this seems to be an intermediate level
between “scheduler” and “controller”, which only schedules specific areas in the plant,
in accordance with the instructions of the master scheduler. Partial evidence indicates
that master schedulers perform the roles described in literature (i.e., information node,
influencer and negotiator, and problem anticipator and solver). However, in addition to
these roles, evidence suggests that master schedulers also influence the execution of a
strategy. This section presents this evidence.

5.1.1

Information node
In accordance with previous literature, master schedulers in this organisation (1)

receive current information from various sources, (2) act as sources of real-time
information, and (3) manipulate information by seeking ways to improve its reliability
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and quality. These behaviours are discussed next. Evidence for these functions are
summarised in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Evidence of schedulers’ actions as information nodes

Information
provision to
the scheduler

[Our scheduling team] is the hub of all
knowledge, and we are lucky that everyone
recognises that. [They are aware that] “if I do
something that might affect supply chain, I’d
better tell them [the scheduling team]”. [Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]

Seeking
information
from the
scheduler

Fred [the master scheduler] has a really good
picture on everything. Everyone speaks to him,
so he’s a good man to channel [information]
through. [Ronald, shift controller, Unit A]

Information
manipulation
and
interpretation

Our challenge was to get a correct capacity
promise.
[Production] now cannot promise any
more than what they have made for the last 13
weeks.
It is called “demonstrated capacity”.
You have only been demonstrating for the last 13
weeks X amount of tonnes, therefore you can only
promise X amount of tonnes.
[Lee, planner and
scheduler, Unit A]

(1) Information provision to the master scheduler
Master schedulers are recognised by the various organisational functions as
central nodes coordinating the plant’s operations. For this reason, master schedulers are
kept informed about the situation of the plant in terms of machines, transportation, and
production status. These master schedulers testify that they are sufficiently informed and
updated to perform their duties in this organisation.
(2) The master scheduler as a source of real-time information
Master schedulers serve as a source of real-time and up-to-date information. This
is evident from that fact that various functions (e.g., the controller in the quote)
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acknowledge the master scheduler is current and up-to-date in the state of the plant, and
thus is a reliable source.
(3) Seeking ways to improve information quality
Master schedulers receive information from various sources; however, they do
not blindly accept that information. Rather, master schedulers seek to interpret and make
sense of that information in order to verify that it is correct. Incorrect information
severely harms scheduling decisions, and therefore master schedulers seek standardised
ways to address consistent problems of incorrect information. For example, due to the
master schedulers’ initiative, a new rule has been introduced regarding the estimations of
capacity. Master schedulers compose production schedules based on estimated capacity.
This estimate is provided by production managers. However, inflated promised capacity
presents potential disruptions to future schedules. Therefore, the schedulers introduced
the concept “demonstrated capacity”, production capacity that has previously been
demonstrated by tangible production outcomes. This is the upper limit of capacity that
production can now promise to produce. The upper limit prevents production functions
from inflating their predictions of future production capacity, and provides master
schedulers with information they find more reliable.

5.1.2

Influencer and negotiator
Master schedulers are required to enact the production schedule; however, they

often do not have formal authority over the different functions of production,
maintenance, or sales, as evident in these quotes:
You can develop the best plan in your head, [but] you don't
own the line and you don't have any direct control over
lines.
You have sell it to someone and get them to sign
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off on something weird with this line, [like] stop a line.
[Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]
We work with a lot of production people. [As a scheduler,]
you certainly have to interact well with them, because
they’re not reporting to you.
[Owen, master scheduler,
Unit B]
These functions often have conflicting interests and agenda. Synchronising their
activities can be challenging. In addition, difficult and non-collaborative individuals,
particularly in the production function, often forcefully advance their own agenda:
A lot of our [production] managers use their bullying
tactic a lot. They come in loud, they come in aggressive.
That is how they get things done. [Fred, master scheduler,
Unit A]
You’ve got some people that just wake up in the morning and
say, “I’ll make it hard today for anybody that I talk to”.
And it’s generally what they do.
[Ronald, shift
controller, Unit A]
Schedulers use three different mechanisms to influence and negotiate with the
conflicting parties: (1) building relationships, (2), personal convincing tactics, and (3)
implicit authority. Evidence of these mechanisms is presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Evidence of schedulers’ actions as influencers and negotiators

Relationships I can show you in here, the crane driver’s
personal phone numbers.
It’s got the names of
their children next to them, so every time they
phone up, I can say, “how’s Alex, how’s Heidi”.
Just to build that rapport, because down the
track when I need something done, they will do
it for me where they wouldn’t do it for other
people. [Paul, unit scheduler, Unit A]
We are lucky we have really good relationships.
Our team has a very good relationship with all
of the units, with people on our same level.
[Lee, Planner and Scheduler, Unit A]
Part of this role is that you really need that
relationship stuff with someone you need to
influence [Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]
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Personal
convincing
tactics

[Convincing tactics] depend on the person. Some
people need lots of data and time to digest
that, others don't, but it is just dealing with
that person’s personality type traits to get the
outcome you want. [Fred, master scheduler, Unit
A]

Implicit
authority

We give the schedule to the slab yard and the
slab yard has to collate the schedule.
That
means they have got their crane and they are
digging all their slabs that I have put on
schedule.
It might be at the bottom of the
stack and they have to dig it out. [Vera, unit
scheduler, Unit B]
(1) Relationships

Some schedulers placed a great deal of emphasis on building relationships. They
expend time and effort building relationships and creating rapport with colleagues from
other functions to establish collateral for future negotiations and requests.
(2) Personal convincing tactics
The master scheduler in Unit A explained that he uses reasoning to convince
individuals, and that he tailors his argument based on the other party’s personality. The
level of detail and the time a person needs to get used to the idea that the scheduler puts
forward depends on the individual who needs to be convinced, and the scheduler not
only is aware of these differences, but also addresses them in his negotiation technique.
(3) Implicit authority
In Unit B, however, relationships did not seem to play as much of an important
role as in Unit A. Despite testimonies of relationship with production functions, the
schedulers’ influence is derived from the organisational norm, which accepts the
schedulers’ implicit authority. The scheduler described in a factual manner how she
provides directions to the slab yard, and how they have to follow these directions.
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5.1.3

Problem anticipator and solver
Schedulers foresee problems in terms of production continuity, achievements of

goals, and performance measures. These problems are either prevented, or addressed
and minimised before they arise. When unexpected problems occur, schedulers seek
various ways of addressing them. Schedulers are familiar with several avenues, or
“levers”, to address a problem. Table 5.3 presents findings that demonstrate this role of
the scheduler.
Table 5.3: Evidence of schedulers’ actions as problem anticipators and solvers

Problem
anticipator

When I want to put a plan together, [I look at]
what can go wrong, and how am I going to deal
with it. [Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]
By deciding to go one way, you might impact on
another unit, or something that you’re going to
have to spend more time with later, so you
obviously you don’t go that way, or minimise
the impact to it, at least.
The biggest thing I worry about is cranes
breaking down, machinery breaking down. As soon
as I hear something’s suss, straight away I’m
looking for avenues, which way can I go [to
overcome the problem]. If it does happen, and
generally 99% of the time it does happen within
an hour, I’m all right, ‘cause I’m an hour
ahead.
[Ronald, shift controller, Unit A]

Problem solver
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[Levers are] usually about pushing export out
or in, that is one lever that you can use.
Recommending that we cut domestic demand,
that’s another lever.
If we have too much
inventory, we can recommend stopping a unit.
There is point-of-production change as well: I
can get another site to help me make my orders.
[Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A
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The first quotes show that schedulers and controllers are constantly looking for
potential problems in an attempt to anticipate them, and prepare solutions for them in
advance.
The last quote demonstrates that in their role as problem solvers, the schedulers
may take various actions (or “levers”) in order to resolve a problem. One lever is
modifying the amount sold as export. Domestic orders can be prioritised over export,
and thus capacity can be used primarily to address domestic rather than export orders. In
contrast, excess inventory can be released to export, thus reducing inventory levels.
Another way to reduce, or avoid excess, inventory levels is by stopping production. If
demand exceeds supply, schedulers can also restrict future demand by setting the
quantities that customer service teams are allowed to sell. And finally, another way to
address excess demand is by getting products produced in another plant.

5.1.4

Strategy executor
In addition to the schedulers’ roles already described, in this organisation the

schedulers are central to the successful execution of production strategy. This centrality
of the schedulers was pointed out by the director of the program to implement Lean
strategy, who since then has managed several organisational changes in the same
organisation. Thus, his reflections and insights were heavily weighted when identifying
the roles that are central to the adoption of Lean strategy. His view on the role of
schedulers is shown in this quote:
[Successful changes here are] run from the middle.
These
[large] companies are managed from the middle. The people
that would make Lean happen, they are typically master
schedulers and the level below them. I think they are the
key.
[If you find] common ground with them, it will work
for sure.
[Otherwise], as soon as their boss loses
Irit Alony
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interest [in Lean] or their boss moves, it’s
struggle. [Cameron, program director, the mill]

going

to

Cameron is referring to the need to gain schedulers’ support for and agreement to
Lean strategy, as they have the power to “run” the large organisation studied. He sees
them as central to the sustainability of Lean strategy as long as they intrinsically agree
with the strategy, and are not driven by the authority of their boss.
This view was supported by other members of the implementation team, when
schedulers were referred to as part of middle management. Schedulers, as part of middle
management, were at the same time the most important, and the most difficult, group to
convince, as demonstrated by the following quotes:
It’s the middle. It’s convincing the people who had to make
it happen… that was our hardest group of people to
convince. [Vincent, project manager, the mill]
The biggest problem was middle management.
Middle
management hated to see any unit stop… they didn’t like it.
[Ross, program sponsor, the mill]
Further evidence that schedulers are key individuals who enact a strategy is seen
when this strategy is explained to the master scheduler, an explanation that comes from
the planner.
Once we [management] have made the decision at the master
planning (MPS) level, I take the outputs, [the] document
that says “this is what we should run” and talk with the
master scheduler.
I make sure that he understands the
direction for him, and the reasons why we have to stop
[production] line - because we are making too much
inventory and it will blow the budget, for example. [Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]
The master scheduler must to understand the overall strategy and the “big
picture”, as the master scheduler has an influence on how targets are achieved. The fact
that higher management and the planner dedicate time to routinely brief the scheduler
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and explain the underlying reasoning behind decisions indicates that the scheduler’s
understanding of the strategy is important.
Another indication of the role of the scheduler as a strategy executor is the
schedulers’ confidence that they can achieve targets dictated to them by the planner, and
the degree of freedom to achieve the targets:
[If] the [planning schedule] says you should be able to
achieve it - make it happen [Fred, master scheduler, Unit
A]
These quotes show that schedulers are responsible for enacting the goals set by
higher management levels. The planner communicates production objectives that are set
on an aggregated level by the plant’s management. Schedulers then translate these
objectives into daily operations. Often, the aggregated level does not take into account
the low-level operational constraints, such as changeover rules, maintenance problems,
and urgent orders. The scheduler, who maintains an overview of the plant’s current state
in terms of resources and constraints, is required to understand the strategy and the
operational implications derived from it in order to execute it.
To execute a business strategy and achieve targets required, schedulers use
“levers”, described in Section 5.1.3. The choice to use a lever and the choice of which
lever affect the alignment with the strategy. For example, one lever described is making
a recommendation to stop production in order to avoid a high inventory level. Using this
lever supports Lean principles. However, schedulers may also export excess inventory
for a lower cost to relieve inventory levels. This practice is not as closely aligned with
Lean principles, since it encourages overproduction (i.e., production beyond requested
amount).
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This role differs from the role of problem solver and anticipator, as the
schedulers do not solely anticipate and solve problems relating to the schedule, but also
problems in achieving the strategy prescribed by higher management.
Current schedulers were not actively concerned with executing Lean practices,
such as reduction of batch sizes and reduction of inventory. Rather, the schedulers were
focused on achieving their targets, with no reference to whether their actions are aligned
with Lean strategy. This is no different to the pressures that led schedulers to reject Lean
strategy when it was implemented in the mill. This pressure to meet production targets
was one of the key inhibitors to the adoption of Lean scheduling practices; this aspect is
further discussed in Section 5.2.1.2-3, which addresses the second research sub-question.

5.1.5

Summary
The analysis in this section provides partial evidence that the roles of schedulers

described in the literature – information node, negotiator and influencer, and problem
anticipator and solver – are relevant to the studied organisations. In addition, the
analysis in this section described another role schedulers play in the organisation:
strategy executors. The analysis shows that the schedulers’ decision-making is crucial to
the successful execution of a production strategy defined at the higher management
levels.
In addition, the analysis reveals that the schedulers in this industry play an
important role when Lean strategy is implemented, enacted, and sustained. Schedulers
decisions are central to production and manufacturing operations in the organisation, and
are able to sustain (or in this case, cause the failure of) the sustainability of Lean
strategy. This role of the scheduler as a strategy executor was not previously described
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in the literature; however, this study demonstrates that it is critical to the sustainability of
Lean strategy in the steel industry.
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5.2 Factors influencing Lean practices
This section addresses the second research sub-question: “What factors
(individual, task, and contextual) support or impede the adoption of Lean scheduling
practices in the steel industry?”. A thematic analysis of interview transcripts and
organisational documents revealed a range of individual, contextual, and task-related
factors that support or impede Lean practices. The analysis was guided by the factors
identified in Chapter 2, summarised in Table 2.2. Individual factors highlight the
importance of schedulers’ emotions and attitudes. Contextual factors take into account
unit performance measures and shared assumptions in the organisation. Task-related
factors take into account production-process requirements and scheduling objectives.
These factors are summarised in Table 5.4. For each category (individual, context, and
task), factors supporting Lean practices are presented first, followed by factors impeding
them.
Table 5.4: Factors influencing Lean scheduling practices

Context

Individual

Supporting Lean practices

§

Schedulers’ emotional skills

§
§

Collaborative focus
Awareness of preventive
maintenance
Prioritisation of customer
needs
Low focus on production

§
§
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Impeding Lean practices
§
§

Expected emotions
Attitudes

§
§
§
§

Quarterly measures of inventory
Overselling
Localised performance measures
Shared resistance to stopping
machines
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Task

§
§
§

5.2.1

Avoiding double handling
Preference for orders over
forecasts
Preference for low inventory

§
§
§

Need for high utilisation
Inventory as means of delivery
Inventory as buffer

Individual factors
The individual factors identified in this study as influencing schedulers’ adoption

of Lean strategy involved significant emotional aspects. The schedulers’ ability to
manage their own emotions enables them to withstand the pressures to deviate from
enacting a strategy. Two other individual factors were found to impede schedulers’
enactment of Lean practices: expected emotions and attitudes.

5.2.1.1 Supporting: Schedulers’ emotional skills
Schedulers in this organisation are subjected to negative feedback that results in
negative emotions. However, the schedulers contend that anticipated negative emotions
do not influence their scheduling decisions. They do, however, attempt to minimise the
chances of occurrence of such negative emotions by communicating with parties that
may be the source of negative feedback. But ultimately, schedulers make decisions that
in their view are best for the business, in spite of the negative anticipated emotions.
The quote below explains how the last days of the week are more difficult for the
scheduler, as on these days the schedule has to be changed to fit the demands of the
weekend. The operators respond in an unfavourable way to changes required in the
schedule. The scheduler, however, does not avoid decisions that lead to such negative
feedback, as the scheduler views these decisions as necessary.
Thursday-Friday are the hell of my job, I get abused every
time.
Thursdays-Fridays are always [about] setting
yourself up for the weekend, because you can only have a
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certain type of material
scheduler, Unit B]

on

the

weekend.

[Vera,

unit

The second quote demonstrates the importance of schedulers’ ability to manage
their own emotions. The planner in this quote explains that when this ability is not
developed, a scheduler can end up prioritising the wrong organisational function,
because of the emotions they evoke:
A novice could make the mistake of listening to the
[production] manager rather than the customer [service]
manager.
[When] you are a novice, you don't have the
confidence in your decisions, so you listen to the person
yelling the loudest or making the most noise. [The mistake
here] would be bending to whoever is yelling at you the
most. [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
The planner explains in this quote that prioritising one organisational function
over another can happen due to an emotional response. When a manager in one
organisation function (in this example, a production manager) uses aggression to
pressure the scheduler, the scheduler may seek to avoid negative emotions by complying
with the aggressor’s demands.
These quotes indicate that schedulers’ ability to manage their own emotions in
the face of pressures applied through negative feedback is important. Schedulers
regularly draw on this ability in order to successfully perform their role. Other
emotional aspects, which impede schedulers’ adoption of Lean practices, are presented
next.

5.2.1.2 Impeding: Expected emotions
During the implementation of Lean strategy, two types of expected emotions led
schedulers to reject Lean practices: negative and positive. Schedulers expected negative
emotions as a result of following Lean practices, such as changeovers and inventory
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reduction. In addition, schedulers expected positive emotions as a result of achieving
traditional goals such a high production volume.

Negative expected emotions: fear and regret
Schedulers consistently resisted stopping production when Lean strategy was
implemented. This resistance is demonstrated in the following quotes:
[Schedulers in] middle management hated to see any unit
stop… they didn’t like it.[Ross, Project sponsor, the mill]
When Lean first goes in, people run up against kanbans and
have to stop.
It becomes very stop-start, which is a big
fear. [Cameron, program director, the mill]
These quotes demonstrate the persistent nature of resistance to the need to stop
production due to kanbans, and the emotional aspect driving this resistance. Individual
emotions (like fear of machine breakdown) were motivating schedulers to reject Lean
scheduling practices. Schedulers anticipated regret for stopping production due to
equipment unreliability and pressure to produce large quantities. These reasons are
summarised in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Expected negative emotions resulting from Lean practices

Unreliable
equipment

There's certainly a view that the plant is
going to break soon, so you might as well make
the most of it while you can.
Because it is
going to be broken tomorrow, and then we'll
need what we made today. If you don't make it
now, you're wasting an opportunity.
That's
driven by a culture of unreliable equipment.
It's very hard to break that down 'cause there
are elements of truth in it.
After breakdowns, they’d [schedulers] say: “If
we’d just run through that kanban and went a
bit longer, we might have been all right.”
[Cameron, program director, the mill]
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Pressure to
produce large
quantities

Schedulers knew that they were going to be held
responsible for production [levels]. They were
thinking “I’ve got to produce a bit extra, I’ve
got to put a bit extra stock there”.
That
would have ruled the day.
That’s the thing
that gets us money in the bank.
[Vincent,
project manager, the mill]

The first quote shows how schedulers’ expected regret led to resistance to Lean
strategy. This quote demonstrates that machine breakdowns during the implementation
of Lean strategy reinforced the view that producing and holding safety stock is a better
strategy for the plant, due to its unreliable equipment. Schedulers experienced regret
over acting according to Lean practices and deviating from the status quo.
It is important to stress that stopping a producing line did not necessarily mean
stopping production altogether. If a line had to be stopped due to a full kanban, the unit
was allowed to switch to a different product (thus engage in a changeover), or slow
down current production. These options mean either maintaining production quantities
or avoid changeover. However, the options were considered to be less desirable than
overproduction.
The second quote shows that pressure to achieve production targets was
prioritised over other considerations. A constant pressure to produce and meet
production targets was overriding other rules, such as adherence to inventory levels, and
led to production that was not aligned with Lean principles. This pressure also relates to
the counter-intuitive nature of Lean strategy, discussed in the next section.
In addition to negative expected emotions, schedulers could expect positive
emotions as a result of achieving “a production record”:
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They feel good when they produce the lot: There’s a thing
around here they call “production records” - who’s made the
most tonnes in a shift. It’s a big thing when someone sets
a new record [Ian, team leader, the mill]
Production records still influence scheduling decisions in this organisation, as
described by a current master scheduler:
Not long ago we spent
production manager] to
running, because in a
production record.
production record, so
scheduler, Unit A]

a week and a half trying [to get a
stop a line.
He wanted it to keep
week and a half he got a yearly
I [let] him [have] his yearly
he will then stop.
[Fred, master

Lean strategy requires that production levels do not exceed customer orders.
This requirement contradicts the goals of many production managers, as explained by the
following quote:
A lot of people want to achieve individually. They want
compete, they want to 'climb a mountain', they want to
outdo people, that's what drives them… slowing down your
mountain climbing to help the overall community was of no
benefit to you at all. They're rewarded to set a record either
financially
or
career-wise,
or
even
just
interpersonally.
Setting a record is a very big thing in
this culture. [Cameron, program director, the mill]
This type of goal, driven by positive expected emotions, counters one of the basic
requirements of Lean strategy – synchronising production along the entire supply chain.
This perhaps was the most persistent source of rejection of Lean strategy, as
organisational feedback is consistent with this goal. Financial rewards for production
managers are still based on their production quantities. In addition, production of large
quantities is further rewarded professionally, through promotions, and socially, through
the responses of other organisational members.
Production managers were seen as the ultimate authority in the business, and the
success of the unit was also seen as the success of the master scheduler. Their
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motivation to compete and produce large quantities was very difficult to counter, when
the proposed strategy did not allow for competition and record-setting.

5.2.1.3 Impeding: Negative attitudes towards Lean practices
The implementation team suggested schedulers, as well as other organisational
members, had negative attitudes towards Lean practices (i.e., small batches, frequent
changeovers, and low inventory levels). Similarly, current schedulers demonstrated that
this negative attitude is still present to a certain extent.
First, this section presents attitudes towards Lean practices evident during the
implementation of Lean strategy. These negative attitudes are evident in three aspects:
(1) intuition regarding Lean practices, (2) belief in the value of Lean practices, and (3)
learning over time.
(1) Intuition
The implementation team expected a negative attitude towards Lean practices.
Therefore, an illustrative game was included in the educational workshop on the
principles of Lean strategy, provided to managers. Section 4.2 describes the
implementation process of Lean strategy in the mill, and further elaboration on this
process and the educational workshop can be found in Appendix B. The illustrative
game, called “paper houses” game, was designed to illustrate and provide experience
with the difference in outcomes between “push” and “pull” strategies. Participants in
this game aim to produce as many “paper houses” as possible within a given time frame.
This game was first played using “push” strategy, where each echelon attempts to
produce as much as it can. The game was then played a second time, this time using a
“pull” strategy. Under “pull” strategy, each echelon responds only to the demand
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generated by its customer echelon. Performance, both in terms of throughput and
product diversity, clearly illustrated the superiority of a “pull” strategy, hence providing
tangible evidence to the superiority of Lean strategy over the traditional production
strategy (this point is further elaborated in Appendix B, Section B). However, this result
contradicted intuitive production practices that the participants were accustomed to. The
outcomes of this game were not sufficient to change the participants’ mindset, as
demonstrated by the following quotes:
It’s counter-intuitive to people - how could slowing down
be better?
People find that difficult to believe because
it’s counter-intuitive. [Cameron, program director, the
mill]
They [schedulers] understood the logic of it.
They
understood the rationale of it, although many of them said
“It's counter intuitive to me. I can see how it's working
but it's still counter intuitive to me, it still doesn't
make sense compared to my old paradigm” [Ross, program
sponsor, the mill]
The immediate and automatic response of schedulers and production managers to
Lean practices was negative, and they rejected Lean practices. Paced production with
small batches was rejected by participants, as it did not match their intuitive evaluation
of these practices. This indicates that the rejection of Lean strategy sprang from their
intuitive system, rather than from a rational evaluation of the strategy.
(2) Belief
Another indication of negative attitudes is the evident belief that Lean practices
are not beneficial to business success. A member of the implementation team explains
how this belief (or rather, this disbelief) became evident when top management changed
and Lean practices were no longer enforced:
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There was an undeniable feeling that they [middle managers]
never really believed that Lean was good for business.
I
think most of them wanted to do a good job, and they
believed that doing a good job is measured by how much
output they produce each shift. [Ian, team leader]
The speaker indicates not only that there was a belief that Lean practices were
not good for the business, but also that there was a belief that production in large
quantities is beneficial.
(3) Learning over time
This negative attitude towards Lean practices (and positive attitude towards high
production volume) develops over time. The next quote indicates how production
managers acquire these attitudes, through experience. It describes how production
managers were reluctant to adopt a positive view of Lean practices when Lean strategy
was implemented. After the implementation, the reduction of batch sizes and inventory
levels resulted in positive outcomes, such as early detection of quality problems, and
shorter lead times. However, production managers were reluctant to attribute these
positive outcomes to Lean practices:
They [production managers] were very reluctant to relate
all those improvement effects to this inventory reduction.
The operating guys have got where they are by running their
mills hard, so when the going gets tough they just go back
to that: they run their mills hard and to hell with the
inventory: “just for a month we’re going to go back to this
old thing. We know it works”. [Ron, team leader, the mill]
When this implementation took place, production was seen as the most important
part of the business. Anything that results in successful production was regarded as
positive, and disrupting production was seen as risky and harmful. Therefore, it is highly
likely that the attitudes of production managers dominated amongst other organisational
members, such as schedulers.
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In addition to evidence of past negative attitudes towards Lean practices, some
evidence suggested current schedulers still have a somewhat negative attitude towards
Lean practices, such as many changeovers and low inventory levels. First, the scheduler
negatively refers to the constant requirement to reduce inventory. Second, a scheduler
explains that a good schedule minimises the number of changeovers, as each changeover
carries a risk to future product quality.
Stupidly, the business squeezes you: can you drop your
inventory a little bit more, can you drop it a little more
[Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
The reduction of inventory is clearly seen by the scheduler in this quote as a
negative step to take.
When you schedule, you have to do the best you can to
minimise [changeovers] because every changeover could
affect product quality. After a changeover, it can take up
to three runs to get the right quality. By the time they
get it right, you might have already run three to four
tonnes. If you think $1300 per tonne, that’s about $6,000
lost in one run.
If I double the number of changeovers
from five to 20, that is a lot of money [Sam, unit
scheduler, Unit A]
The scheduler in this quote explains why changeovers should be avoided: quality
after a changeover cannot be guaranteed, and may result in defects. Producing defects is
seen as a three-fold loss: loss of raw material, loss of processing time, and loss of the
new material that would be needed to replace the defective run.
The role of attitudes in scheduling decisions has not been previously addressed in
scheduling literature. These aspects are discussed in Section 6.2.

5.2.2

Contextual factors
Contextual factors shape the environment in which scheduling is performed, and

therefore determine how conducive the environment is to Lean scheduling. Contextual
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factors found to support Lean scheduling practices are collaborative focus, awareness of
preventive maintenance, awareness of customer needs, prioritisation of customer needs,
and a low focus on the demands of production. Contextual factors found to impede Lean
scheduling practices are quarterly measures of inventory, overselling, localised
performance measures, and shared resistance to stopping machines.

5.2.2.1 Supporting: Collaborative focus
A collaborative environment surrounding the schedulers supports their
coordination of resources and activities. Unit A consciously emphasised the importance
of collaboration, explaining that it enables the synchronisation of goals and effort
between the various functions, increases cross-functional awareness of possible issues
and impacts, and enables superior decision-making. This importance is demonstrated in
the following quotes:
Our team is successful because we hire people [who have]
soft skills, good influencing skills and a fairly good
level of interpersonal savvy.
I will choose someone that
has those skills over someone with [domain-specific]
knowledge. [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
I am a big fan of ringing up and chatting to someone too.
Part of this role is that you really need a relationship
with someone you need to influence, and you can't do that
via email.
I really needed their input [customer service]. There is a
lot of things they can do with orders: referring to
customers, talking, calling [and accepting an order as]
“complete”.
That really helps improve your delivery
performance and it makes you not waste capacity.
You can
make exactly what you need.
[Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]
These quotes show the emphasis placed on relationships in Unit A through
selection of employees for the scheduling team, the preference of communications
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methods that support relationships, and an example of the benefits of such relationships
with the customer-service function. This focus on collaboration contributes to the unit’s
effectiveness and its performance. Effectively addressing customer needs reduces
unnecessary inventory, and thus supports Lean practices. Establishing relationships with
parties involved in the production process supports Lean practices, as these relationships
enable synchronisation of the efforts of various organisational functions.

5.2.2.2 Supporting: Prioritisation of customer needs
Prioritising customer needs across functions (including production managers)
counters the influence to produce high quantities. When schedulers need to make
decisions that do not cater for production’s goals (i.e., high throughput and high
production volume), they need to justify these decisions. When timely delivery is
acknowledged across functions as important, and accepted as important by production
managers as well, it is an acceptable justification. This enables schedulers to make
decisions that align with Lean strategy. Evidence of this counter-influence is presented
in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Demonstrating awareness of customer needs

Awareness of
customer
needs as
opposed to
production
demands

Irit Alony

There
is
a
lot
more
focus
on
delivery
performance [DP], a lot more recognition from
the [production] unit [and] the operations
managers, that DP is an important thing and
that sometimes we might have to stop our line
to get to delivery performance.
That’s
helpful, especially when I did say that the
priority is DP and it is reflected in those
behaviours.
Still not very good, to stop a
line, but there is an understanding.
[Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]
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The scheduler refers to “delivery performance”, which is a measure of timely delivery
used in the organisation. This measure compares orders that were dispatched on time to
arrive at the customer’s requested date, and the orders sent later than that. The scheduler
indicates that although stopping production is seen as a negative step, it is more
acceptable if it contributes to timely delivery. The scheduler indicates that production
units are understanding of the need to achieve timely delivery, and the fact that it may
come at the expense of their own performance.

5.2.2.3 Supporting: Awareness of preventive maintenance
One of the important supporting functions of Lean strategy is preventive
maintenance. By scheduling maintenance and embedding it into mandatory procedures,
maintenance is routinely performed and minimises breakdowns. In addition, preventive
maintenance initiatives when breakdowns appear possible can prevent them, and the
accompanying lengthy downtimes, as demonstrated in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Evidence of preventative maintenance

Planned
preventive
maintenance

Planned maintenances, which are on each unit,
are every six weeks or so [Lee, planner and
master scheduler, Unit A]
Generally their maintenances start
[Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]

Unplanned
preventive
maintenance

Irit Alony

on

time

For instance, our automatic crane - if it
starts playing up before it gets to 3 o’clock,
I make sure I get three or four technicians
over there to help the nightshift bloke through
nightshift.
There’s no point leaving him to
try and source people ‘cause there’s no-one
here through the middle of the night. So I’ll
source the people over before they go home, try
and get something done with it, and then
hopefully for the next 24 hours, the problems
are deleted. That helps me out, helps him out,
and the company.
[Ronald, shift controller,

Masters by Research

Page 119 of 224

Unit A]
Preventive maintenance is central to continuous and predictable performance that
Lean strategy requires, and therefore practices of consistent scheduled maintenance as
well as preventive maintenance are necessary. Scheduled maintenance is adhered
because it is included in the planned schedule. In addition, the shift controller explains
that he seeks preventive maintenance if there is an indication equipment may break
down. This initiative prevents downtime during night shift, when corrective
maintenance cannot be performed.

5.2.2.4 Supporting: Low focus on the demands of production
managers
Production managers strongly resisted Lean practices when Lean strategy was
implemented (Section 5.2.1.2). In this organisation, production managers are mainly
interested in achieving high volume and throughput. They view schedules that do not
cater for this aim unfavourably. In the past, this priority of maximising production
levels, capacity utilisation, and throughput was shared by the entire organisation
(Sections 5.2.1.2 - 4). However, at present, although this need to produce high quantities
is understood and respected, it no longer dominates scheduling priorities. Quotes
supporting this view are presented in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Demonstrating low focus on production

Low focus on
the demands
of production
managers

I just say: “you will run what we need to run”,
and sometimes they say: “come on, what the
hell, we need some tonnes!”…[but in the end,]
production is there to do what I ask them to
do, or produce what I ask them to produce.
[Sam, unit scheduler, Unit A]
They all [production managers]bitch and whinge:
“why are we doing this?” [changing over or
stopping a line], because they want to keep it
going, and yet we are going to stop [the line].
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[Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]

5.2.2.5 Impeding: Inventory levels measured quarterly only
The infrequent measurement of inventory levels supports the practice of
maintaining high inventory. Inventory levels are only measured quarterly, and therefore
they can exceed their limits during the rest of the time, as presented in this quote:
Inventory - the focus is on it only four times a year.
[Only] at the end of each quarter, [we ask]: “have we met
our inventory target?”. [Lee, planner and master scheduler,
Unit A]
This condition may actually exacerbate variability along the supply chain, as
during certain periods production will be lowered to reduce inventory. Lean strategy
seeks to create stable and predictable patterns along the supply chain: the variability
resulting from relatively infrequent monitoring of inventory counters Lean practices.

5.2.2.6 Impeding: Overselling
One of the worst sins, according to Lean strategy, is to commit to selling more
than the plant can produce. This practice goes against basic common sense, as it
inherently leads to excessive demand on production and delivery delays. Overselling
creates greater urgency to produce large quantities and maximise capacity utilisation.
Two underlying motivations support this practice: (1) the sales unit’s incentives and
performance measures, which are based on quantities sold, and (2) the need to accept
domestic orders as a way to maintain domestic customers rather than lose them to
foreign markets. Table 5.9 presents evidence for these motivations.
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Table 5.9: Evidence of overselling practices

The sales unit
motivated by sales
figures and not
aware of inventory
reduction
Not restricting
domestic orders

Salesmen don’t care about inventory. That’s
the supply chain. Salesmen don’t care. All
they care about is money. [Cameron, program
director, the mill]
[Restricting domestic orders] is a concept
that
we
have
never
had
in
[this
organisation].
Every order we just say:
“thank you, bring it on”, even though we
know we are overloaded.
[Lee, planner and
master scheduler, Unit A]
Our business has always been one of we will
never knock back a domestic order, so we
just take orders, way more than we are
producing [Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]

Overselling provides justification for overproduction. The acceptance of
overproduction is also demonstrated in periodic reports sent to all department managers.
A quarterly report includes a graph of production quantities for each business unit
against target quantities. When the production is below targets, a bubble explaining the
reason for the shortage appears, typically describing a major breakdown event.
However, when production amounts are above targets, no explanation is provided. This
demonstrates that failing to meet production target is viewed as something that requires a
satisfactory explanation, whereas overproduction is acceptable, if not supported. This is
in contrast to one of the main principles of Lean strategy – elimination of
overproduction. From a Lean perspective, production levels that are above target
warrant an explanation just as much as below.
Overselling reduces schedulers’ belief that timely delivery can be achieved at all,
and provides a reasonable justification in schedulers’ minds for large batches and high
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production quantities. For this reason, overselling works against the adoption of Lean
practices.

5.2.2.7 Impeding: Localised performance measures
In this organisation, performance measures must be directly related to the ability
of the performer to control the measured outcome. For this reason, production managers
are not measured on delivery performance, as that depends on functions that exceed their
influence, such as downstream production, dispatch, and delivery.
The need to measure performance that depends only on the individual’s area of
responsibility prevents measuring performance that depends on collaborative efforts.
Production levels remain the main measurement of production managers’ performance.
However, this measurement, which is based on core competencies, leads to reduced
collaborative effort on the part of production managers.
The
scheduling
team
often
invites
them
[production
managers] into our decision-making meetings, but they just
get bored.
They are still in their own little area.
I
would love it if they would join us more, because then they
can to see that they are not an isolated unit, there is a
whole supply chain out there.
Sometimes they choose to forget that. When they want to go
fast, they don’t care who that affects.
Even though they
do know that they have an affect up and down.
[Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]
The main focus of production managers remains production of tonnes and high
throughput; this focus is reinforced by their performance measures. Since production
managers are permanent parties in the negotiation of the production schedule, their
interests persistently bias negotiated solutions towards non-Lean practices.
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5.2.2.8 Impeding: Shared resistance to stop a machine
Although this resistance to stop a machine has been discussed is related to
individuals, this resistance is also contextual. Findings reveal a strong shared resistance
towards stopping production. Prior to the implementation of Lean strategy, a widely
accepted view in the organisation was that production should never be stopped; the idea
was incomprehensible. The following quote demonstrates the novelty of this practice:
We were introducing something entirely new.
You would
never stop the line, absolutely never. Not in the history
of the Mill, or even [the entire organisation].
And we
actually stopped them. [Vincent, project manager, the mill]
Stopping a production machine is still seen as a negative step. This step requires
strong justification, not only to appease production managers but also to justify the direct
reduction of capacity utilisation. This focus on continuous production is driven by the
company’s top management. Machines are only stopped when there is a threat of
congestion that will stop production completely, or if inventory is about to exceed the
budget. However, machines are not stopped if demand for production is low.
Production that is not addressing demand is a violation of Lean practices, as it
accumulates unnecessary inventory. However, this strong bias against stopping a unit
from running strongly impedes the alignment with Lean strategy. Evidence of this bias
is summarised in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Evidence of a common bias against stopping a machine

Culture and top
management
focus on
continuous
production

Irit Alony

Whether you like it or not, this president
right now, like the president before, is very
heavily focused to keeping lines running.
That’s our [motto]: “don't stop the line”.
There might be kanbans, and that all makes
sense and you do all this training “you should
never exceed a kanban”, until the first time
you try and stop a production unit.… [A
kanban]
is
just
a
guide.
Production
definitely [is a priority] [Fred, master
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scheduler, Unit A]

Continuous
production to
achieve capacity
utilisation

Production despite
low demand

5.2.3

To stop the mill, you’re just stopping the
production of material.
Every coil they can
process over there, we’re making money on. So
they’re down to 24 hours, 36 hours. It’s 36
hours of production stopped, lost. You can’t
gain that back. [Sam, unit scheduler, Unit A]

Sometimes your demand is a bit low and they
still want you to keep a unit running, just
aim for the upper and make a little bit more
than you need to.
[Lee, planner and
scheduler, Unit A]

Task-related factors
Some of the factors supporting Lean strategy are driven by factual, task-related

data, as well as driven by economic imperatives and production requirements. These
factors include avoiding double-handling of products, a preference for orders over
forecasts, and a preference for low inventory levels. Task-related factors found to
impede the adoption of Lean scheduling practices are the need for high utilisation, the
use of inventory as a means of delivery, and the use of inventory as buffer against
uncertainty. Evidence of these factors is presented next.

5.2.3.1 Supporting: Awareness of the risks of double-handling
Pre-production, i.e., production of product prior to its delivery date goes against
Lean practices. In addition, according to Lean strategy, unnecessary movement is a form
of waste that has to be minimised. When product is processed prior to its due delivery
date, it has to be moved into storage, and then moved again to delivery.
In this organisation, every movement carries the risk of damaging the product, by
physical dents and scratches. When schedulers are aware of these risks to product
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quality, they prefer to avoid unnecessary movement. This preference was evident in
interviews as well as informal conversations; for example: “I don't want to
take it out of the [machine] because that is doublehandling” [Vera, unit scheduler, Unit B]. This awareness of the
negative impacts of unnecessary movement therefore supports Lean practices.

5.2.3.2 Supporting: Preference of orders over forecast
Lean strategy in its classic form does not require forecasting; however,
forecasting is a reality in many businesses, and this reality has been accepted into Lean
practices. Forecast orders take lower priority in comparison to existing orders in Lean
strategy. Preferring forecasts over existing orders can result in excessive inventory, and
if forecast orders were to be prioritised (for example, in order to achieve large batch
sizes), this would lead to high inventory, counter to Lean principles. Thus, preferring
existing orders and aiming to deliver them on time reduces potential inventory levels,
and aligns with Lean practices. An example of preferring an actual order over a forecast
order is demonstrated in the next quote.
Yesterday we were running so well, flowing along beautiful,
[and suddenly our] crane dies.
Total chaos, nothing goes
to that bay and that’s our most widely used bay, and hardly
any room in the other bays.
So now I’ve got to send
material out.
[I checked to] see what was prioritised:
priority for customers.
[I put] customer coils in the
dispatching fields, and [put away] anything that was [based
on forecast]. [Ronald, shift controller, Unit A]
This quote demonstrates a situation when delivery is constrained. The controller
in this case prioritised material that needed to be sent to customers over material that
needed to be moved and stored as inventory. This prioritisation of actual orders over
inventory-building is consistent with actions of schedulers and planners. These actions
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support the reduction of inventory, and thus support Lean practices. This practice is
closely related to the focus and awareness of customer needs, addressed in Section
5.2.2.2.

5.2.3.3 Supporting: Preference for low inventory levels
One of the major aspects of Lean strategy is maintaining low inventory.
Schedulers’ preference for low inventory levels thus supports this aspect of Lean
strategy. Two factors were found to support schedulers’ preference for low inventory
levels: budgetary reasons, and practical reasons of space limitations. These factors are
presented in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11: Reasons for preferring low inventory

Budget
supporting
low inventory

For example, we have to stop number 3 paint
line because we are making too much inventory
and it will blow the budget
I think that [several weeks] is a hell of a
long
time
to
carry
extra
inventory,
in
preparation for a planned downtime.
[Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]

Space
limitations
supporting
low inventory

There is no point cutting [the slab] until you
are going to schedule [it] because don't forget
slabs take up more room than skilts because you
have lots of little ones.
Instead of one big
stack of skilts, you have got another four
instead of one and they have got to find a
place for it. [Vera, unit scheduler, Unit B]
Instead of using up all our room and then have
nowhere to put it, I can conserve some room for
that
material
to
come
[Ronald,
shift
controller, Unit A]

5.2.3.4 Impeding: Need for high utilisation
There is an accepted view across units and functions that utilisation has to be
maximised. Capacity utilisation under Lean strategy is high, and Lean strategy does not
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suggest sacrificing it. However, utilisation in Lean strategy is achieved indirectly, by
scheduling small batches and short runs.
The pressures to achieve high capacity utilisation lead schedulers to avoid
stopping production lines. Changeovers are also not viewed favourably, as each
changeover is seen to carry the risk of machine breakdown. Table 5.12 presents
evidence.
Table 5.12: Evidence of biases and pressures to maintain high utilisation

High
utilisation
required

The policy at [Unit A] is to load every single
unit to 100%, so full 100% utilisation.
Every year we go through a budget and so are
all
my
budgets
achieved
in
terms
of
utilisation, unit throughput, how many tonnes
go through each line, despatches
There is an expectation
keep the lines running.

that

we

will

always

[Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
Stopping a
line as
utilisation loss

Their [production managers’] main target is
utilisation: “how many tonnes can I get through
my unit”.
If I was to make a decision which
stopped one of the units, there would be
serious questions asked by my boss and the
bosses of the units, there would be serious
questions asked.
[Lee, planner and scheduler,
Unit A]

Reluctance to
changeover

The less you fiddle with the machine the more
reliable it will be - there is that concept,
you don't touch it.
Every unit would love to
just run the same thick size and colour non
stop [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]

The pressure to maintain high capacity utilisation is present in the schedulers’
minds when they make scheduling decisions, and directs their efforts and attention to
solutions that address this pressure. This focus is different to the focus required for Lean
practices such as levelled scheduling and small batches. Lean practices require more
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changeovers, and thus the pressure to maintain high utilisation does not support Lean
strategy.

5.2.3.5 Impeding: Inventory levels perceived as means of delivery
Schedulers believe the time required to satisfy an order is far longer than the time
required to process a product. This difference between processing time (“value-add
time”) and time required for production (“production lead time”) is far smaller when
Lean principles are followed. However, in this organisation, this difference is enormous:
production lead time is about seven weeks, whereas the value-add time is less than two
days.
The problem with a lengthy production lead time is that it is also far longer than
the time the customer is willing to wait for their order to arrive – “order lead time”.
When the order lead time is exceeded by the production lead time, orders must be
satisfied using pre-made inventory. Thus, inventory levels are expected to be kept high,
contrary to the Lean practice of reduction of inventory. Table 5.13 presents quotes
demonstrating these points.
Table 5.13: Evidence of erroneous belief in inventory as the means to delivery performance

Production
lead time
versus
value-add
time

The actual processing time would be hours. …[our
lead time] is really just the queue length.
We
order [feed from our upstream unit, and it takes]
two weeks to get the coil to the beginning of our
unit. Then I give it three weeks to get through
[our unit], whereas the physical processing time
is very small.
If you could somehow juggle it,
you could get it within one day. But we have to
have batches and queues, to get [production] unit
efficiency [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]

Inventory as
a means to
address
demand

Because 70% of our product is [delivered from]
stock, if you haven't got enough [stock] there,
you are in trouble.
You might not be able to
supply the customer.
The assumption is that if we have the right amount
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of stock there, we will get good delivery
performance. [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]

5.2.3.6 Impeding: Inventory levels as buffer against uncertainty
Inventory is seen as a buffer against uncertain events, and schedulers perceive
their environment as disruptive and saturated with uncertainties. The risk-averse nature
of this company, the perception of a problematic and uncertain production environment,
and unpredictability in demand, together support higher levels of inventory for the sake
of insurance. This goes against the Lean practice of maintaining low inventory. Table
5.14 summarises evidence of the use of inventory as a buffer.
Table 5.14: Evidence of the use of inventory as a buffer

Uncertain
production
environment

Our unit performance is poor, very, very
variable.
We are not world class, it is very
low and so a lot of the safety stock [has] to
account for unit performance.
[Lee, planner
and scheduler, Unit A]

Unpredictable
demand

At
the
moment
our
demand
changes
very
dramatically. It is quite seasonal and we are
not very good at picking the correct flows of
the demand.
We are constantly changing
[production plans] within a very short horizon.
It is not uncommon to get changes for the
forecast for the month that you are in. [Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]

Inventory as a
means of
satisfying
demand

This plan [means] that I am going to be short
and not have enough stock through that period
of time.
So there [I may not] achieve unit
utilisation and delivery performance.
This is
not good.
The assumption is that if we have the right
amount of stock there, we will get good
delivery
performance.
[Lee,
planner
and
scheduler, Unit A]
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5.2.4

Summary
This section provided evidence of various factors that support or impede Lean

scheduling practices in this organisation. Individual factors identified in this study
highlight the role of schedulers’ emotional aspects in scheduling decisions. The
contextual factors in this study demonstrate how the priorities of their unit and
organisation, such as collaboration versus localised performance, prioritisation of
customers, and resistance to machine stopping, influence their scheduling decisions.
Finally, task-related factors demonstrated how process requirements and task objectives
can support or impede the adoption of Lean scheduling practices.
Many of the factors discussed in this section closely relate to assumptions shared
by organisational members, including the schedulers. These assumptions are presented
in the next section.
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5.3 Shared assumptions
This section presents the concepts addressing the third research sub-question:
“What shared organisational assumptions and practices support or impede the adoption
of Lean scheduling practices in the steel industry?” Many of the factors identified in
Section 5.2 are related to assumptions shared by the schedulers and other organisational
members. These assumptions were sometimes stated directly by participants. At other
times, the assumptions emerged from an analysis of the factors identified in Section 5.2.
This section uncovers these assumptions (summarised in Table 5.15 below), based on
direct statements and supporting evidence from the analysis of interviews and
organisational documents.

5.3.1

Assumption 1: The source of business success
A shared assumption regarding the source of business success is evident when

the objectives (and resulting priorities) are examined. Schedulers referred to the change
in perception of the importance of timely delivery. Schedulers indicated that at present,
the focus on high utilisation and production quantities is decreased compared to the
focus on timely production, and that even production managers (whose performance is
not measured based on timely delivery) accept that their own objectives (high
throughput and production levels) may need to be sacrificed in order to achieve it
(Section 5.2.2.2).
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Irit Alony

§ Customer/ production focus
§ High utilisation need
§ Shared resistance to
stopping a machine
§ Collaborative focus
§ Localised performance
measures
§ Shared resistance to
stopping a machine
§ Overselling
§ Shared resistance to
stopping a machine
§ Quarterly inventory
measurement
§ Inventory for delivery
§ Inventory as a buffer
§ High utilisation need
§ Shared resistance to
stopping a machine
§ Preventive maintenance
§ Inventory as a buffer
§ Inventory as a buffer
§ Inventory for delivery

Factors

High production volume is achieved
by high utilisation and large batches

High production volume is
achieved by perfecting core
activities and changeovers
Production lead time is not far
greater than order lead time

How to achieve high
production volume

Length of production
lead time
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Kanbans are an indication of
inventory levels and inventory costs

Kanbans support the reduction of
WIP and help achieve perfection

The role of the kanban

Masters by Research

Optimising each function’s core
activity best answers customer
needs

Collaboration between functions is
necessary to best answer customer
needs

How to address
customer needs

Production lead time is far greater
than order lead time

The source of business success is
production of quality product with
low costs

Impeding

The source of business success is
addressing customer demand on
time

Supporting

The source of business
success

Assumption

Table 5.15: Shared assumptions supporting or impeding Lean strategy

In contrast to this prioritisation of timely delivery, evidence from the
implementation case suggests that the organisation used to make production quantities a
priority, which achieve scale economies and reduce production costs. This prioritisation
of high production quantities is also evident in current pressures to maintain high
utilisation (Section 5.2.2.8), and in the shared resistance to stopping a machine (Section
5.2.3.4). The prioritisation of one objective over another indicates that this objective is
viewed as important to the overall goal referred to by many – business success.
Once timely delivery is acknowledged as an importance aspect of business
success, production of smaller batches (which is at the core of Lean strategy) is more
acceptable. In turn, this acceptance enables schedulers to prescribe small batches for
production, without being seen as risking business success.

5.3.2

Assumption 2: How to address customer needs
Even if customer needs (including timely delivery) are viewed as critical to

business success and important to address, the question of how to address them remains
open. Two different assumptions regarding this question are inferred in this case study:
one assumes customer needs can best be addressed by communication between all
functions and a coordination of their efforts. The other assumes that each organisational
function should perfect its own operation.
The first assumption is evident in the importance placed on collaboration and
interpersonal skills that enable such collaboration in Unit A. The scheduler in this unit
explains that the scheduling team needs relationships in order to perform their role well,
and the planner, who is involved in hiring, explains that inter-personal skills are superior
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in her view to task-related skills in their unit (Section 5.2.2.1). The emphasis that
schedulers in this unit place on relationships is also evident when the schedulers’ role as
a negotiator and influencer is presented (Section 5.1.2). Evidence indicates that the
schedulers dedicate time and effort in order to build and maintain these relationships
with other organisational functions: production, maintenance, and sales. Obviously
collaborative relationships cannot be established unilaterally, and the fact that these
relationships are established indicates that the other parties reciprocate and support them.
This collaborative focus indicates that schedulers and other unit members view them as
valuable to the successful performance of their role.
In contrast, a different assumption is evident when examining localised
performance measures (Section 5.2.2.7), which support overproduction (Section 5.2.2.8)
and overselling (Section 5.2.2.6). These performance measures, and the localised focus
that aligns with them, indicate that sales and production view their core activities as the
source of business success. Production views their ability to produce efficiently (and not
necessarily effectively) as critical for success, and sales view their ability to sell large
quantities as important. When these functions assume that their core activities are the
source of success, it is difficult to coordinate these activities, as required by Lean
strategy.
When collaboration is accepted as a critical way to achieve business success, the
different functions are more accepting of other functions’ input, and are more willing to
use that input to guide their own operations. This adjustment is critical for the different
functions to work in concert, as required by Lean strategy. This study demonstrates that
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this shared assumption influences how difficult (or easy) it is for schedulers to align with
Lean practices.

5.3.3

Assumption 3: The role of the kanban
Kanban is a simple mechanism designed to restrict product levels, so that

production is paced along the supply chain. This mechanism poses an upper level for
intermediate product (WIP) between two production units. When this limit is reached,
production at the supplying unit is stopped, until the customer unit consumes the WIP
and the kanban is “emptied”. The kanban mechanism affects the degree to which the
operation is aligned with Lean strategy.
In this case, one assumption predominated: that the kanban is simply a guide, and
should not be strictly adhered to. This assumption is evident when the scheduler
explains how kanban adherence is secondary to production continuum (Section 5.2.2.8).
In addition, the fact that limits of inventory levels are only considered once a quarter
(Section 5.2.2.5) indicates that these limits are not viewed as critical to performance or
business success. This is further reinforced when the schedulers view high inventory
levels as necessary for the achievement of timely delivery (Section 5.2.3.6), and as a
buffer against uncertainty (Section 5.2.3.6). This view makes kanbans seem obstructive
to business success and performance.
However, the implementation case demonstrates how critical kanban adherence
for the sustainability of Lean strategy. This is illustrated in the program director’s view
of how Lean strategy was gradually rejected in the mill, once the new top manager was
appointed:
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[The new plant manager was] a very highly regarded
production guy.
…
He allowed kanbans to be broken and
didn’t follow up. [Inventory levels] went up a bit: he
didn’t do anything about it.
[Cameron, program director,
the mill]
This permission to breach kanban levels gradually eroded the successful
reduction of lead times, as described by the program’s sponsor:
Days of inventory rose from 23 through 57, all the way up to
90. They ended up with three months of inventory. [Ross,
program sponsor, the mill]
In order to sustain Lean strategy, kanbans need to be strictly adhered to. This
point is further discussed in Section 6.3.3.

5.3.4

Assumption 4: How to achieve high production volume
Lean strategy does not advocate for limiting total production volume; however,

the way high production volume is achieved in this strategy is different to the traditional,
intuitive way. Instead of aiming to produce a large quantity every time (by batching
different orders into one large production run), Lean strategy requires small batches in a
steady and continuous flow.
The traditional assumption, that a high production volume overall is achieved by
many individual instances of high production volume, was suggested by one of the
implementation team leaders. This team leader explained that production managers are
looking to set yearly production records, and they seek to achieve these records by
achieving high production levels each shift:
[Production management’s] theory is that the only way we’re
going to get the yearly [production record] is by getting
lots of shift production records.
[Ian, team leader, the
mill]
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This view that only large batches lead to high production volume is further
reinforced by present pressures for high utilisation (Section 5.2.3.4), and by present
resistance to stopping a machine (Section 5.2.2.8). Both factors favour continuous
production and large batches as a way to achieve high production volume. These factors
suggest that stopping a running machine, even if for a changeover, is seen as having the
potential for reduced production volume.
Further support for this assumption is revealed when the role of inventory is
examined. Inventory levels are seen as a way to address uncertainties such as
breakdowns and surges in demand (Section 5.2.3.6). The schedulers do not rely on
production capabilities to address such uncertainties, instead relying on high levels of
inventory, achieved while production was possible. This creates an assumption that
while machinery is available and production is possible, large batches should be
produced. Large batches therefore compensate for lost machine availability.
Equipment breakdowns create a sense of urgency to produce large quantities even if not
currently required, as the machinery has to be utilised while it is functioning.
Equipment reliability is one way Lean strategy addresses the view that
production must be maximised while possible. When the maintenance schedule is
adhered to, and preventive maintenance reliably prevents breakdowns, there is less
urgency to produce while possible, and Lean practices can be followed.

5.3.5

Assumption 5: Length of production lead time
Lean strategy aims to achieve a drastic reduction of production lead times. This

requires the assumption that such reduction is possible. However, if lengthy lead times
are seen as necessary evil, this reduction is difficult to achieve.
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Schedulers believe that high inventory levels are necessary in order to address
demand, as they see demand lead times as longer than production lead times (Section
5.2.3.5). The schedulers explain that they need to build up inventory levels based on
forecasts, in order to prepare for short-term demand. The fact that this lead time is
extremely lengthy in comparison with the time required for actual processing does not
change this assumption, and is not directly related to batching. In addition, the need to
build inventory levels to buffer potential breakdowns (Section 5.2.3.6) indicates that
uncertainties are seen as potentially harmful for timely delivery. Schedulers do not
believe that in the case of a breakdown or demand surge, production would be able to
address demand in time. This is in contrast to the actual production (value-add) time
indicated of two hours. Typically orders are requested within a few weeks, and few
breakdowns last that long. Therefore, schedulers accept that the realistic lead time is
longer than order lead times, and do not seek to reduce this gap.

5.3.6

Summary
This section revealed five assumptions that are shared by organisational

members. The assumptions were identified based on explanations provided by
participants for practices that support (or mostly, impede) the adoption of Lean strategy,
and were further supported by evidence of practices related to these assumptions. The
assumptions identified are:
(1)

The source of business success can be assumed to stem from addressing
customer demand on time (supporting Lean strategy), and from keeping
product costs low (impeding Lean strategy). This assumption is related to the
focus of the unit: production focus (impeding Lean strategy) versus customer
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focus (supporting Lean strategy), the need for high utilisation, and a
resistance to stopping a machine (impeding Lean strategy).
(2)

Addressing customer needs can be assumed to be done through
collaboration (supporting Lean strategy) or local optimisation (impeding Lean
strategy). This assumption is related to the degree of the units’ collaborative
focus, localised performance measures, overselling, and resistance to stopping
a machine.

(3)

The role of the kanban can be seen as either fundamental (supporting Lean
strategy) or indicative (impeding Lean strategy). This assumption is related
to the resistance to stopping a machine, quarterly measures of inventory, and
the use of inventory as means of delivery and as a buffer against uncertainty.

(4)

Achieving high production volume can be seen as either through a
continuous operation of small batches, with perfected activities and
changeover (supporting Lean strategy) or through high utilisation and large
batches (impeding Lean strategy). This assumption is related to the need for
high utilisation, resistance to stopping a machine, preventative maintenance,
and the use of inventory as a buffer.

(5)

The length of production lead time can be seen as either close to order lead
time (supporting Lean strategy) or as far greater than order lead time
(impeding Lean strategy). This assumption is related to the use of inventory
as a buffer against uncertainty, and as a means of delivery.
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Chapter 6

Discussion

Findings presented in the previous chapter addressed the three research questions
by identifying the roles schedulers play in the organisation studied, by identifying task,
individual, and contextual factors that influence scheduling decisions, and by identifying
assumptions shared by organisational members that are relevant to scheduling decisions,
along with the factors that influence these decisions. This chapter discusses these
findings and compares them to previous findings described in the literature.
Section 6.1 addresses schedulers’ roles and compares these findings to current
literature. Section 6.2 discusses individual factors found to influence scheduling
decisions in the context of current behavioural decision-making literature. Finally,
Section 6.3 discusses underlying assumptions found in this case to support or impede the
adoption of Lean scheduling practices, and discusses them in the context of previous
studies relevant to Lean strategy.

6.1 Schedulers and the adoption of Lean strategy
This section addresses the first research sub-question: What role do schedulers in
the steel industry play in the enactment of Lean strategy, and how does it compare with
schedulers’ previously described roles?
Most of the roles of schedulers identified in this case were consistent with
previous findings. Previous studies have described schedulers playing the role of
information nodes, influencers and negotiators, and problem anticipators and solvers
(Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Guinery 2008). However, the
centrality of schedulers to the successful adoption of a strategy has not previously been
made explicit. Two major themes underlie the centrality of schedulers to the enactment
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of Lean strategy: (1) the scheduler’s role as a negotiator and facilitator, and (2) the
importance of the scheduler’s discretion and prioritisation in scheduling decisions.

6.1.1

The scheduler as negotiator and facilitator
Previous literature identifies the importance of interpersonal relationships to the

operation of schedulers (Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Karltun
2007). Schedulers, as described in previous studies, often lack formal control over the
other functions they work with, and thus use relationships as a source of influence. The
importance of interpersonal skills in this study is evident, for example in hiring practices
in Unit A, where interpersonal skills are preferred over task-related skills. It is also
evident in schedulers’ expenditure of time and effort to build and maintain a rapport with
the various operators. These findings are consistent with the literature.
While previous studies of Lean strategy emphasise the importance of cohesive
relationships among team members (e.g., McLachlin 1997; Fraser, Harris & Luong
2007), this study emphasises the importance of interpersonal skills of and relationships
maintained by schedulers. Cross-functional collaboration is achieved in discrete
industries by restructuring the organisation into product-based cells, rather than
functional departments. However, this study suggests that schedulers are particularly
critical to this collaboration in the steel industry, more so than in discrete industries,
since cellular manufacturing and work teams cannot be implemented in the steel industry
(Belvedere & Grando 2005; Shah, N. 2005; Shah, R. & Ward 2007). The collaboration
between the different functions has to be facilitated by a central position, which holds an
overview and an understanding of the entire operation.
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Schedulers are key to the coordination and collaboration between different
organisational functions (production, sales, and logistics) that Lean strategy requires.
Schedulers facilitate this collaboration by using their interpersonal skills. They make the
various organisational functions (e.g., sales, production, and logistics) aware of each
other’s needs and constraints. In addition, schedulers influence the various functions by
explaining to them the impact of their actions on overall business success. For example,
schedulers explain to production managers that if they continue to overproduce, they will
exceed the budget. Therefore, schedulers draw on their interpersonal skills to establish
relationships and facilitate coordination across functions, as required in Lean strategy.

6.1.2

Schedulers’ discretion and prioritisation
Schedulers regularly use their discretion to prioritise different needs. Previous

studies acknowledge that schedulers determine the priorities of objectives and make
decisions regarding trade-offs (Cegarra 2008). This prioritisation is critical to the
enactment of Lean strategy, as it determines whether level scheduling is achieved, as
required by Lean strategy (Naylor, Naim & Berry 1999). This prioritisation depends
solely on schedulers’ discretion. Under Lean strategy, schedulers are required to prefer
small batches and low inventory levels. When they do not maintain this prioritisation,
Lean strategy is not sustained: inventory levels rise and lead times extend.
These priorities contradict traditional priorities in the steel industry, as
demonstrated in this study, and as generally found in process industries (Fransoo &
Rutten 1994). The traditional preference for large batches and high inventory levels is
reinforced by assumptions shared across the organisation, as further discussed in Section
6.3. However, this study emphasises the critical role of schedulers in the steel industry.
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Their trade-offs between batch sizes and lead times are at the centre of Lean strategy,
and must align with it if it is to be successfully enacted.
Findings in this study also have methodological implications for research on
schedulers. Schedulers display their priorities not only by trading-off batch sizes and
lead times, but also by drawing on various alternatives to achieve their targets (Section
5.1.3). To prioritise short lead times, schedulers draw on other production facilities to
address production demand. Because they prioritise production quantities over customer
demand, schedulers use export clients as a relief valve for excess inventory. To lower
the priority given to production quantities, schedulers may recommend stopping
production lines that overproduce.
The fact that schedulers can often prioritise and make decisions without either
affecting or being affected by the production schedule has important methodological
implications for studying scheduling decisions. Methodologies that assume scheduling
decisions can only be reflected in changes in the schedule (see, for example, Fransoo and
Wiers, 2006) need to account for courses of action available to the schedulers that are not
reflected in the schedule. Otherwise, schedulers’ actions that are not reflected in the
schedule may not be accounted for, and thus compromise the study’s validity.
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6.2 Individual factors influencing schedulers adoption of Lean
strategy
Section 6.1 highlighted the influence schedulers have on the adoption of Lean
strategy. Scheduling practices are central to a successful and sustainable enactment of
Lean strategy: understanding the factors influencing individuals responsible for
performing these practices can clarify the difficulties involved in such enactment. This
is addressed by the second research sub-question: What factors support or impede the
enactment of Lean scheduling practices in the steel industry, and how do they influence
scheduling decisions? These various factors were divided into three categories:
individual, task, and contextual. Individual interpersonal skills and the ability to manage
their emotions were found to support schedulers’ enactment of Lean practices.
Individual attitudes and anticipated emotion were found to impede the enactment of Lean
practices.

6.2.1

Individual skills enabling Lean practices
This study shows that schedulers’ ability to manage their own emotions can

support the enactment of Lean strategy. Lean scheduling practices invoke negative
reactions from other organisational parties, mainly production managers: these reactions
pressure schedulers to deviate from Lean scheduling practices (Section 5.1.2 and
Section 5.2.1.1). In order to consistently align with Lean strategy, schedulers must be
able to operate despite this pressure. This research shows that schedulers are able to
manage their own emotions and overcome their influence in order to make decisions
they find beneficial for the business. This ability to manage emotions can therefore
support the enactment of Lean strategy.
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In contrast, two main individual factors were found to impede the enactment of
Lean practices. One is schedulers’ anticipated emotions, which were found to impede
the enactment of stopping a production line and reduction of inventory. The other is the
schedulers’ attitudes, which led to the rejection of small batches and low inventory
levels.

6.2.2

Anticipated emotions impeding Lean practices
Both positive and negative anticipated emotions were found to reinforce

traditional scheduling practices. Expectations of positive emotions as a result of
achieving large production volume and production records supported overproduction
and large batches. Expectation of negative emotions, such as regret and fear, impeded
decisions required for the enactment of Lean strategy, such as stopping production,
kanban adherence, small batches, changeovers, and low inventory levels, as discussed in
Section 5.2.1.2. Negative emotions were expected due to pressures to meet production
targets, and due to fear of breakdowns that could prevent achieving these targets.
Positive emotions were expected due to a cultural esteem for production records.
Expectations of emotions, both positive and negative, led schedulers to favour statusquo decisions that aligned with traditional practices, over Lean practices.
This finding suggests that scheduling decisions, although based on factual
considerations, are influenced by anticipated emotions, similar to choices by gamblers,
consumer decisions, and interpersonal decisions (Zeelenberg 1999; Connolly &
Zeelenberg 2002; Bazerman 2006). This finding also supports the suggestion of
Baumeister et al. that all expected emotions lead to “safe” choices, including positive
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expected emotions (2007, pp. 192-194). This has the effect of rendering people who
consider future emotional consequences risk-averse and conservative.

6.2.3

Intuitive evaluation of Lean practices – attitudes
This study provides indicative evidence that schedulers who operated under the

traditional strategy developed negative attitudes towards Lean practices over time.
Strong pressures to achieve high production targets, maintain high capacity utilisation,
avoid machine downtime, and avoid stock outage drove schedulers to develop a
preference for schedules that do not follow the rules of Lean strategy. Instead,
schedulers developed a preference for high inventory levels that ensured against
breakdowns and demand surges, large batches, and a minimal number of changeovers.
These attitudes are plausible, considering the counter-intuitive nature of Lean
strategy. This counter-intuitive nature can be attributed to the saliency of feedback.
Saliency refers to the strength of the tie between the decision and its consequences, and
depends on the immediacy and intensity of feedback, among other factors. When the
consequences occur much later than the decision, feedback saliency is degraded (Croson
& Donohue 2006). In Lean strategy, these consequences specifically occur later than
decisions concerning batch sizes and inventory levels. However, when a machine breaks
down, or inventory runs out, the consequences are immediate and, in this case, carry
negative emotions. In contrast, when traditional practices are followed, the successful
production of large quantities is immediately visible and carries positive emotional
consequences. This asymmetry between the consequences of the two strategies biases
scheduling decisions towards traditional practices, rather than Lean practices.
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Although scheduling decisions concerning batch sizes and inventory levels are
traditionally treated as computational, combinatorial, and rational problems (Baker &
Scudder 1990; Baker & Trietsch 2009), this study demonstrates that schedulers draw on
their intuition to make them. This intuition is developed through experience, and
provides schedulers with a sense of “right” and “wrong” when it comes to different
practices (Slovic et al. 2007). Lean strategy requires practices that counter this intuitive
sense, as shown in Section 5.2.1.3, and are therefore difficult to implement in the steel
industry. Because schedulers’ intuition has been their main strength, it is difficult to
expect them to abandon it for the sake of a new set of rules, even if these rules have been
logically and practically proven superior.
Schedulers’ attitudes towards Lean practices are inferred from the immediate
and evaluative nature of their response to these practices. Attitudes are extensively
recognised for having an evaluative role towards objects (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975;
Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 1977; Ajzen 1991). In this case, the object is Lean
practices, and a negative attitude towards them develops through lengthy experience.
This lengthy experience is typical of schedulers, as shown in previous studies (e.g.,
MacCarthy & Wilson 2001). As in the previous studies, the schedulers in this study are
long-term members of the organisation. This lengthy experience provides a long time
for schedulers to develop an attitude.
These attitudes were addressed by the implementation team, who explained how
Lean strategy works, and conducted a participative game that demonstrated the value of
Lean practices. However, negative attitudes towards Lean practices were evidently not
changed. This is consistent with previous findings that showed attitudes formed by
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direct behavioural experiences have a stronger influence than attitudes formed through
indirect experience (Fazio et al. 1982). Indeed, attitude acquired through schedulers’
experience prevailed over attitudes prescribed by the adoption of a new strategy.
Although Lean strategy does not advocate reducing capacity utilisation, and even
emphasises the eventual increase in capacity utilisation achieved by supply-chain
synchronisation production pacing, it leads to an initial and temporary capacity
reduction. In discrete industries, this temporary reduction is addressed by generating
excess capacity (Ohno 1988), which absorbs utilisation losses. However, process
industries typically cannot generate excess capacity, as capacity is constrained by
physical machine capabilities (Crama, Pochet & Wera 2001; Harrison 2005). Therefore,
a temporary loss of capacity utilisation is expected at the first stages of Lean strategy
implementation. This loss of capacity utilisation is regarded by schedulers as a negative
consequence of Lean strategy.
Lean strategy was rejected by schedulers in the organisation studied here as it led
to a reduction in performance measures in the short term. These performance measures
were related to the outcome of their decisions, and not to the process. In general,
process-related feedback is better than outcome-related feedback when complex
mechanisms operate (Croson & Donohue 2006). The effectiveness of feedback is
critical to the success of Lean strategy, due to its complex and counter-intuitive
mechanisms. This study therefore suggests that performance measures may need to be
redesigned to align with the process of Lean practices rather than the outcome, thus
reducing the dominance of production targets and drawing schedulers’ attention to
levelled scheduling and small batches.
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6.2.4

Summary
Two individual factors were found to impede the adoption of Lean scheduling

practices in the steel industry: negative attitudes towards Lean practices, which are
learned over time and lead to the rejection small batches, low inventory levels, and
stopping production; and expected emotions, which leads schedulers to favour
traditional scheduling practices that are status quo and seen as “safe”. These factors are
relevant to scheduling decisions due to schedulers’ reliance on intuitive decisionmaking.
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6.3 Shared assumptions related to task and contextual factors
The previous section discussed the influences of individual factors on
scheduling decisions, and how they affect the enactment of Lean strategy. In addition
to these individual factors, this study also identified task-related and contextual factors
that are relevant to schedulers’ adoption of Lean practices. A further analysis of these
task and contextual factors revealed assumptions, shared across the organisation, that
influence schedulers’ adoption of these practices. Schedulers’ decisions are strongly
interrelated with the operation and performance of other functions, such as production,
sales, logistics, and higher management. Therefore, schedulers must take into account
the underlying assumptions that shape the perceptions of others.
Decision-making literature does not always make a clear distinction between
task-related and context-related variables, since decision context often determines the
decision task (Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993). Indeed, the context in which
scheduling decisions are performed in this study determines the scheduling task.
Contextual factors influence schedulers’ interpretation and perception of constraints,
priorities, and objectives. Therefore, contextual and task-related factors are discussed
simultaneously with the assumptions shared by organisational members, which influence
their adoption of Lean strategy. Each assumption is inferred from several factors
identified to support (or impede) Lean scheduling practices. In addition, each
assumption relates to a different aspect of Lean strategy, described in Section 1.1. Table
6.1 summarises these assumption and the Lean principle they influence.
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Table 6.1: Shared assumptions and corresponding Lean principles

Assumption

Lean principle

•

The source of business success

•

Value

•

How to address customer needs

•

Value

•

The role of the kanban

•

Paced production

•

Continuous improvement

•

How to achieve high production
volume

•

Paced production

•

Length of production lead time

•

Continuous improvement

6.3.1

The source of business success
The source of business success relates to the perception of value. When the

source of business success corresponds with a customer-centric view and involves
timely delivery of customer orders, it is easier to align scheduling decisions with Lean
practices than when low-cost products are seen as the source of success. Lean strategy
seeks a systematic method to achieve timely delivery, whereas traditional
manufacturing seeks low-cost production. Aiming for low-cost production leads to a
focus on cost reduction, which causes schedulers (and other organisational members) to
overweight the immediate and certain costs of small batches and kanban adherence.
This preference of certain cost reduction over the generation of intangible value can be
attributed to base rate bias (Bar-Hillel 1990), which leads individuals to prefer specific
information over general information that may be more relevant.
This preference, in turn, leads to scheduling decisions that do not align with
Lean strategy. To support Lean production, timely delivery needs to be acknowledged
as a source of value in steel products. This acknowledgement supports scheduling
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practices that reduce production lead times, at the expense of local efficiency and cost
reduction. Indeed, previous findings indicate that a shared awareness of customer needs
supports the adoption of Lean strategy (Nahm, Vonderembse & Koufteros 2004),
although this support was not directly linked to scheduling practice. The current study
offers insight as per how the understanding of customer needs supports Lean practices.
For example, when timely delivery is seen as important, it justifies stopping production,
even though production stopping reduces the achievement of localised production
targets.
Paradoxically, Lean strategy does not result in increased overall production
costs. Although smaller batches are traditionally non-economical in process industries
(Crama, Pochet & Wera 2001; Shah, N. 2005), the reduction of batch size required by
Lean strategy does not necessarily lead to greater costs, as the increase in localised costs
is offset by the increased overall productivity. Previous studies of the adoption of Lean
strategy in the steel industry did not report cost increases (Dhandapani, Potter & Naim
2004; Harrison 2005; Abdulmalek & Rajgopal 2007; Storck & Lindberg 2007), and
neither was an increase evident in this study. However, this study shows that an
assumption that high utilisation reduces costs and supports business success (Section
5.2.3.4) impedes the adoption of Lean strategy.
The awareness of customer needs, in this case, counters the influence of
pressures to deviate from Lean practices, such as the need to produce large quantities,
maintain high utilisation, and avoid stopping a machine. Since the entire plant is aware
of the need to address customer needs on time, the scheduler can more easily advance
Lean practices when justifying decisions to other parties and stakeholders. As discussed
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in Section 2.5.1, the need to provide justification can make some decision aspects more
prominent in the decision-maker’s mind (Simonson 1989). Thus, having customer
needs as a potential objective makes the justification of Lean practices less difficult than
if this awareness was not present among the other stakeholders.
When schedulers give low importance to pressures from production functions,
they are more likely to prefer customer needs over production of large quantities.
Results show that compared with past years, contemporary schedulers are less focused
on accommodating production’s requests for high volume (Section 5.2.2.4). When
Lean strategy was previously implemented in this organisation, the demands production
managers placed on quantities and tonnes were more widely accepted by the scheduling
team, whereas at present, there is greater awareness within production units of
addressing customer needs, rather than achieving large quantities.

6.3.2

How to address customer demand
Closely related to the previous assumption on the source of value is the

assumption on how it is achieved. While the traditional approach emphasises the
optimisation of core activities (such as sales and production), Lean strategy emphasises
the coordination and synchronisation of these functions through collaboration.
Although collaboration is commonly mentioned as an important aspect of
cellular manufacturing (McLachlin 1997; Fraser, Harris & Luong 2007), or as an aspect
of product design (Womack & Jones 2003), this study shows that even though cellular
manufacturing is inapplicable, and even when product design does not take place, a
collaborative focus is necessary in the steel industry as well. A collaborative focus
enables schedulers to influence the stakeholders involved in developing and enacting
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the schedule, and enables schedulers to balance cross-functional needs. Schedulers in
process industries therefore facilitate the type of collaboration achieved in cells in
discrete manufacturing.
Some performance measures do not encourage a collaborative focus, but rather
localised optimisation of core activities. Such performance measures (described in
Section 5.2.2.7) legitimise the focus of production units and sales representatives on
their core activities. Localised performance measures reduce the focus on collaborative
efforts with other functions. For example, overselling is strongly criticised by
proponents of Lean strategy (Womack & Jones 2003, p. 56), and referred to as “one of
the greatest evils of traditional selling and order-taking systems”. The authors explain
that overselling is an indication of poor “knowledge of or concern about the capabilities
of the production system” by sales workforce, and its damaging consequences are late
deliveries and bad will from customers.
However, when the parties understand the importance of synchronising their
efforts, they are more aware of their own impact on the overall business and supply
chain. This awareness increases the acceptability of Lean practices, such as kanban
adherence, that reduce localised achievements.

6.3.3

The role of kanbans
Kanban adherence is strongly emphasised in literature as critical to the

sustainability of Lean strategy (Ohno 1988; Monden 1994; Hopp & Spearman 2004).
Kanbans ensure paced production along the entire supply chain, and do not permit
localised production peaks that do not take into account other production units.
Kanbans also expose imperfections and problems in the production process, and thus
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facilitate continuous improvement (Billesbach 1994). When this role of kanbans is
understood and accepted, adherence to kanbans facilitates a sense of urgency to resolve
the problem that stopped production.
In contrast, this study shows that implementing kanbans is insufficient for the
sustainability and enactment of Lean strategy. In addition to their implementation, the
critical role of kanbans in sustaining continuous production needs to be understood.
Otherwise, if kanbans are seen as merely a guideline that indicates the state of inventory
compared with planned budget (Section 5.2.2.8), and if the kanbans are not strictly
adhered to, they are not effective in supporting Lean strategy. Kanbans in these
circumstances do not maintain paced production, and do not help detect problems that
prevent it.
Two main factors impede kanban adherence. First, kanbans are only measured
quarterly, and not more frequently (such as daily). Therefore, the schedulers are not
forced to consistently adhere to inventory levels dictated by kanbans (Section 5.2.2.5).
In addition, a shared resistance to stopping machines overrides the importance of the
signals given by kanbans. This resistance to stopping machines is further reinforced by
the need for high utilisation, which also overrides the need to address problems exposed
by a full kanban (Sections 5.2.2.8 and 5.2.3.4). However, when there is a preference for
low inventory due to space limitations, kanbans must be adhered to. Indeed, a physical
limitation of storage space has been the most effective way to enforce kanban adherence
in this organisation (Appendix C, Section A) and can be a method to support the
adoption of Lean strategy.

Irit Alony

Masters thesis

Page 157 of 224

Second, although schedulers’ performance measures support kanban adherence,
the influence of these performance measures is overpowered by the pressure to maintain
high utilisation. Previous studies of schedulers’ objectives showed they prioritise due
dates over utilisation (Cegarra 2008), but in this case high capacity utilisation receives
equivalent importance, even though scheduling decisions initially aim to achieve timely
delivery. Schedulers overtly claim that due dates are more important than utilisation
levels. However, in practice they aim to achieve full capacity utilisation. High capacity
utilisation is maintained despite product levels exceeding kanbans. Thus, the role of the
kanban is not assumed to be critical to business success, and this assumption impedes
the enactment of Lean strategy.

6.3.4

How to achieve high production volume
Lean strategy claims that high production volume can be maintained when small

and standardised batches are constantly produced along the entire supply chain. These
small and standardised batches lead to a predictable, stable, and consistent production
pace. In other words, with Lean strategy, high production volume is achieved over
time.
In contrast, an assumption that high production volume at every run results in
high production volume overall impedes the adoption of Lean strategy. This
assumption leads to the scheduling of large batches, which result in high inventory
levels (Lieberman, Helper & Demeester 1999), and eventually leads to congestion and
reduction of overall production volume (Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky & Simchi-Levi 2003).
In this study, the latter assumption was implicitly raised when schedulers
explained why they would not stop a machine, or how they need to achieve high
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utilisation. There is an underlying assumption that stopping a running machine, even if
for a changeover, leads to low production volume (Section 5.2.2.8).
Changeovers also represent a risk to the machine’s ability to continue
production. Improving the changeover process is central to the success of Lean strategy
(Ohno 1988; Womack & Jones 2003; Hopp & Spearman 2004). Proponents of Lean
strategy claim that changeovers must be perfected by reducing their duration and
ensuring their reliability, so that they do not cause a significant reduction in production
capacity. Indeed, reports of successful adoptions of Lean strategy in the steel industry
indicate that changeover times were significantly reduced and their reliability was
significantly improved, in order to support Lean practices of small batches
(Dhandapani, Potter & Naim 2004; Harrison 2005; Abdulmalek & Rajgopal 2007;
Storck & Lindberg 2007). In this case, however, the assumption that high capacity
utilisation is reached by large batches indicates that changeovers are still regarded as
disruptive and harmful to production volume. This assumption promotes large batches,
which lead to high inventory levels, and thus impede the adoption of Lean strategy.
Another factor reinforcing the assumption that high production volume requires
large batches is equipment (un)reliability, identified in Section 5.2.3.6 as a source of
uncertainty. When the equipment is seen as unreliable, schedulers expect breakdowns
which reduce production capacity. This creates an assumption that while machinery is
available and production is possible, large batches should be produced. Large batches
therefore compensate for lost machine availability. Equipment breakdowns create a
sense of urgency to produce large quantities even if not currently required, as the
machinery has to be utilised while it is functioning.
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Preventive maintenance, however, promotes predictable production availability.
This predictability reduces the urgency to produce when possible and to produce large
batches, as the scheduler can be reasonably certain that future demand can be addressed
by future production. Lean strategy requires the adjustment of maintenance practices
(Spencer & Guide, 1995) so that production predictability is achieved. This case
demonstrates how adjusting maintenance practices can support the modification of
assumptions required for the success of Lean strategy.
A preference for large batches can also be attributed to the saliency of feedback,
discussed in Section 6.2.3. Saliency refers to the strength of the tie between the decision
and its consequences. When the consequences occur significantly later than the decision,
feedback saliency is degraded (Croson & Donohue 2006). Since in Lean strategy, high
production volume is achieved over time, this achievement is not as salient as the
immediate achievement of high production volume due to a large batch at a time. When
large batches are scheduled, the successful production of large quantities is immediately
visible. This asymmetry between the visibility of consequences of the two strategies
impedes the adoption of Lean scheduling practices.
Seeking high production volume at every run impedes paced production, which
can only be achieved when small standardised batches are produced (Rother & Shook
2003). When scheduling aims for localised high volume, it is impossible to achieve
paced production, which is central to the continuous flow of product required by Lean
strategy.
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6.3.5

Length of production lead time
One of the major aims of Lean strategy is to reduce the time it takes to produce a

product (i.e., production lead time) so it is as close as possible to the duration of actions
necessary for production (i.e., value-add time) (Rother & Shook 2003; Womack &
Jones 2003). In process industries, it is not uncommon to find value-add times that
represent a small fraction (less than 5%) of the total production lead time (Shah, N.
2005). This enormous gap leaves ample room for improvement, and indeed, successful
adoptions of Lean strategy in the steel industry report dramatic reductions of their
production lead times. However, if schedulers (and other organisational members)
assume these lead times are set, and cannot be changed, such a reduction is not likely to
be achieved, as demonstrated in the case studied here. In this case, inventory is viewed
as the only possible way to address customer demand (Section 5.2.3.5). The efforts for
improvement then focus on maintaining a high level of inventory, which can satisfy
demand on time when orders are accepted, and when unpredictable breakdowns occur.
Inventory as means of insurance is not uncommon (e.g., Davis 1993); however, Lean
strategy sets against this view of inventory, and aims to minimise the uncertainty that
calls for such insurance. The acceptance of high inventory levels contradicts Lean
scheduling practices, and thus impedes the adoption of Lean strategy.

6.3.6

Summary
This study reveals five underlying assumptions that are relevant to three main

Lean principles. Two assumptions relate to the principle of value: the core of business
success and how customer demand is addressed. Two assumptions relate to paced
production: the role of the kanban, and how to achieve high production volume.
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Finally, two assumptions relate to continuous improvement: kanban adherence and the
difference between lead times and value-add times.
These assumptions dictate practical behaviours that can support or impede the
successful and sustainable adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry. This study
shows how each assumption relates both to the behaviour necessary to support Lean
scheduling practices, and to Lean principles.
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6.4 Contributions and implications of this study
The discussion chapter has identified several different contributions which have
implications for theory, practice, and methodology. This section highlights these
specific contributions and their implications.

6.4.1
Contribution to theory: identifying a new role of
schedulers
To date, theory on schedulers has only defined three roles of schedulers:
information nodes, influencers and negotiators, and problem anticipators and solvers
(Jackson et al., 2004; Berglund & Guinery, 2008). This study identified an additional
role. The schedulers in the steel industry play an important role when Lean strategy is
implemented, enacted, and sustained. Schedulers decisions are central to production
and manufacturing operations in the organisation, and are able to sustain (or as in this
case, lead to the failure of) the sustainability of Lean strategy. This role of the
scheduler as a strategy executor was not previously described in the literature; however,
this study demonstrates that it is critical to the sustainability of Lean strategy in the steel
industry.

6.4.2
Contribution to theory and practice: The contextual
influence of production on schedulers
Schedulers cannot, and do not, sustain a strategy by themselves. Since
schedulers often lack formal authority over the various stakeholders that they schedule
for (Berglund & Guinery, 2008), their influence is limited to what can be achieved by
bargaining and favours (Jackson et al., 2004). The context in which they schedule
therefore strongly influences schedulers’ ability to adopt lean scheduling practices.
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Therefore, addressing the priorities of the parties that normally negotiate with
production schedulers can be critical to the sustainability of Lean strategy. In particular,
the priorities and demands of production managers need to be addressed. This finding
bares practical implications for adopters and implementers of Lean strategy in process
industries.
One of the contextual factors that were found to impede the adoption of Lean
strategy was the contextual expectation and motivation to reach high production
volume. A success in achieving high production volume is still considered one of the
main indicators of the success of a business unit in the steel industry. Even an episodic
achievement (such as high production volume in a single shift) is greatly appreciated in
this industry. This motivation to outperform other units and other production managers
(both past and present) was found very difficult for schedulers to counter. However, it
is necessary to abandon this motivation if Lean strategy is to be successfully adopted.
Theory on the adoption of Lean practices therefore gains an insight into the central role
of schedulers on one hand, and on the other hand, the influence that production units
have on these schedulers.

6.4.3
Contribution to theory and practice: Schedulers facilitate
cross-functional collaboration
Theory on Lean strategy has strongly advocated for cross-functional
collaboration, which has been adopted by many practitioners. However, in the process
industry, cross-functional collaboration cannot be achieved by cellular manufacturing.
Instead of direct collaboration between the different functions, the collaboration has to
be facilitated by a central position, which holds an overview and an understanding of
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the entire operation. Schedulers, who have this view and understanding, were found in
this study to facilitate the coordination and collaboration between different
organisational functions (production, sales, and logistics) that Lean strategy requires.
They make the various organisational functions (e.g., sales, production, and logistics)
aware of each other’s needs and constraints. Schedulers also use rational explanations
to influence the various functions, when they explain to them the impact of their actions
on overall business success. This finding broadens the existing forms of crossfunctional collaboration, and draws attention to the role of schedulers in this capacity.

6.4.4
Contribution to theory and practice: Schedulers’ “soft”
skills: management of emotions, anticipated emotions, attitudes,
and interpersonal skills
The “soft” skills of schedulers were found to have an impact on the
sustainability of Lean strategy. Schedulers’ inter-personal skills, as well as their ability
to manage their own emotions, were found to support Lean strategy. Schedulers’
attitudes towards Lean practices, as well as anticipated emotions, were found to impede
the sustainability of Lean strategy. These findings highlight the importance of “soft”
skills of schedulers for the success of the sustainability of Lean strategy. This has to be
considered when Lean strategy is adopted in process industries: do the schedulers of the
unit adopting Lean strategy possess these skills?
This finding is also important to advance theory on Lean strategy. Lean strategy
emphasises “soft” skills to support collaboration, however this finding details several
skills not previously identified in Lean strategy literature (attitudes, management of
emotions, and anticipated emotions). This finding also highlights that these skills are
particularly important for schedulers.
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6.4.5
Contribution to theory and practice: Performance
measures for the sustainability of Lean strategy
So far, performance measures have been addressed by Lean literature in terms of
the outcome that they should encourage (Fullerton & McWatters 2001). Theory to date
suggests that individual performance measures of production workers need to reflect
cross-functional training (Karlsson & Åhlström 1995). However, this study shows two
new aspects to consider when performance measures are revised for Lean strategy in the
process industry: (1) reconsider the performance measures of the schedulers, who are
critical to the production process, and (2) revise the performance measures to support
the process of adhering to Lean principles (i.e., low inventory and small batches), rather
than the outcome of Lean strategy (which is high volume along with responsiveness to
customer demand). This principle fits in with previous findings in a different context,
showing that feedback for decision processes enables better learning than feedback for
decision outcomes (Croson & Donohue 2006). However, this principle has not been
previously linked specifically to the adoption of Lean strategy.

6.4.6
Contribution to practice: Priorities of schedulers
necessary for the sustainability of Lean strategy
This study emphasises the importance of the daily decisions of schedulers’ in
the steel industry in sustaining Lean strategy. Schedulers daily trade-off between batch
sizes and inventory levels. To sustain Lean strategy, these trade-offs must align with it.
Lean strategy can only be sustained if these trade-offs priorities small batches and low
inventory levels. This implication for practitioners places a strong emphasis on
priorities that must be maintained for the strategy to be successfully adopted.
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6.4.7
Contribution to methodology: How to study schedulers’
activities
Studies of schedulers have employed a wide range of methodologies (Wiers
1996; Jackson, Wilson & MacCarthy 2004; Berglund & Guinery 2008; Cegarra 2008).
Some methodologies have relied on changes in the schedule as a measurement of
schedulers’ activities (see, for example, Fransoo and Wiers, 2006). This study found
that schedulers can make changes with no impact on the production schedule. This
means that methodologies used for studying schedulers’ activities, that rely on changes
in the schedule as a measurement of schedulers’ activities need to account for courses of
action available to the schedulers that are not reflected in the schedule. Otherwise,
schedulers’ actions that are not reflected in the schedule may not be accounted for, and
thus compromise the study’s validity.
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Chapter 7

Limitations

This study has several limitations that make it difficult to generalise its findings.
First, it is based a single company. Second, the evidence of schedulers’ sources of
resistance to Lean strategy was indirect or retrospective. Third, the degree to which the
assumptions are shared across organisational members was not tested. These limitations
are addressed below.

7.1 Studying a single company
This study is based on a single company, which has its own set of practices,
history, shared understandings, and economic conditions. These variables suggest that
results may not be transferrable to other steel manufacturers. However, when examining
the few reports available on Lean strategy implementation in the steel industry, many of
these characteristics appears to be shared (Abdullah & Rajgopal 2003; Harrison 2005;
Abdulmalek & Rajgopal 2007; Storck & Lindberg 2007). Other steel manufacturers
share practical aspects impeding the adoption of Lean strategy in this organisation:
unreliable equipment (Harrison 2005) and monumental in size (Abdullah & Rajgopal
2003), as well as saturated capacity (Abdulmalek & Rajgopal 2007). In addition, other
steel manufacturers share many human aspects which include frequent senior
management turnover (Harrison 2005), as well as pressures to produce in large quantities
(Storck & Lindberg 2007).
Furthermore, researchers can expect that the organisation in this study and other
steel manufacturers will have similar cultural elements (Chatman & Jehn 1994). Shared
assumptions, which are an element of organisational culture (Schein 2004), are likely to
be similar as well. Because the organisational variables influencing the findings in this
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study are representative of the steel industry, the results are likely to be transferrable to
other steel manufacturers.

7.2 Indirect and retrospective evidence of individual factors
Individual factors influencing schedulers to reject or adopt Lean practices were
identified either indirectly or retrospectively. The individual factor that supports
schedulers’ enactment of a strategy (i.e., interpersonal skills) was identified from direct
testimonials of schedulers; however, the organisation studied was not actively
implementing Lean strategy. It was found that interpersonal skills assist schedulers’
enactment of a strategy, and thus it is inferred that these skills would support the
enactment of Lean strategy. This proposition can be tested in future studies.
The identification of individual factors that impede the enactment of Lean
strategy (i.e., attitudes and anticipated emotions) was based on indirect retrospective
evidence. As the researcher had no access to schedulers who were active at the time of
the implementation, these factors were inferred from retrospective testimonies of
individuals involved in the implementation of Lean strategy, and not from direct
testimonies of schedulers. In order to address this limitation, a triangulation of these
findings through interviews with current schedulers was conducted, and resulted in
partial support.
Further confirmation of these findings is possible either by examining the
attitudes and anticipated emotions of schedulers during an adoption of Lean strategy in
the steel industry, or by surveying schedulers for their attitudes towards and anticipated
emotions from following Lean practices.
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7.3 How shared are the shared assumption?
Assumptions identified in this study are assumed to be shared amongst
organisational members; however, few organisational members from different functions
were included as participants in this study. For example, production managers, to whom
are attributed most of these assumptions, were not interviewed. However, the broad
spectrum of participants in this study (i.e., schedulers, planner, controller, engineers,
human-resources managers, and senior managers) confirms that production managers
hold these assumptions, and that they dictate many of the fundamental organisational
perceptions of the source of business value and success, and the way to achieve high
production volume. Further confirmation on the prevalence of these assumptions
amongst other organisational members can be attained through quantitative survey
research, or further qualitative research such as focus groups, interviews, or qualitative
surveys.
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Chapter 8

Conclusion

In search of an understanding of the reasons behind the low uptake of Lean
strategy in process industries, this study employed an inductive approach and examined
the steel industry. The study focused on the importance of schedulers to the enactment
of Lean strategy, and sought to understand the nature of their impact on its adoption.
First, the study compared previously described roles of schedulers with their role in the
steel industry. Second, based on extant literature on human decision-making, the study
developed a framework for various factors influencing schedulers’ decisions that support
or impede the enactment of Lean strategy. These factors were divided into three
categories: individual, task, and context. Third, the study identified the main principles
that guide Lean strategy, and suggested that a revision to several underlying assumptions
in the organisation would be required.
Using a case-study methodology, the decision-making framework was used to
identify various factors involved in a rejection of Lean strategy in a steel-manufacturing
organisation, and to explain the way these factors operated, as well as interrelations
between them. A thematic analysis of retrospective interviews with key individuals
involved in the implementation revealed several factors leading schedulers to reject Lean
strategy. These factors were triangulated and supplemented with factors revealed
through a thematic analysis of interviews with current schedulers in the organisation.
The individual factors indentified in this research highlight the importance of
schedulers’ interpersonal skills, as well as schedulers’ ability to manage their own
emotions. These factors can support the successful enactment of any strategy. In
addition, two individual factors that impeded the enactment of Lean scheduling practices
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were identified: attitudes and anticipated emotions. The influence of these factors has
been previously identified in human decision-making and behaviour literature; however,
this study extends their influence to scheduling decisions.
In addition to the individual factors, task-related and contextual factors that
influence schedulers’ enactment of Lean strategy were identified. A further analysis of
these factors revealed a set of assumptions shared amongst organisational members that
provide context for – and therefore influence – scheduling decisions. These assumptions
are concerned with the source of business success, the way to address customer demand,
the role of kanbans, the way to achieve high utilisation, and the length of lead times.
Schedulers need an alignment between these assumptions and Lean principles to enact
Lean strategy.
Despite the limitations of this study, which drew on a single organisation and
relied on retrospective and indirect evidence, it provides valuable insights into the
individual factors that impede schedulers in the steel industry from adopting Lean
strategy. This study extends on existing operations management literature by
highlighting the importance of schedulers to the enactment of Lean strategy, by
addressing individual factors that impede this enactment, and by explicating shared
assumptions unique to the steel industry that are relevant to this enactment.
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Appendix A. Factors influencing scheduling decisions
– a thematic analysis
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate the process of the first level of
analysis, which identified behavioural factors influencing scheduling decisions. The
framework for production-scheduling decisions suggests three categories of factors that
influence them: individual, task, and context. Factors examined in the individual
category are attitudes motivation, capabilities, and experience. Factors in the task
category are information, objectives, and time. Factors in the context category are
justifiability, the number of alternatives available, and organisational risk aversion.
To identifying the influence of these factors on schedulers’ decisions, factors
were interpreted in relation to their supporting, impeding, or lack of effect on the
adoption of Lean scheduling practices. This analysis served to guide the next two levels
of analysis: the identification of task, individual, and contextual factors supporting or
impeding Lean strategy adoption (Section 5.2), and shared assumptions relevant to the
adoption of Lean strategy (Section 5.3). Evidence for the influence of each factor on
scheduling decisions is presented, along with the interpretation of the importance and
relevance of the factors to the adoption of Lean strategy.

Section A -

Individual

Decision-makers themselves are known to have an impact on the decision.
Indeed, different schedulers provide different schedules, as explained in the next quote:
We each have a different process of getting to [the desired]
point. I might save this [batch] for the second cycle and
put half it on this cycle. Clay might not, Clay might put
it all on [at once]. [Vera, unit scheduler, Unit B]
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Three factors were found to influence the difference between schedulers:
motivation, capabilities, and experience. Evidence of the influence of each factor is
presented next.

(a) Motivation
When composing a schedule, schedulers are motivated by different aspects of
their work. Evidence showed schedulers were motivated by achieving businessperformance objectives, receiving positive managerial feedback and avoiding negative
feedback, and proving their own capabilities and value. There was also a social
motivation to maintain a schedule without negative consequences for the next shift.
Table A.1 summarises evidence of these motivators.
Table A.1: Schedulers' motivators

Business
performance

If you get timely delivery then we are doing
well. We are making money [for the business].
[Sam, master scheduler, Unit A]
I want to do what is best for the business.
[Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
[Sam, Unit scheduler,

Proving
individual
capabilities
and value

I want to do a good job.
Unit A]

Achieving
positive
feedback

The boss would like to see it 100% [delivery
performance]; we are lucky if we can get it 95%
and still get a bit of a smile out of him. I
want to satisfy my boss. [Sam, unit scheduler,
Unit A]

Avoiding
negative
feedback

I don’t want to get yelled at, and that means
that I will plan to have 100% utilisation of
those units. [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit
A]
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There would be questions asked and it would
indicate that I was a poor planner if the units
were
under-utilised.
[Lee,
planner
and
scheduler, Unit A]
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Social
responsibility
– helping the
next shift

For the next 24 hours I help my partner come
in. I do my work for today, but I also do my
work for tonight. So if I had to work tonight,
it wouldn’t be too bad of a shift. I help my
mate out as well, and I expect him to do the
same for me in the morning. [Ronald, shift
controller, Unit A]

Schedulers’ motivation to “do the right thing for the business” was instrumental
in the understanding of the role of shared assumptions in Lean strategy adoption.
Schedulers agreed, across units and roles, about this motivation. Therefore, if schedulers
in the past rejected Lean strategy, it suggests their understanding of the source of
business success differed to that of Lean strategy.
Schedulers’ motivation to achieve positive feedback and avoid negative feedback
was central in the understanding of possible influences that impede the adoption of Lean
strategy in the steel industry. While achieving Lean goals leads to positive feedback,
failing to achieve production targets and utilisation entails risking negative feedback.
The asymmetry between the impact of positive and negative expected feedback can
explain why avoiding negative feedback prevailed over the attainment of positive
feedback, as presented in Section 5.2.1.2.
Finally, the socially motivated aim to assist the next shift can support Lean
practices, particularly when preventive maintenance is performed. Preventive
maintenance supports a predictable and stable production environment, reducing
schedulers’ need for high inventory levels, as explained in Section 5.2.3.5.

(b) Capabilities
Three types of capabilities were referred to by schedulers: cognitive,
interpersonal, and emotional. However, the importance attributed to these types varied.
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Although scheduling is often seen as a complex combinatorial task, drawing on cognitive
capabilities, several schedulers indicated that apart from extensive knowledge of the
specific technical aspects of the plant, scheduling is a simple decision-making process
that does not draw heavily on cognitive capabilities. The schedulers illustrated this point
by saying “it is not rocket science” (Fred, master scheduler, and Ronald, shift controller,
Unit A).
In contrast, interpersonal and emotional capabilities were highlighted by
schedulers as critical to a successful performance of their role. The schedulers’
interpersonal skills are relevant to their role as influencers and negotiators, when the
schedulers’ authority does not extend over production or sales functions. In those cases,
schedulers draw on interpersonal capabilities to influence other parties to achieve the
outcome they are after.
The emotional capabilities were also relevant to scheduling decisions, by
influencing (or preventing an influence on) prioritisation. The schedulers describe the
risk of making decisions based on negative feedback originating from other functions
(such as production), and the need to draw on emotional capabilities to withstand the
pressure they exert. Quotes conveying these concepts are summarised in Table A.2.
Table A.2: Capabilities of schedulers

Interpersonal

Our team is successful because we hire people
that [have] soft skills, good influencing
skills and a fairly good level of interpersonal
savvy.
I will choose someone that has those
skills over someone with knowledge.
[Lee,
planner and scheduler, Unit A]
Some people need lots of data and time to
digest that, others don't, but it is just
dealing with that personality type to get the
outcome you want. [Fred, master scheduler, Unit
A]
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Emotional

You’ve got to have lots of patience, tons of
patience. ‘Cause you’re dealing with people out
on the floor that just wake up in the morning
and think, “I think I’ll make it hard today for
anybody that I talk to”. And it’s generally
what they do [Ronald, shift controller, Unit A]
Thursday-Friday are the hell of my job, I get
abused every time. [Vera, unit scheduler, Unit
B]
When you are a novice, you don't have the
confidence in your decisions so you listen to
the person yelling the most. [Lee, planner and
scheduler, Unit A]

Schedulers’ interpersonal and emotional capabilities were so strongly emphasised
by participants that these capabilities were preferred to task-related and domain-related
knowledge. This contributed to the decision to include these capabilities in the second
level of analysis as a factor relevant to the adoption of Lean strategy. Schedulers’
cognitive capabilities, however, were not strongly emphasised. The cognitive demands
on schedulers were played down. For this reason, schedulers’ cognitive abilities were
not included in the next level of analysis.

(c) Experience
Schedulers’ experience was found to influence their decisions in three ways.
First, as expected, experience extends schedulers’ domain-specific knowledge, and
makes them more familiar with potential solutions (or “avenues”) to problems.
Second, experience indirectly facilitates schedulers’ influence on other functions,
as the schedulers’ experience provides them with credibility. This credibility supports
schedulers when they need to make decisions that are unfavourable to other functions.
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The second quote in Table A.3 provides an example: when the line has to be stopped, the
schedulers’ credibility is sufficient for production managers to accept it.
Finally, schedulers’ experience develops their awareness of the consequences of
dealing with negative feedback. The third quote in Table A.3 was discussed in the
context of emotional capabilities; however, this quote is also relevant to individual
experience. Through experience, schedulers learn not only the practical side of their
decisions, and the implications of these decisions for business performance, but also the
influence of their own emotions on such decisions. They learn to moderate this
influence, in order to achieve business results they strive for.
Table A.3: Contributions of schedulers’ experience

Domainspecific
knowledge

There’s quite a few avenues you can take, but
you
need
to
know
them.
[Ronald,
shift
controller, Unit A]

Credibility
and
reputation

I gained really good knowledge and experience, I
got a little bit of street credibility by doing
that. [Production] people would say: okay, you
have worked on shift, so you know the area.
They may ask: “have you taken everything into
account?” and if I say “Yes, I have, and we have
to stop [your line]”, they will usually accept
that. [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]

Emotional
capabilities

When you are a novice, you don't have the
confidence in your decisions so you listen to
the person yelling the most. [Lee, planner and
scheduler, Unit A]

The importance of schedulers’ experience was relevant to understanding
schedulers’ role in this steel-manufacturing organisation. Schedulers are familiar with
many possible ways, or avenues, to achieve an outcome. Their reputation enables them
to enforce decisions even if these decisions are not favoured by the organisational
functions that they affect. Thus, schedulers play an important role in the execution of a
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strategy. They can enact a production strategy within a business, and thus their role is
central to the adoption of Lean strategy.
The importance of schedulers’ experience to their ability to manage their own
emotions in order to perform their role supported the conclusion that emotional aspects
of scheduling decisions need to be further addressed and understood, in order to provide
a complete picture of scheduling decisions that can support (or impede) the adoption of
Lean strategy.

Section B -

Task

Three task-related factors were found relevant to scheduling decisions:
information, objectives, and time. Evidence of these factors is presented next. Quotes
demonstrating the concepts presented are summarised in tables at the end of each subsection.

(a) Information
In some respects, schedulers’ information needs are well supported by the
organisation’s information systems. Schedulers across units indicated they have
sufficient information for their decision-making. The information systems in the
organisation generally support their information needs, by providing all aspects of realtime information on ordering, current schedule, and inventory position, as well as
historical information regarding production, ordering, and delivery.
The organisation’s information systems enhance information accessibility by
providing visual aids. Graphs display trends, colour schemes indicate inventory levels
and their adherence to limits, and visual cues present a virtual state of the plant in terms
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of machine status. These visual aids, in the form of graphs, colour schemes and visual
cues, increase information availability to the scheduler.
Contrary to these findings, which indicate the organisation’s thorough awareness
of the need to support decision-makers’ information needs, other findings indicate that
the schedulers’ job cannot be fully automated. Schedulers need to apply human
judgement to the information they use. Part of the schedulers’ expertise is to interpret
and contextualise it. This contextualisation and interpretation is a human function that
cannot be automated. Schedulers rely on their experience and their understandings of the
interrelationships between various operational aspects for this interpretation. Schedulers
apply their judgement to the recommendations of the computerised planning tool, and
also elicit priorities from other functions (such as sales) in order to use resources
effectively.
In addition to information available through information systems, schedulers
receive information via personal contact. This aspect has been presented in Section
5.1.1, under the scheduler’s role as an information node. At times, schedulers prefer
communicating directly rather than using information systems to elicit information.
Examined from a behavioural decision-making perspective, information provided
through personal contact is more vividly perceived and more available to the scheduler
than information provided through information systems. In addition, these personal
interactions build the relationships schedulers require to successfully perform their role.
Evidence of these various aspects of information available for schedulers are
summarised in Table A.4.
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Table A.4: Aspects of information in scheduling

Information systems
visual support

[Our information system] is very graphic,
very good data.
It does everything from
plant flow to product level: at each
location in the plant, at our external
warehouses, history of each of those,
access coil pieces if you want to do it.
[Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]
It is fantastic, it is a very good visual
tool.
[It provides] information for
decision-making. [Lee, master scheduler,
Unit A]

Need for context
from human sources

This [computer-generated] plan is saying:
“please produce a lot more”.
We suspect
that [in two weeks] we have a maintenance,
and the [computerised model] is building
that stock now.
But I think that is a
hell of a long time to carry extra stock.
[Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
You can work with [customer service], and
ask: “I haven't got enough capacity,
what's the product you really want me to
make?” [Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]

Information
exchange as a
conduit of
relationships

I am a big fan of ringing up and chatting
to someone too. As part of this role, you
really need that relationship stuff with
someone you need to influence.
You can't
do
that
via
email.
[Fred,
master
scheduler, Unit A]

Evidence on the availability of information indicated that this aspect is not central
to the understanding of the rejection of Lean strategy in this organisation. However,
evidence indicating that schedulers apply their judgement and influence scheduling
decisions beyond the recommendations of computerised models reinforced the
conclusion that schedulers are critical to the adoption of Lean strategy. In addition, the
time and effort spent by schedulers to nurture their relationships with other members of
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the organisation reinforced the understanding of the scheduler as an influencer and
negotiator, discussed in Section 5.1.2.

(b) Objectives
Various types of objectives drive schedulers. The targets that are overtly
declared as the objectives of a schedule are capacity utilisation, timely delivery (or
delivery performance), and adherence to inventory targets. However, in practice, ,
inventory targets are only measured four times a year, and are therefore treated only as a
recommendation during the rest of the time. The other two objectives (production levels
and timely delivery) guide scheduling decisions regularly. Although timely delivery
guides scheduling decisions, a strong pressure to achieve production targets was evident.
These priorities are presented in Table A.5.
Table A.5: Main priorities of schedulers

Production Whether you like it or not, this president right
levels
now, like the president before, is heavily
focused on keeping lines running.
That’s our
priority
[motto]: don't stop the line.
There might
kanbans, and training says: “you should never
exceed a kanban”, until the first time you try
and stop a production unit. [A kanban] is just
a guide. Production definitely [is a priority]
[Fred, master scheduler, Unit A]
Timely
delivery
priority

My major priority is mostly customer getting the
coil on time. That’s what I try and run by the
most,
with
all
the
computer
systems
and
everything we have there. … We can’t do two
things at once. [Ronald, shift controller, Unit
A]
I really have no driving force other than
[delivery due date], so I know I have got to
meet a [delivery due date], that is my only
driving force. [Vera, unit scheduler, Unit B]
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Schedulers often reduce the complexity of their objectives to one simple goal –
delivery performance. This simplification is a common behavioural strategy in the case
of multiple contradicting objectives. Although schedulers across units and levels overtly
indicate they prioritise timely delivery over other priorities, in practice there is strong
pressure to maintain production continuity. This pressure is also relevant to justifiability,
and will be further discussed in Section C (a) of this Appendix. Understanding this
pressure contributed to understanding shared assumptions in the organisation, leading to
scheduling decisions that do not support Lean practices, as discussed in Section 6.3.4.

(c) Time
Despite evident time pressure, scheduling team members often engage in
analytical and group decision-making. Analytical decision-making is more timeconsuming that intuitive decision-making, and group decision-making is more timeconsuming than individual decision-making. Schedulers make decisions that can be
justified, supported, and referred to in hindsight.
Table A.6: Time consuming decision-making

Analytical and We would do it as a team, just sit down and say
“right, lets use some rational process”. There
group
are four basic tools which are: problem
decisionanalysis, situation appraisal, decision-making
making
and potential-problem analysis.
Once you have
chosen a direction, you can use the potential
problem, what could go wrong with it and have
some
preventative
actions
and
contingency
actions. [Lee, planner and scheduler, Unit A]
Gaining
approval of
others
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Sometimes you only have five minutes. You don’t
make the decision, obviously, in five minutes,
but you’ve got five minutes to think about it,
and have a quick chat with some other people,
to get their opinion, in case there’s something
else thrown into the soup. [Ronald, shift
controller, Unit A]
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Choosing these time-consuming decision processes under time pressure indicates
a need to avoid risks, blame, and criticism. This aspect of scheduling decisions
highlights the influence of organisational blame on schedulers’ decisions. Although
schedulers are relatively autonomous when making decisions, consequences of these
decisions are subjected to the feedback of others. This insight contributed to the
understanding of schedulers’ rejection of Lean practices in the face of organisational
criticism over such practices.

Section C -

Context

Contextual factors relevant for scheduling decisions were mentioned in all
interviews, indicating that contextual factors are commonly relevant to scheduling
decisions. The major contextual themes identified in this case are justifiability, and
recent conditions. Shared assumptions relevant for scheduling were examined in detail
in Section 6.3, and are therefore not presented in this appendix.

(a) Justifiability
Although the schedules are not reviewed by others, decisions that have an impact
on other organisational functions (particularly production) need to be justified, or more
than that – sold to them. This need to gain the endorsement of other organisational
functions leads to a need to keep certain aspects of the decision available in the
scheduler’s mind.
If you make somebody less happy, you have to be able to have
an answer in your head, if they ring you up and ask: “why
did you do that?” If you can give them an answer that makes
sense, chances are they are going to go away. [Fred, master
scheduler, Unit A]
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Justifiability has been shown to promote status-quo and “safe” decisions. The
need to justify scheduling decisions can lead to status-quo scheduling practices, such as
maintaining large batches and high inventory levels. These status-quo decisions do not
support the adoption of Lean strategy, which requires smaller batches and low inventory
levels.

(b) Recent conditions
Schedulers at all levels maintain a mental image of the current situation of the
plant. In some units, this image is supported by computerised visual tools, presenting the
status of each machine. This mental image provides context for interpretation of new
information regarding interruptions, updates, and changes to the existing situation.
When an interruption occurs, in addition to resolving the problem, schedulers also
prepare alternative plans for all possible events and their consequences.
You need to know virtually every crane, fields, the whole
works, what’s in them, how much is in them, where you can
play with putting feed, where you can afford to put feed.
You need to know the whole plant, in detail.
You always
have to have lots of avenues, ‘cause every minute something
could go wrong and stop. [Ronald, shift controller, Unit A]
This mental image and awareness of recent events aids schedulers in their role as
problem anticipators and solvers, presented in Section 5.1.3.

Appendix A

Page 201 of 224

Appendices

Appendix B. Lean strategy implementation
management
One might claim that the implementation of Lean strategy in this case failed due
to unprofessional or inappropriate change management. Indeed, failures of change
initiatives are far from rare – a recent examination of success rates of change projects
show that only 41% of change efforts meet all their objectives (Jørgensen, Owen & Neus
2009). Other change efforts either fall short of their objectives, or are discontinued prior
to completion. However, in this study the implementation of Lean strategy was done
professionally, by experienced change managers, who had ample resources and who
dedicated time to educating the entire plant. This appendix shows that despite the
presence of some generic change-management problems, a full understanding of the
rejection of Lean strategy in this steel manufacturing facility involves the understanding
of aspects specific to the adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry.
Extensive literature on change management seeks to establish factors necessary
for a successful implementation of organisational change (Weick 1995; eg., Kotter 1996;
Cameron & Quinn 1999; Dawson 2003). Reviewing that body of literature is outside the
scope of this thesis. However, a recent publication regarding the implementation of
Lean strategy (Yauch & Steudel 2002) presents a list of prevalent factors supporting a
successful change implementation. These are: clear definitions, effective
communication and involvement, a sense of urgency for change, adequate resources,
small steps, and effective rewards. The next sections provide evidence of how these
factors were addressed by the implementing team, and show that this evidence does not
provide a complete understanding of the failure to adopt Lean strategy in this case.
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Section A -

Clear definitions

Several aspects have to be clearly defined to support a successful change
implementation. High-level aspects involve a vision, purpose, goals, and strategy. Lowlevel aspects concern performance criteria and measurement systems. Organisational
aspects involve roles, structure, and authority. The implementation team was highly
aware of the need for clear definitions. In addition, the organisation studied has a low
tolerance of uncertainty, and thus change initiatives typically address clarity of
definitions. Evidence of the clarity of definitions in this case is provided in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Evidence of the clarity of definitions

Definition

Evidence

Vision and Key Message in Communications:
purpose
This
project
is
not
about
just
reducing
inventory, it is about continuous improvement and
getting product to our customer faster. [Project
summary document]
Strategy and
goals

•

Target: 1/2 week of safety stock and 1 week
of replenishment orders in finished goods.

•

Replenish only what gets shipped from the
finished-goods kanban [Mill finished goods
summary presentation]

•

Focus on how quickly
forecast to invoice

•

Small-step improvement process

•

Manage by
monitors

•

[Enforce the] kanbans

having

[Institutionalisation
Mill]
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Performance Introducing “Days of
measure of lead times:
criteria

inventory”

(DOI)

as

a

We introduced “days of inventory” as a measure.
Nearly everybody in the whole company still has
that measure in their bonus today [Cameron,
program director, the mill]
We were looking at “work in progress”, finished
goods
inventory
status;
on-time
delivery,
quality, performance, and days of inventory in
total.
We then relate that back to daily
decisions. [Fiona, project manager, the mill]
Procedures

Form – “Authority to exceed kanbans”

Clear roles We made sure that we had meetings with the senior
management team at the Mill every week. [Fiona,
and
project manager, the mill]
authority

(a) High-level definitions
Definitions of the vision, purpose, strategy, and goals were evident in several
implementation documents and presentations. These definitions were stated at the
beginning of most internal implementation documents, providing context and
understanding of the goals and purpose of the project, and the strategy of the
implementation.

(b) Low-level definitions:
Performance criteria were defined and aligned with the Lean objectives. The
measure “days of inventory” reflected how long a product resides in inventory prior to
delivery. This measure is directly linked to lead time, and the team made this
relationship clear, as well as the relationship between this measure and daily practices.
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(c) Organisational definitions
Daily practices were restricted by procedures, exemplified by kanban adherence.
The procedure for exceeding a kanban was made clear to schedulers and a form
specifying why a kanban needs to be exceeded attests to the clarity of the procedure for
exceeding it.
Finally, the implementation team drew on the authority of the units’ top
management. This authority was established initially when the unit’s top manager
adopted Lean strategy, and was reinforced by weekly team meetings. This authority was
useful while implementing training programs, maintenance practices, and kanban
adherence.
This evidence demonstrates that the implementation team clarified definitions
both internally, amongst themselves and senior management, and externally to the
workers in the unit. The implementation team thoroughly addressed this aspect of
change: high-level, low-level, and organisational issues were clearly defined. The way
these definitions were communicated, as well as other aspects of Lean strategy, is
presented next.

Section B -

Effective communication and involvement

Effective communication of the upcoming changes and involvement of
organisational members in the change processes are known to support organisational
change (Hackman & Oldham 1980; Kotter 1996). Both promote employee commitment,
acceptance, and understanding of the change.
The implementation team placed a strong emphasis on communication
throughout the implementation. After the initial introduction of the upcoming change
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and its meaning (i.e., reduction of inventory), the implementation team ran workshops to
train and educate all unit members by familiarising them with Lean theoretical principles
and practical aspects. Unit managers went through a two-day workshop, and operators
went through a half-day version. In addition to these workshops, which were run at the
beginning of the program, awareness sessions were run prior to the introduction of each
practice change. These awareness sessions were designed to familiarise and alert
individuals of the nature of the change and the logic behind it. Packages of written
material were handed out at the end of these sessions, making the information available
and accessible.
The implementation team aimed to make sure at least 85% of the unit members
were familiar with each new practice. To achieve this aim, a log of all participants in all
workshops and awareness sessions was kept and displayed. Evidence of these
communication practices is presented in Table B.2 below.
Table B.2: Evidence of effective communication practices

Teaching
theory of Lean
strategy

We’d do a lot of theory about push/pull, about
forecasting,
about
batch
sizes
and
some
basic
fundamentals of Lean strategy. [Cameron, program
director, the mill]

Practical
demonstration
of Lean
principles

We ran a game demonstrating the difference between push
and pull.
[Using “Push” strategy] we could make 2
colours of houses in 10 minutes and now [using “Pull” ]
we can make 49 colours of houses in two minutes.
They were enjoying having to cut things out.
By the
end of the game they felt better about Lean strategy.
They were happy that it worked. [Cameron, program
director, the mill]

Communication
of
implementation
steps
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We had a lot of communication packages developed to
hand to people.
Before we started implementing
anything, we would hold 45-minute awareness sessions,
and in the end, hand out the package. [Fiona, project
manager, the mill]
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Members’
training followup

We set targets and we measured how many people were
trained.
I’d also plot how many people had been
trained on a particular technique that we’d need to get
going. Our goal target was to communicate to 85%. We
made sure that we were 85% or above. We made sure that
we didn’t lose somebody. [Fiona, Project manager, the
mill]

The implementation team took the training session very seriously, and key
individuals who refused to attend workshops or sessions were not let off the hook. The
following quote describes a creative and humorous way employed to enforce
participation of a particularly resistant manager:
I went to the ambulance station, hired a wheelchair and said
to him, “I’m going to drive you today!”
He was all
embarrassed. He wouldn’t let me use the wheelchair, but he
did walk out [and joined the workshop].
[Fiona, project
manager, the mill]
In addition to a one-way communication of the change, the implementation team
sought to involve unit members in the implementation of the change. Involvement is
defined as employees’ exercise of influence on how their work is carried out (Morgan &
Zeffane 2003). In accord with this definition, employees were involved by eliciting their
input and enabling that input to influence their work. Lean strategy prescribes lower
levels of inventory, and standardised batch sizes. Managers and schedulers negotiated
the new inventory levels, and were asked to determine the appropriate standard batch
size. When the implementation team realised such a size could not have been
determined, they abandoned that aspect of Lean strategy and focused inventory levels,
which were less controversial and easier to implement.
We went through an exercise - how big should the batch be?
The operating guys spent quite a bit of time [trying to
determine it]. After about six months of trying real hard,
they couldn’t work out the batch size.
Because they
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couldn’t give me any answer about that, we approached it
from another point – how long should a product take to
process. [Ian, team leader, the mill]
This quote, and the process the team leader went through, demonstrates how the
implementation team adjusted principles of Lean strategy to suit the needs and
conditions of unit. The implementation team did not simply dictate the terms of the
change, but modified the implemented principles according to unit members’ input.
In addition, managers requested an information system that would assist them
with the adoption of the new practices. This system was developed to support the
schedulers’ and managers’ information needs, and to enable them to relinquish inventory
that served as insurance. It was developed quickly and effectively: it is still in use today
in the organisation, attesting to its success. The next quote demonstrates these aspects of
involvement:
We [project team] used to say to people: “We want you to
live with less inventory. What would make your job easier?”
They’d say, “If I could get information on this, that would
be really good”. We’d go and deliver this brand new system
for them.
No questions asked, no business case, no
bureaucracy. We’d just do it. Within days these people had
a system that did what they wanted.
They had this new
information they helped design. This system is still in use
today [Cameron, program director, the mill]

This section shows that managers and operators were trained and educated
regarding Lean strategy, and that every step of the program was announced and clarified
prior to its implementation. Theoretical and practical material was summarised and
handed out. Targets and strategies were clearly defined and communicated consistently
throughout the unit. Unit members were involved and consulted in order to adjust the
change and the systems, to support their needs. This section shows that the rejection of
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Lean strategy was not due to lack of knowledge of this strategy, or due to poor
communication.

Section C -

Adequate resources and support

This project enjoyed ample support and funding from when the implementation
team was trained (i.e., 12 months before the actual implementation), until 18 months
after the implementation. After 18 months, the top manager left the unit, and the lack of
support from the new top manager enabled the decay of Lean strategy enactment. This
section provides evidence of the degree of the support that was available prior to the
change in management, and shows how the change in management led to the rejection of
Lean strategy.
Naturally, projects with insufficient resources would struggle to survive.
Resource allocation often depends on top management support and political sponsorship;
however, such support and sponsorship can extend beyond tangible resources (Yauch &
Steudel 2002). As with many change initiative, top management support is necessary for
successful supply-chain management initiatives (Gunasekaran et al. 2004). Political
sponsorship can help remove roadblocks and advance change initiatives, since political
behaviours inevitably accompany organisational change (Price, Lavelle et al. 2006).
This project had both top management and political support. Top management
was present in weekly performance-monitoring meetings. This involvement assisted
with enforcing Lean practices, as explained in the quote below:
The brief on Monday meetings had the senior [manager], which
was very powerful, and people knew they had to have a pretty
good explanation if there was a major deviation from the
targets. Those targets were very visual, particularly the
amount of “work in process”. [Vincent, project manager, the
mill]
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The implementation team had ample financial support, as they were part of a
corporate-wide program of Lean implementation. This support assisted with practical
aspects necessary for the implementation, such as the development of the information
systems discussed in Section B of this Appendix. The next quote demonstrates the
support of corporate finding.
We’d go and [build an information system] because I had
corporate funding, and I had two programmers that work for
that.
We’d go and deliver this brand new system within
days. [Cameron, program director, the mill]
Corporate funding also enabled the implementation team to undergo a thorough
training with world-class experts, over a period of 12 months. Perhaps the most
convincing evidence for adequate resources is the absence of evidence for a lack of
resources. The possibility that additional resources were necessary was not raised in any
interviews or informal conversations.
In additional to practical and financial support, the implementation team elicited
the political sponsorship of senior, credible top managers in the organisation. These
members are clearly described in the following quote:
Sponsors are the senior people who provide guidance; give
[the project] credibility, and help with roadblocks. Once a
month I would go to my sponsors and ask for their help and
their counsel. If I ran into a roadblock I could go to my
sponsors and explain my roadblock.
They might be able to
give me some counsel. They might say, “Let me give them a
call”, or perhaps, “Have you thought about this approach?”
[Cameron, program director, the mill]
These quotes demonstrate the availability of funding to the project team, the
guidance and support of senior credible members, and the support and follow-up of the
mill’s top manager.
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Although political support was present, it was no longer effective once the mill’s
new top manager was appointed. The new top manager was not committed to
implementing Lean strategy. His rejection of Lean strategy reduced the reinforcement of
Lean practices, which eventually resulted in performance deterioration.
[The new plant manager was] a very highly regarded
production guy.
He had the view that the problem at the
mill was caused by poor quality. He focused on less errors,
higher yields. He allowed kanbans to be broken and didn’t
follow up. [Inventory levels] went up a bit: he didn’t do
anything about it. [Cameron, program director, the mill]
Although the lack of support from top management contributed to the rejection of
Lean strategy, it does not provide a complete explanation for the consistent resistance
this strategy encountered in this organisation. By the time the new manager was
appointed, Lean strategy had been in place over 18 months. However, the resistance to
Lean practices predated this appointment. When top management support was lost,
resistance forces overpowered the efforts of the implementation team, but the underlying
causes for this resistance cannot be explained by the management turnover. This case
demonstrates that the pressures to reject Lean strategy in the steel industry stem from
more fundamental issues.

Section D -

A sense of urgency for change

A sense of urgency has long been identified as an important element for a
successful change (Kotter 1996). It gives organisational members a strong drive to make
necessary adjustments. Although the implementation team strove to install this sense of
urgency, they were unsuccessful.
The sense of urgency to improve the mill’s performance could have been driven
by the fear for its survival. The mill had been under threat of shutting down for several
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years. Fierce overseas competition had undermined the plant’s financial viability, and
employees were in constant fear of losing their jobs. The rest of the steelworks in the
area were undergoing extensive downsizing, and the workforce had been reduced from
20,000 to less than 5,000 employees. Thus, the fear of job loss was not unjustified.
Many of the workers lacked formal education, and their expertise was a result of
many years of work in the plant. Few employment alternatives would have been
available to these employees had they lost their jobs, as the organisation was the major
employer in the region.
Employees’ fear of losing their jobs was sufficient to lead to their support of
business survival; however, organisational members often mentioned another important
reason for wanting the plant to continue: pride in being a local manufacturer of goods, as
demonstrated in the next quote:
In the big picture, when we have a can of beetroot, we can
sit with our family and say, “hey guys, this is tin plate
from Australia, made by Australian workers”. But we can’t
say that, now that the plant is shut.
[Vincent, project
manager, the mill]
These fears of the plant loosing its economic viability could have served to
provide organisational members with a sense of urgency to achieve a successful change.
Improving operational performance in the mill would have brought along financial
benefits, and such improved performance could have justified continuing its operation.
This angle was communicated to unit members; however, this did not create the sense of
urgency required for them to be engaged in the new strategy, and did not elicit their
support, as demonstrated in the following quote:
We said, “Guys, we’re here for the survival of the business.
We’re here to improve the business, so we can all have a
job”.
But I don’t think they actually believed that the
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business was in trouble.
They just couldn’t see the
picture. The business itself was in denial that they were
in trouble.
They’ve been told they’re in trouble for the
last five, six years. “Guys, you’re not making any money”,
“Yeah, heard that before”.
People were in denial.
[Vincent, project manager, the mill]
This quote shows the attempt to instil a sense of urgency in members of this
plant, and the project managers’ retrospective view indicating this sense of urgency was
not present despite these attempts. A sense of urgency is usually considered a motivator
to undergo the discomfort involved in change, providing the initial thrust of energy to
promote the change. However, the progression of change in this case demonstrates that
despite this lack of urgency, the change gathered momentum by the energy of the
implementation team, and by achieving initial successful results. Therefore, the lack of a
sense of urgency does not fully explain the forces that undermined the sustainability of
Lean strategy in this organisation.

Section E -

Small steps and short-term success

A comprehensive change can be a long process, which requires long-term efforts.
Short-term wins and successes maintain the momentum for such a lengthy process
(Kotter 1996). The implementation team was aware of this, and accordingly, broke the
change up into small manageable steps. Each step was introduced by an awareness
session, described in Section B of this Appendix. Furthermore, the team operated
against common stagnant organisational approach, and implemented ideas immediately,
to gain momentum:
[We] broke it up so that each major production unit was a
separate project.
It started off by having a small team
working with Vincent, who engaged people in the production
unit. Rather than analysing to death any suggestion, we had
people walking out the room and doing stuff straight away.
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That created a [momentum].
mill]

[Fiona, project manager, the

The team made use of small successes: the successful results from each step were
made visible by recording success stories in a field book. The effectiveness of these
successes was further reinforced by the plant manger himself:
Owen made it his business to go and sell it, to ask
questions about it all the time.
He’d go in and say –
“Isn’t it good what so-and-so has done.
Now what are you
doing?” [Ian, team leader, the mill]
Success was demonstrated through visual display of achieved targets, such as
reduction of days of inventory, as well as by demonstrating performance improvements
in some units. The reduction of inventory resulting from Lean strategy made the
facilities tidier and more pleasant to work in. This success created an initial momentum
and support of the change:
We were seeing very positive results in terms of the
reduction of inventory, and the housekeeping was fantastic.
Everybody got a big buzz out of it, even the operators.
That was a wave of “this is good”. [Vincent, project
manager, the mill]
However, these successful results did not elicit conviction among all unit
members, and did not sustain the implementation. Managers’ old convictions were too
strong, and the success of others was not sufficient to elicit their support of Lean
strategy.
We had about six in-line process managers, and there was
varying levels of acceptance.
[For example, one manager]
was very much in support of it, a very strong advocate. We
started there and proved to others that this had been
successful. But it didn’t seem to impact on other people.
They couldn’t make the shift from what they’ve been doing in
the past to the suggested changes. [Vincent, project
manager, the mill]
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This case provides evidence that small steps and short-term successes are
relevant to the successful implementation of a change. However, they may not have a
sufficient impact on the sustainability of this change. This section demonstrated that
while small steps enabled a visible progress in the change, and the celebration of shortterm success created the expected momentum, in the long run they did not create the
necessary change in intuitive decision-making to support Lean practices.

Section F -

Effective rewards and incentives

Organisations reward behaviours and activities in many ways. Financial
incentives are universal, and, as explained in Section 2.6.2.3, require adjustment when
Lean strategy is implemented. Other rewards and incentives, such as promotion
opportunities and recognition organisation-wide, are not as simple to adjust, as they
involve individuals and systems that are beyond management’s control. Financial
rewards, although addressed, did not hold the key to a successful and sustainable change
in this case. Social and promotion-related rewards proved far more sustainable, and their
influence was detrimental to the success and sustainability of Lean strategy.

(a) Financial rewards
In this unit, a fundamental revision of rewards was not possible. As discussed in
Section 5.2.2.7, the rewards in this organisation needed to reflect performance that
depended solely on the evaluated individual, and not the individual’s impact on overall
performance. Therefore, many of the performance measures were unchanged, as the
following quote explains.
That’s the way that the business was set up: the guys
working in the unit were responsible for the unit’s costs.
They didn’t feel like they were responsible for the total
costs in the business [Ian, team Leader, the mill]
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However, the implementation team was able to introduce a performance measure
that reflected Lean principles: Days Of Inventory (DOI). This measure examines how
long inventory remains undelivered. It reflects production lead-time, and is parallel to
the “early” measure in early-tardi scheduling problems (Baker & Scudder 1990). Having
this measure included in individual performance measures raised the awareness of the
costs of work-in-process inventory, as demonstrated in the following quote:
[We made] days of inventory [a part of] everybody’s bonus.
Having it in the measures was important.
It made people
believe that it mattered. But I’m not sure the money itself
mattered. [Cameron, program director, the mill]
This measure did not have a great impact on individual salary. The speaker
addresses that point by saying the money itself may have not mattered. Supporting
evidence for the speaker’s view was found in interviews with contemporary schedulers.
All contemporary schedulers claimed that the bonus component of their salary did not
drive their decisions. For example, the master scheduler in Unit A explains how his
bonus component, determined meeting production targets and reduced inventory levels,
was reduced last year:
Unfortunately somehow they both missed. I still to this day
don't understand how that happened.
All I can do is give
good schedules to the line. You still do the right thing by
your company, even though I should have been [aligning
decisions with my incentives], I am not going to do that.
It doesn’t work like that.
[Fred, master scheduler, Unit
A].
In addition to financial recognition, production quantities (and not reduced
inventory) entail personal, social, and professional rewards. In this setting, a
fundamental cultural change would have been required, to reduce the importance
attributed to producing large quantities. This change was beyond the ability and the
timeframe of this implementation team. However, it is an important mindset that needs
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to be acknowledged when implementing Lean strategy in the steel industry. The next
quotes demonstrate how important large quantities are in this industry.
There’s a thing around here they call “production records”:
who’s made the most tonnes in a shift. It’s a bit thing,
when someone sets a new record.
[Ian, team leader, the
mill]
They [production managers] are tremendously proud of it and
the promotion system respects it.
The guys that get
promoted are the ones that break records. [Cameron, program
director, the mill]
In summary, although rewards and incentives were revised to include Lean
principles, culturally embedded rewards overpowered their effect. These culturally
embedded elements are part of the factors impeding a successful and sustainable
adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry, as discussed in Section 5.2.1.4.

Section G -

Summary

When examining how the implementation was managed, it is evident that it was
managed professionally, by experienced change managers. The implementation team
addressed and was aware of central change management principles. The implementation
team clearly defined their vision, purpose, goals, and strategy, and communicated them
consistently, comprehensively, and extensively. The implementation team involved the
workers and acknowledged their contribution, and when necessary used their input to
adjust the change efforts. The implementation team had ample resources and support.
Finally, the implementation team created and celebrated short-term wins and successes.
However, despite these efforts and awareness, several aspects critical to
successful change management impeded the implementation of Lean strategy in this
case. First, the implementation team was unable to instil a sense of urgency in the unit,
as threats of shutting down the unit had been present for years before. Second, top
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management changed after about 18 months, and the new management was not
committed to or accepting of Lean strategy. Finally, rewards and incentives were
modified to include Lean principles; however, their influence may have been minor in
comparison with the social and cultural rewards in this organisation.
These impeding conditions undoubtedly played a role in the rejection of Lean
strategy in this organisation. However, these impeding conditions do not fully explain
the forces leading to this rejection. First, despite the lack of a sense of urgency, the
implementation was initially successful. Thus, the changes brought about by Lean
strategy were accepted and adopted despite possible complacency. Second, the change
of management occurred relatively late in the implementation. During this time,
improved performance demonstrated the benefits of Lean strategy, yet Lean scheduling
practices were subjected to continuous resistance. Thus, a change of management
merely removed the enforcement of Lean principles. However, this does not explain the
rejection of Lean scheduling principles throughout the implementation. Finally, the
social and cultural rewards in the organisation go hand-in-hand with the factors
uncovered in this thesis that explain this persistent resistance to Lean principles.
These three factors – a lack of sense of urgency, top management turnover, and
traditional regard for large quantities – are common in the steel industry. A full
understanding of their impeding influences on the adoption of Lean strategy could
benefit future efforts of such implementations. This thesis does not reject changemanagement theory, but supplements its principles with concepts that are peculiar to the
adoption of Lean strategy in the steel industry.
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Appendix C. Interview protocols
Section A -

The mill case study – interview questions

(a) Background questions
§
§
§

How long have you been working in [this organisation]?
How long were you working in the mill?
What was your role in the mill?

(b) The introduction of SCV*
§
§
§
§

How was the change introduced?
What was the focus of the change? (reduce inventory, improve quality, improve
response time, improve productivity, other)
Who was trained? (managers, employees)
What was the core message of the training?

(c) The implementation of SCV
§
§

- How did it work? What were the physical changes?
- What was the reaction of managers and of employees?

(d) Acceptance of SCV
§

What aspects of SCV were favourably accepted?

(e) Resistance to SCV
§
§

Resistance: what was the nature of the concerns?
How were the concerns expressed?

(f) Failure of SCV
§
§
§
§

How did it fail? What were the first things that stopped working?
Was the change in mill management unavoidable?
Was the success only dependent on management?
How did performance get worse? What caused the deterioration?

(g) Lessons
§

What kind of implementation would have avoided failure?

*

SCV - Supply Chain Velocity, Lean strategy
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Section B -

Contemporary scheduling – interview questions

(a) Background
Q1:

Ask questions about the person’s background, history and role in their current position.
[What relevant supply chain and scheduling experience have they had? Jobs, education].

Q2:

In a few sentences, please describe the role of your unit in the overall [company] supply
chain. What are the unit’s core products / services? [Understanding decision’s context]
Q2a: Would your answer be any different 12 months ago?
Q2b: Do you expect your answer to change within 12 months? [The influence of recent
supply-chain changes]

Q3:

What is the nature of the decisions you need to make on a routine basis? [Understanding of
the role of the individual in the decision process]

Q4:

To help guide the rest of the interview, please describe your role in the process of
decisions. What is your area of responsibility? [Understand the individual’s role and
responsibility]
Q4a: Would your answer be any different 12 months ago?
Q4b: Do you expect your answer to change within 12 months? [The influence of recent
supply-chain changes]

(b) Nature of decisions made in unit
This section aims to capture the nature of decisions being made, as well as the situation
in which these decisions are typically required.
Q5:

If I was a new person to work in your role [Master Scheduler], and you were my trainer,
how would you describe to me the goals of a schedule? [Getting an understanding of the
main goals of production scheduling decisions]
Q5a: Please describe the typical “baseline” decisions made in your unit. What is the
typical decision you are required to make?

[Getting a picture of the typical

decision]
Q5b: What are the main goals your schedule should achieve? What are the main key
performance indicators (KPI) taken into account? [Getting a picture of the goals and
drivers of production-scheduling decisions]
Q5b1: Would your answer be any different 12 months ago?
Q5b2: Do you expect your answer to change within 12 months? [The influence of recent
supply-chain changes]
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Q6:

What are typical mistakes made in this role, by novices? What is the consequence of these
mistakes? [Understanding negative consequences]

Q7:

Please describe the typical interruption requiring an adjustment of your initial decision.
[Understanding unexpected influencing events]
Q7a: What percentage of these interruptions is unforeseen events, versus overdue
information?

Q8:

What is the level of discretion you have in making these decisions? How much is predictated? [Capturing the role and input of the individual]

(c) Task-related characteristics of decision
This section aims to provide understanding of task related influences: time available,
information, presentation, and availability.
Q9:

Please indicate how much time you typically have to make a routine decision. How much
time is available for consultation with others, information gathering, comparison of
different options and their consequences? [Searching for variance in time available to
different decisions-makers]

Q10: Please indicate the key information typically available to you at the time of scheduling
production. [Perceived information needs for a decision – to be compared with information
required for optimisation of schedule]
Q11 Who do you consult when making a decision? [Search for other sources of information and
influence]
Q11a: How frequently do you communicate with the following parties? (Please fill table
C.1)
Table C.1: Information sources and influences for production scheduling decisions

Function

Frequency

Weighting

Production
Maintenance
Quality
Logistics (Dispatch and
Delivery)
Customer Service (Ordering)
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Q12: Please indicate the format of the various information items (i.e., is the information directly
accessible via information system, does the information need to be calculated, or does it
need to be verbally requested) [Searching for presentation bias and availability bias]
Answers to questions 10-12 are expected to fill Table C.2.
Table C.2: Production-scheduling decisions information descriptions

Information

Source and Format

Availability

(d) Individual-related characteristics of decision
This section aims to provide understanding of individual influences such as incentives,
experience, and decision motivators.
Q13: What objectives guide your decisions?
Q13a: Among the drivers of your decisions, which are related to your performance
indicators (KRAs)? [Understanding the role of individual financial incentives]
Q13b: Which financial incentives apply to your role? What are the financial measures your
role is estimated on (STIs/ BIIs)? [Understanding individual financial incentives]
Q13c: Among the drivers of your decisions, which are related to the performance indicators
of your superior (KRAs)? [Understanding the influence of supervisory drivers]
Q13d: What other motivators drive your decisions? [Gaining a full picture of the drivers]
Answers to questions Q13a-Q13d are expected to conform to Table C.3.
Table C.3: Organisational levels and motivators categories

Organisational
Level

Time
Horizon

Time
Buckets

Decisions Drivers

Number of
Individuals

Sales and
Operations Plan

1 fiscal
year

Months /
Weeks

High-Level Budget Planning

~5

Master
Production
Schedules
(Master
Schedulers)

3 months
rolling

Weeks

Customer Priorities:
•

Profitability of products

•

Delivery history

~5

Maintenance Requirements:
•
Backlog elimination:
•
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Production
Plans (Unit
Schedulers)

1 week

Daily

Delivery performance (DP):
•

Cut-off time for delivery

•

Carrier availability

•

Order size (small orders are
easier to achieve)

10-20

Utilisation:
•

Maximise throughput rates

•

Minimise number of
changeovers

•

Minimise duration of
changeovers

•

Minimise movements –
preference for accessible
feed material/delivery
material

Inventory Levels (DOI):
•

Reduce inventory levels

•
Production
Schedule (Shift
Controllers)

2 days
rolling

Hourly

Utilisation (see above)

~100

Inventory Levels:
•

Availability of space

•

Minimise movements:
accessibility of storage
space

Q14: What part of your decisions is imposed on you? How are they imposed? [Understanding
organisational control mechanisms and their influence on individual goals]
Q15: Which career paths are available to decision-makers in your role? To what extent do you
think they influence how you make your decisions? [Understanding the role of career
aspirations as part of individual goals]
Q16: When you consider possible events, what is the worst possible situation under which a
decision has to be made? [Understanding what is being avoided]
Q17: Please describe a few “bad” scenarios in terms of unexpected events. How often do these
events occur? How seriously are they taken into account when a decision is made?
[Understanding negative consequences to be avoided]
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Q18: Over time you must have developed a method of making these decisions. How would you
describe it? [Individual experience: developed heuristics]
Q18a: How long does it take to develop this understanding? [Individual experience: tenure]
Q18b: What previous roles in this organisation provide useful background to this role?
[Individual experience: different units]

(e) Context-related
This section aims to understand context related factors and their influence on production
decision-making.
Q19: Does anyone review your decisions? To what extent is that kept in mind when decisions
are made? How does that affect the way decisions are made? [The role of a need to justify]
Q20: Who is affected by your decision? How does that impact on your decision? [the role of
social context]

(f) Concluding Questions
Q21: Please describe major relevant decision aspects which have not been covered in
this interview.
Q22: Have you got any questions?
Q23: Do you agree to be contacted again for further clarification and additional
information?
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